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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

FRED I. GREENSTEIN takes the measure of President Bill Clinton's leadership in his first year in office. He argues that rather than having a single leadership style President Clinton alternates between two styles: one in which he attempts to advance a wide variety of aims with little attempt to establish priorities or adapt to political realities, and a second more measured and pragmatic style.

JOHN B. DUNLOP examines Russian elite and mass attitudes toward the break-up of the USSR during the critical period of 1987–1991 and the roles of Gorbachev and Yeltsin in helping to bring about that break-up.

DEBORAH L. RHODE analyzes public policies on adolescent pregnancy against their broader historical, legal, and socioeconomic background. Her central premise is that such policies have been based on incorrect assumptions about the problem and therefore have contained inadequate solutions.

L. SANDY MAISEL looks at the ways in which the two major party platforms were crafted in 1992, noting differences between them in terms of both process and final product. Despite differences, however, both party processes produce candidate platforms, not party platforms, and thus give a good indication of directions of the president's postelection policy initiatives.

DAVID SKIDMORE examines the failure of foreign policy reform during the Carter administration. He argues that Carter's initial strategy of adjustment to relative U.S. decline eventually gave way to more traditional cold war policies under the pressure of domestic political constraints.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Presidential Leadership Style of Bill Clinton: An Early Appraisal

FRED I. GREENSTEIN

My aim in what follows is to delineate the leadership style of President Bill Clinton—that is, the outer pattern of his political behavior—so far as it has been evident in the first year of his presidency. It is outside of my scope to speculate in any extended way about Clinton's interior qualities. Nevertheless, the aphorism "style is the man" serves as a warning that it is not possible to take account of an individual's characteristic mode of action without some reference to its inner wellsprings.

Any analysis of Bill Clinton's White House performance must surely come to grips with the puzzle of how and why such an intrinsically attractive individual with such advanced political skills can have presided over an administration that got off to such a conspicuously uneven start and should stand so low in the esteem of the American people. I will proceed in something of a trait-psychological fashion, enumerating various of the more conspicuous qualities Clinton brings to his presidency, reflecting on how they fit into the larger pattern of his leadership, and comparing his leadership to that of various of his predecessors.

Caveats

First, several caveats. I do not have privileged access to the Clinton presidency. My remarks are based on readily available public sources,

FRED I. GREENSTEIN is a professor of politics at Princeton University and the director of Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School Research Program in Leadership Studies. His books include *How Presidents Test Reality* (with John P. Burke) and *Leadership in the Modern Presidency.*

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principally the reports of Clinton's actions that have appeared in the press since his election, supplemented by observations of Clinton's public performance through the more unabridged mediums of C-Span and an often-instructive Government Printing Office serial publication that records even the most trivial of presidential utterances, the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*. I will make only passing reference to Clinton's extensive gubernatorial experience.[1] Finally, Clinton's presidential leadership has not yet settled into a fixed pattern; he is still in the process of adapting the modus operandi that served him in his home state to the far more demanding political environment of the nation's capital.

As Clinton himself is quick to point out, his initial difficulties can be attributed in part to his unusually ambitious and controversial program and to the disposition of the media to focus more on the mechanics of presidential performance than on the substance of presidential programs. And as Clinton also is wont to note, by the end of his first August in the White House, his administration was far from devoid of achievement. In spite of the false starts, he had appointed a widely approved attorney general and a much respected Supreme Court justice. His controversial, unsuccessful attempt to fulfill his campaign promise to reverse the ban on gays in the military by executive order was accompanied by his less publicized successful exercises of executive authority to reverse the bans on abortions in overseas military hospitals and fetal-tissue research. Most important, his presence in the White House was responsible for or seemed likely to lead to two nonincremental policy changes of the sort that are exceedingly difficult to bring to pass in the United States: a major deficit reduction measure and, in all likelihood, some kind of comprehensive transformation of the nation's health system.[2]

Clinton's Uneven Performance

Still, the Clinton presidency got off to an almost uniquely rocky start, and much of the buck seems to stop in the Oval Office. The scope

[1] For an informative collection of personal reminiscences of Clinton's upbringing and Arkansas political career, see Ernest Dumas, ed., *The Clintons of Arkansas: An Introduction by Those Who Knew Them Best* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1993).

[2] Clinton issued his executive orders on abortion and fetal-tissue research and took a number of other similar actions, such as the removal of the so-called gag rule forbidding anyone other than doctors to discuss abortions at federally funded family planning clinics on 22 January 1993. *Facts on File*, 28 January 1993, 47–48. For a characteristically articulate defense by Clinton of his achievements and his predilection to seek numerous policy ends simultaneously, see his remarks in a 20

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of Clinton's policy aspirations is itself a reflection of his distinctive approach to leadership. And any attempt to claim that Clinton's difficulties have been mainly a result of the way the press chose to cover his administration must come to grips with the almost willful ineptness of Clinton and his associates in their relations with the press. None of the previous ten modern presidents from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George Bush commenced his presidency to the accompaniment of a comparable succession of avoidable gaffes, including the president who was Clinton's early inspiration, John F. Kennedy. While Kennedy's first 100 Days did include the abortive invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy put that fiasco behind him with considerable aplomb and without loss of public support.

Clinton's approval level at the traditional 100-day marker was lower than that of eight of his nine immediate predecessors, and his unpopularity added to his difficulty in advancing his initiatives. The 55 percent approval of Clinton's performance at that early point in his presidency contrasted unfavorably with the approval percentages at the same point in their presidencies of Presidents Harry Truman (87), Dwight Eisenhower (74), John Kennedy (83), Lyndon Johnson (75), Richard Nixon (61), Jimmy Carter (61), Ronald Reagan (67), and George Bush (58). (The approval level of President Ford, whose ratings had gone into free-fall after his pardon of Richard Nixon, after three months in office, was 48 percent.) Moreover, by the time of a 5–6 June survey, Clinton's approval had reached a nadir of 37 percent, slowly rising thereafter. It is common to attribute Clinton's low approval ratings to the narrowness of his electoral victory. But it should be noted that even though Clinton received only 43 percent of the popular vote in the 1992 general election, he received a very favorable press during the transition, at which time news stories focused on such matters as his masterful performance in the two day economic summit he convened in Little Rock, not on the succession of controversies over ill-advised actions that was to begin as soon as he took office. During the transition, his poll ratings were substantially more favorable than they came to be after he entered the White House.[3]

July 1993 interview with members of the Wisconsin press, which are reproduced in the Appendix. "Remarks in an Interview with Members of the Wisconsin Press," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 29 (26 July 1993): 1390–91.

[3] An ABC-*Washington Post* poll of 11–14 December 1992, for example, found that 72 percent of the public approved of his handling of the transition; another ABC-*Washington Post* poll found in 14–17 January 1993 that 68 percent of the public had a favorable impression of Clinton. Other polls in that period were comparably favorable. On comparative presidential performance, see "Public

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To say that Clinton's performance has been uneven, however, is to say that it has not been uniformly maladroit.[4] The problem Clinton poses for president watchers is that of identifying the combination of strengths and weaknesses that accounts for his up-and-down performance. In my own efforts to do so, I have been particularly struck by the diversity of the qualities Clinton brings to his leadership, the extent to which they seem at times to be warring with one another, and the novelty of their combination in a single individual. I am equally struck by the tendency of those qualities to come together in different ways at different times in an alternation between a no-holds-barred style of striving for numerous policy outcomes with little attention to establishing priorities or accommodating to political realities and a more measured, pragmatic style of focusing on a limited number of goals and attending closely to the politics of selling his program. This is so much the case that one might better speak of Clinton's leadership styles rather than his leadership style.

Clinton's Leadership Qualities

The following somewhat untidy enumeration of qualities Clinton brings to his leadership begins to tell the story of how the components of his style fit together and come into play under varying circumstances.

High on any such listing is Clinton's passionate interest in public policy, particularly domestic policy. (He exhibited little interest in foreign policy in his initial months in office and even after his aides began to describe his foreign policy as one of "enlarging" the global range of democracy his actions in the international arena were cautious and largely ad hoc.) Clinton is preoccupied with policy not just in the broad sense of having general policy aims, but also in the narrower

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Opinion at Presidential Beginnings," *The Public Perspective* 4 (May/June 1993): 8–18. The statistics on Clinton's popularity during the transition were made available to me by the Roper Center. The most recent statistics were provided by the Gallup organization.

[4] One of the high points in Clinton's uneven performance in his first months in office was his widely acclaimed, largely extemporaneous presentation of his economic program to a joint session of Congress on 17 February 1993. Polls conducted immediately after that speech showed widespread public support for his program, support in no way evident months later when his presidency had been through so many widely publicized travails. See the account of Clinton's 17 February presentation in *Facts on File*, 18 February 1993, 93. For systematic evidence about the connection between the way the press covers presidents and their public support, see Richard A. Brody, *Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion and Public Support* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).

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sense of being fascinated by the specific details of particular policies. Beginning in the Truman years, when the practice of the presentation by presidents of an annual legislative program came into being, all presidents have promulgated policies as part of their official responsibilities.[5] But only a few presidents appear to have had much intrinsic interest in the detailed rationales for alternative policies. Eisenhower brought to his presidency a deep concern with the logic of national security that went back to his early career as a military planner and staff officer. Kennedy developed a curiosity about the logic of policies while he was in office, largely as a consequence of his interactions with his more specialized advisers. And Carter was notable for his preoccupation with the details of his own policies. But Clinton is a devotee of policy *qua* policy and not just the policies of his own administration, so much so that his rhetoric on the stump sometimes has more of the ring of the public policy school than of the political arena.

Clinton also stands out in the extent to which he is a political animal, although his preoccupation with politics is less distinctive than his passion for policy in a universe that includes Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon. He is political both in the public sense of battening on the responses of the mass public and in the private sense of reveling in the arts of persuasion and cajolery. There is no obvious precedent in the modern presidency for a chief executive who combines a concern for and interest in politics and policy to the extent that Clinton does.

The link between Clinton's policy and political orientations is his intelligence and verbal facility. The record abounds with evidence of his seemingly effortless ability to elaborate at length about his policies with modifications of emphasis from audience to audience. The perfectly grammatical 100-odd-word sentences Clinton is able to spin out extemporaneously could not be more unlike the fractured prose of George Bush. What is less clear, however, is whether his exceptional verbal intelligence is accompanied by a comparable analytic intelligence and capacity to make sound judgments.[6]

[5] Richard E. Neustadt, "The Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," *American Political Science Review* 48 (September 1954): 641–71.

[6] The following is a vintage Clinton utterance: "The people who say that if I want to go to a four-year phased-in competition model [in connection with health care reform] and that won't save any tax money on the deficit in the first four years, but will save huge tax money on the deficit in the next four years, miss the main point, which is that if we have a system now which begins to move health care costs down toward inflation, and therefore lowers health care as a percentage of the GNP in the years ahead, the main beneficiaries by a factor of almost two to one will be in the private sector." "Excerpts from the Interview with President-Elect Clinton," *Wall Street Journal*,

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Other elements of the Clinton amalgam are an almost preternatural energy, exuberance, and optimism. Even when he was deeply beleaguered at the time of the New Hampshire primary, Clinton exhibited an optimism reminiscent of FDR's capacity to radiate confidence under conditions of extreme adversity. But unlike Roosevelt, he has no war or depression as a foil for these qualities, and unlike Roosevelt he is not a natural dramatist. More fundamentally, he appears to lack a comprehensive strategic sense about how to present himself to the public and advance his policies.[7]

Related to Clinton's energy, enthusiasm, intelligence, and devotion to policy is a cluster of more problematic traits—absence of self-discipline; hubristic confidence in his own views and abilities; and difficulty in narrowing his goals, ordering his efforts, and devising strategies for advancing and communicating the ends he seeks to achieve.

Another of Clinton's traits is a predilection to take on large numbers of personal responsibilities, so much so that it is difficult for his administration to move on more than one track at a time. Here the obvious comparison is with Jimmy Carter. One concomitant of his failure to delegate has been his administration's tardiness in naming appointees. Clinton's prodigious talents are very much in need of management lest he fly off in all directions, but he is not easily managed. He appears not to have given much thought to problems of creating an effective staff.[8] Given his energy and intelligence, he probably did not need to be very attentive to staffing in Little Rock, but he plainly does in

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18 December 1992. For an instructive analysis of the multidimensionality of intelligence, see Howard Gardner, *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

[7] Interestingly, Roosevelt's capacity to radiate a sense of good cheer was not always to his advantage during the period of his candidacy. His critics dismissed him as lacking in presidential stature, partly because of what Edmund Wilson once described as his "unnatural sunniness." Such skepticism was forgotten in the wake of Roosevelt's magisterial display of leadership upon assuming power in March 1933. Clinton's assumption of power, of course, was anything but magisterial. On Roosevelt's pre-presidential image, see Patrick J. Maney, *The Roosevelt Presidency: A Biography of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Twain Publishers, 1992), 39.

[8] On the Clinton administration delays in making appointments and Clinton's tendency to overload the Oval Office, see Daniel Pearl, "Clinton's Slow Pace in Making Appointments Affects Policy at Some Departments and Agencies," *Wall Street Journal*, 20 August 1993. For a discussion of the antithetical approach to delegation of an earlier president, Dwight Eisenhower, see Fred I. Greenstein, "'Centralization Is the Refuge of Fear': A Policy-maker's Use of a Proverb of Administration" in Robert T. Golembiewski and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., *The Costs of Federalism: Essays in Honor of James W. Fesler* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), 117–39. On presidential staff systems in general see John P. Burke, *The Institutional Presidency* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

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Washington. He is said to be a student of the presidency and of American history, but he shows little awareness of the uses some presidents have made of well designed formal organization. Indeed, he entered the White House with no plan for White House organization, whether at the informal or the formal level, and initially peopled his staff with aides who had little Washington experience and who lacked the stature to help him to control his own centrifugal tendencies. This, of course, was the early story of his White House. Then he turned (with seemingly good results) to such Washington insiders as veteran Republican White-House aide David Gergen for staff assistance.[9]

As articulate as Clinton is, his record of communicating his aims to the public has been poor. Paradoxically, his fluency serves him poorly. He finds it all too easy to deluge the public with details, and it appears to be difficult for him to transcend policy mechanics and convey the broad principles and values behind his programs. Here, of course, he is the antithesis of Ronald Reagan, who was notoriously innocent of policy specifics but gifted at evoking larger themes.

At the personal level, Clinton appears to be one of the more ingratiating incumbents of the Oval Office.[10] Like another presidential charmer, Franklin Roosevelt, his amiability sometimes leaves those who consult with him the false impression that he has accepted their views, when he intends only to acknowledge that he has heard them. Clinton's impulse to be agreeable feeds the familiar charge that he seeks to be all things to all people and reinforces the "Slick Willie" epithet that is turned against him by his enemies. Yet he has made surprisingly limited use of his charm and persuasive powers, perhaps because like many bright, self-confident people, he is impatient with those who do not share his views and not likely to take them seriously. Thus, he naively overestimated his ability to win support by appealing directly to the public through cable television, failing to cultivate the

[9] Jack Watson, "The Clinton White House," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23 (Summer 1993): 429–36. On Clinton's failure to plan for staffing the White House, see Jack Nelson and Robert J. Donovan, "The Education of a President: After Six Months of Quiet Success and Loud Failure, Bill Clinton Talks About the Frustrating Process of Figuring Out His Job," *Los Angeles Times Magazine*, 1 August 1993. On the Gergen appointment and its effects, see Michael K. Frisby, "Communication Guru Gergen Works His Alchemy on Clinton to Improve Chemistry with the Press," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 August 1993.

[10] This in spite of a quick temper and a tendency to be irritable, which are usually evident only to his associates, but which sometimes emerge in public, as occurred when he abruptly terminated a meeting with the press that followed his announcement of the nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court after receiving what he deemed to be a hostile question. (Characteristically, he then convened another meeting with the press and made amends.)

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press, and doing little during the transition to win over such key Washington actors as Senators Sam Nunn and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. And once in office, he was slow to do much to enlist the support of Republican moderates and Democratic conservatives.

I have left for last what seems to me to be Clinton's most redeeming traits, ones that bode favorably for his leadership in the long if not the short run: his remarkable capacity to rebound in the face of adversity, his fundamental pragmatism, and his capacity (in spite of being rather thin-skinned) to admit his own failings. This cluster of traits helps account for the commonly made observation that he is incapable of sustained error.

The Clinton Syntheses

The Clinton leadership style is less distinctive for its components than for the way they fit together. As I have suggested, there appear to be two Clinton syntheses. Under some circumstances, his traits combine to form an undisciplined, have-it-all approach; and under others they converge in a more focused, accommodating style. When he is in the first mode, as he was in his initial term as governor of Arkansas, as well as in his first months in the White House, Clinton is animated by his policy enthusiasm, his boundless energy, and his impatience with the views of those who do not share his policy vision. Even when he is in the first mode, however, he is no Woodrow Wilson, capable of bringing his own program to defeat by insisting that the Congress take its medicine. But when he pulls back after overreaching himself, his compromises are likely to have a disheveled, rear-guard quality, as was the case of his prolonged negotiations over gays in the military.

Clinton's second, more pragmatic and focused mode of operation appears to come into play only after outside forces have humbled him. Like the proverbial mule that needs to be persuaded by a two-by-four, he resists self-discipline. In Arkansas it took electoral defeat to induce him to trim his sails. Rejected by the voters after his first term, he spent the next two years mending fences and devising more modulated policies. He then won election to the governorship a second time and went on to pursue his policies in a more restrained manner, serving for an additional decade. In Washington the transformation of Clinton's approach to leadership came much more quickly, coinciding roughly with the crescendo of criticism of his leadership occasioned by the arbitrary ritual on the part of the press of assessing a new president's first 100 days.

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Why does such an intelligent, politically aware leader, who knows in his heart that he should "focus like a laser," begin his presidency in a fashion more reminiscent of a cluster bomb? And why is he dependent on external correction? My task of examining Clinton's style does not require that I reach a settled conclusion about this and other questions that bear on his inner workings, including questions bearing on the continuing uncertainty over who the "real" Bill Clinton is. Some answers are likely to be found in his upbringing. Clinton and his aides have themselves drawn attention to his alcoholic stepfather, suggesting that his almost unsettling good cheer reflects the exaggerated need to be agreeable of children (and stepchildren) of alcoholics.[11] This has an obvious bearing on Clinton's tendency to leave people with the misleading impression that he accepts their views. But his lack of self-discipline would appear to have other roots. At a minimum, Clinton, whose outward characteristics seem almost to have been custom-made to illustrate James David Barber's active-positive character type, shows the difficulty of categorization, in that much of what is puzzling about him stems from inner complexities that do not figure in Barber's or perhaps any other classification.[12]

More to the point may be the political psychology of Richard Neustadt in which the accent is on "political" rather than "psychology." Neustadt's 1960 book nicely anticipates many of Clinton's problems. Neustadt, it will be remembered, argued that a president's ability to get results is impeded by the fact that even though the nation's problems are huge, there is little readiness on the part of the other members of the Washington community to transcend political advantage and support the policies he proposes to address those problems. The president has two basic resources with which to accomplish his purposes, above and beyond his executive powers and his ability to use them as bargaining chips, according to Neustadt: his reputation with other policy makers as a skilled, determined player and their perception that he has the support of the public.[13]

[11] For technical and nontechnical sources to the literature on the effect of alcoholism on the children of alcoholics, see Edward Kaufman and E. Mansell Pattison, "The Family and Alcoholism" in E. Mansell Pattison and Edward Kaufman, eds., *Encyclopedic Handbook of Alcoholism* (New York: Gardner Press, 1982), 663–672; and Sharon Wegscheider Cruse, *Another Chance: Hope and Health for the Alcoholic Family* (Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books, 1989).

[12] James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 4th ed., 1992). For a convenient account of Clinton's career and family background, see Gwen Ifill, "Man in the News: William Jefferson Clinton," *New York Times*, 16 July 1992.

[13] Richard E. Neustadt's 1960 account remains basically unaltered in the current edition of his classic, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt*

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Clinton managed to diminish both resources in his first months in office. His political and policy propensities often converged in a manner that led him to be perceived by other members of the political community as inconstant and disingenuous, not only because he departed from previously held positions, but also because his departures often seemed effortless.[14] It would not matter much to members of the Washington community that a president seemed insincere (what else is new?), if he were seen as having the public behind him. But Clinton was conspicuous for his failure to capture the imagination and enthusiasm of the American people.

Before he modified his style, Clinton, who had proclaimed that he would be Reaganesque in his preoccupation with results, was less like Reagan than like the previous southern governor-turned-president, Jimmy Carter, in that he acted as if once elected he could put politics behind him. In fact, the man from Hope made even less effort than the man from Plains to establish a favorable public persona. Once in office, his tendency was to confine himself to impersonal and distinctly noninspirational messages on such themes as the need to "grow the economy." He and his associates did little to humanize his presidency: Hilary Clinton became the all-business Hilary Rodham Clinton; daughter Chelsea dropped from sight; and the campaign bus was garaged. The outward face of the Clinton presidency became that of George Stephanopoulos engaged in damage control. There was a whir of policy proposals but little indication of the values they were intended to advance and little seeming effort to project to the public the sense that behind the proposals there was a compelling leader around whom it might rally.[15]

The presidential style of William Jefferson Clinton remained very much a work in progress in the latter part of his first year in office. While he had appeared decisively to have shifted modes and adopted

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to Reagan (New York: The Free Press, 1990). For an elaboration of Neustadt's analysis, which anticipates many of Clinton's early difficulties, see Peter Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload: An Essay on *Presidential Power*" in Aaron Wildavsky, ed., *Perspectives on the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 406–430.

[14] A case in point is Clinton's easy abandonment of the British-Thermal-Unit tax in the negotiations over his deficit-reduction package, which damaged his political stock with supporters of his original measure in the House of Representatives.

[15] For discussions of what citizens appear to expect of their presidents and of the president as interpreter of public aspirations, see Fred I. Greenstein, "What the Presidency Means to Americans: Presidential 'Choice' Between Elections" in James David Barber, ed., *Choosing the President* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977); and Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1991).

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a more measured and accommodating approach to achieving his means by his first summer in office, he returned from a much needed, much publicized vacation at the end of August with a legislative agenda that was a seeming prescription for systemic meltdown—a proposal for transforming the national health system which in and of itself exceeded the normal policy-making capacity of the American political system; the intensely controversial North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA), which faced major opposition within his party; and, as if two such demanding measures were not enough, a proposal for cutting governmental bureaucracy and red tape under the appellation of "reinventing government."

Yet Clinton had no sooner undergone what looked to be a major stylistic relapse, than he and his associates took a series of politically astute steps that were breathtaking in their contrast with the multiple comedies of errors of the first half of the year. Clinton launched his postvacation policy season with a media-wise announcement of his bureaucratic reform proposal, very much in the Ronald Reagan-Michael Deaver line-a-day tradition of providing the television networks with irresistible footage for the evening news programs. In announcing the proposal, the White House staged an appearance of Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore on the White House lawn with a forklift laden with government regulations.

He put forth his health care proposal in a manner that suggested not that he had drawn a partisan battle line, but that he was prepared to negotiate and engage in a complex process of coalition building around an issue that had the dual potential of bringing his presidency to grief or enabling him to campaign for a second term as a president who had broken gridlock and brought about an achievement of startling proportions. He and Mrs. Clinton defended his health plan with an energy and eloquence that brought approving responses in the press and the polls. And after first signaling that NAFTA might have to be delayed, he enlisted all five living ex-presidents in support of the treaty and delegated the politics of advancing it to a bipartisan team of political skilled aides, concentrating the bulk of his efforts on his health program.[16]

The jury remains out on Bill Clinton's presidential leadership, not only on whether it will return to its first mode or continue in its second,

[16] Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Puts Trade Pact on the Back Burner," *New York Times*, 9 September 1993; Herbert Rowen, "Clinton's NAFTA Gospel," *Washington Post National Weekly Edition*, 27 September 1993.

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but also on how effective it can be in advancing Clinton's ambitious aims. Whatever the outcome, Bill Clinton has already provided evidence that the importance of the personal qualities of the American chief executive remains undiminished in the post-cold war era.*

APPENDIX
PRESIDENT CLINTON ON PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

Q. Mr. President, rightly or wrongly, public opinion polls have suggested that a number of people see you as not being a strong leader. They also see your position on gays in the military as being a bit of a compromise. Would you expect to continue to compromise on important issues in the future, or do you see yourself as becoming a stronger leader on those key issues?

The President. Let me tell you, I regret those opinion polls. I think they have something to do, frankly, with the way you folks discuss those issues. Now, let me just run through this. I am the first President in a decade who has had his budget considered seriously by Congress. After Ronald Reagan's first budget, every budget that he and George Bush presented was laughed off as a political document. Seventy-five percent of the Republicans in the House of Representatives . . . voted against the last Bush budget. This one is being taken seriously. I am the first President in a decade that was complimented, not criticized, in the recent meeting of the world's great industrial countries, because we're doing something serious about our economy. I immediately organized the G-7 nations to support Boris Yeltsin when he was in [sic] the ropes last spring. That's not a sign of weakness. And we had a major role in the preservation of democracy in Russia. We passed the family leave bill, the motor voter bill through Congress quickly. We have three major pieces of political reform moving through Congress, already passed one House: campaign finance reform, lobby reform, and the line-item veto. I don't think that is a sign of weakness.

When you live in a democratic society and you're elected President, you are not a dictator. The resolution we had on the gays in the military, which was worked out by Les Aspin from Wisconsin, was a slight compromise from my position in this way: If it were up to me alone, I would say that a person could acknowledge being gay openly, clearly, but say that he or she was completely conforming to the Military Code of Conduct and be able to serve. In this policy, if a person does that, that raises the presumption that the person intends to do something that the Code of Conduct forbids. But then the service man or woman is given the opportunity to demonstrate that he or she will abide by the code. That's the rule. The second thing this policy does, which goes well beyond any-

* This article is dedicated to the memory of Aaron Wildavsky. My work on it was supported by grants from the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and the John J. Sherrerd and Oliver Langenberg Funds of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.

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thing I discussed in the campaign, is to provide very explicit . . . protections for privacy and associational rights by service members without regard to their sexual orientation. . . .

I am the first President who ever took on this issue. Is that a sign of weakness? It may be a sign of madness, sir, but it is not a sign of weakness. And I think that we need to get our heads on straight about what is strong and what is weak. When a President takes on tough issues, takes tough stands, tries to get things done in a democracy, you may not get 100 percent. Was I wrong to take 85? What would have happened if I had just put my campaign pledge into play? You know and Les Aspin will tell you, the United States Congress would have reversed it. So I would have the great fortune of being able to say I'm "Simon Pure," and the people in the military who are serving well and honorably who happen to be homosexual would not be one step further ahead than they were when I got elected. They're much better off today because we took on an honorable compromise.

That's what democracy is about. Read the United States Constitution. It's about honorable compromise. And that is not weakness if you are making progress.

Source: "Remarks in an Interview with Members of the Wisconsin Press," 20 July 1993, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 29 (26 July 1993), 1390–91.

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Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire, 1987–1991

JOHN B. DUNLOP

Since 1987, when Mikhail Gorbachev's programs of glasnost and democratization began to set off chain reactions of convulsive political change, ethnic Russians have been a people in quest of an identity. During the seventy years of communist rule, most Russians had come to accept the regime's attempt to identify their interests as a people with those of the USSR as a whole. This identification had been reinforced structurally: unlike the other fourteen union republics, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (or RSFSR for short) had deliberately not been given many of the institutions enjoyed by the other republics; there was, for example, no Russian KGB, no Russian MVD, no Russian Academy of Sciences, and no television channels or radio stations geared specifically at the interests of ethnic Russians. Strikingly, there was not even a Russian Communist party, while all the other republics possessed their own party organizations.

The obvious aim behind this denial of structural parity to the Russian Republic was to bind Russians, the linchpin ethnos of the Soviet Union, as closely as possible to the USSR as a whole. There is evidence that the regime was to a considerable degree successful in achieving this goal. Nationalities specialist Yurii Arutyunyan has noted that, "[the]

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concepts of 'Union' and 'Russia' in the minds of Russians is one and the same. . . ."[1]

This conjoining of the concepts "Russian" and "Soviet" was further emphasized by the fact that some twenty-five million Russians lived in the minority republics. This migration of Russians to the periphery had served to dilute the political and economic clout of the titular peoples of the other republics. In the Russian Republic, on the other hand, Russians lived compactly, comprising 81.5 percent of the population, thereby making Russia the third most ethnically homogeneous republic in the union after Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the words of two Estonian scholars, this vast movement of Russians to the periphery "was a demographic policy specifically directed from the center, whose purpose was the formation of a nationally mixed population in every region of the Soviet Union."[2] In Estonia, they report, the number of Russians increased from 23,000 in 1945 to 475,000 in 1989. The aim behind the regime's encouragement of such migration was to create a supra-ethnic "Soviet people" who would speak Russian but be ethnically and culturally mongrelized.

An Empire that Is Not an Empire

Western commentators have frequently applied the term Russian empire both to pre-revolutionary Tsarist rule and to the post-revolutionary Soviet state. This imprecise use of terminology serves to skew and to distort the position of Russians under both the tsars and the Soviets. The nationalities specialist, the late Hugh Seton-Watson, was wont to underline his conviction that the Tsarist empire should not be regarded as an ethnic Russian empire. "The government of the Russian Empire," he stressed, "was based on the principle of autocracy. All Russian subjects owed allegiance to the Tsar, who was responsible only to God. Provided that they loyally obeyed him, they enjoyed his protection regardless of whether they were Russian by speech or religion."[3] It was only toward the end of the nineteenth century, Seton-Watson notes, during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II,

[1] Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "The Russians Outside Russia" (unpublished paper presented at an international colloquium sponsored by the Feltrinelli Foundation of Milan on "Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts, and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union," Cortona, Italy, 16–18 May 1991).

[2] Aksel Kirch and Marika Kirch, "Russians as a Minority in Contemporary Estonia" (unpublished paper presented at Cortona conference).

[3] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The New Imperialism* (Chester Springs, PA: Dufour Editions, 1961), 23.

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that the Tsarist government began to adopt a conscious policy of Russification. "The previous policies," he writes, "had been made in the name of a monarch responsible to God. Russification was a policy made in the name of the Russian nation. It assumed that Russians were superior to the other subjects of the tsar. . . ."[4]

If the Tsarist empire cannot, except for its closing years, be termed a Russian empire, much less can the Soviet empire be so considered. As Carl Linden points out, "the [Soviet] party-state in its strict conception acts not in the name of those it rules but as a proxy of the future 'communized' humanity freed of political rule and no longer separated into nation-states. By its ideology the Soviet party-state is the revolutionary replacement of the Russian nation-state, not its continuation."[5] However, in practice, as Linden notes, considerations of *Realpolitik* often required the Soviet regime to tap the energies of Russian patriotism as a "secret additive" to its power. This was especially true during Leonid Brezhnev's long reign, which witnessed a marked decline in the mobilizing power of the official ideology. During the Brezhnev years, an ideologically illicit "Russian imperial nationalism" was covertly used to prop up a decaying Marxism-Leninism.

If the Soviet Union cannot legitimately be termed a "Russian empire," neither can Russians be called an "imperial people." As Alain Besançon commented in 1983, the position of Russians in the USSR differed in important ways from, say, the position of the English or the French in the British and French empires. "To have an empire," Besançon explained, "one must have a privileged people, an essentially military means of conquest, and limited goals. The Russian people have no privileges. It has 'advantages' certainly, as the surest ally of communism, and party leaders are often drawn from its ranks, even in the national republics." However, Besançon went on, "These advantages [of the Russians] are not rights. Moreover, they are compensated for by heavier obligations, exemption from which is considered by the Russians to be a privilege of the non-Russian nationalities. A Russian who enjoys privileges as a Communist owes his privileges to his communism, not to his Russianness."[6]

[4] Ibid., 30–31.

[5] Carl A. Linden, *The Soviet Party-State: The Politics of Ideocratic Despotism* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 95.

[6] Alain Besançon, "Nationalism and Bolshevism in the USSR" in Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 10–11.

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With the exception of the Central Asian Muslims, Russians in the Soviet Union did not live noticeably better than did the titular peoples of the minority republics. Debilitating poverty, wretched roads, and environmental degradation were the norm in the Russian Republic as they were throughout the USSR. The Russian national religion, Orthodox Christianity, was as zealously repressed as say, Judaism and Islam. Russian patriotic thought was carefully monitored and, where deemed necessary, suppressed by a watchful censorship. Some Russian nationalist spokesmen, such as Vladimir Osipov, editor of the well-known *samizdat* journal *Veche*, found themselves undergoing long prison sentences for preaching "the Russian idea."

However, while they lived badly and were not an "imperial people" in the western sense of that term, ethnic Russians were encouraged by the regime to take pride in the fact that they belonged to a "great power." As Milovan Djilas observed in 1988: "It's true that the ordinary Russian bears the main burden of empire, without sharing its blessings. But the fact is: almost every Russian, lowly or elevated, embraces with enthusiasm the idea of Russian aggrandizement and takes for granted that he has to make sacrifices for it."[7] In a perverse sense, therefore, if Djilas is correct, imperial pride took the place of economic well-being for many ethnic Russians.

Russians Witness a Fragmentation of Empire

During the years 1990 and 1991, we seemed to be witnessing an almost textbook case of the collapse of an empire. The multinational Tsarist Empire—only 45 percent of whose populace were ethnic Russians—had, as is well known, been on the verge of breakup in 1914. Through a combination of coercion, cunning, flexibility, and considerable luck, the Bolsheviks had been able to render this dying empire, albeit with somewhat altered borders, viable for another seventy years, and indeed to expand its direct influence into Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, with its indirect influence spreading throughout the world. In hindsight, we can see that this vast empire began to suffer from degeneracy and "imperial indigestion" during the Brezhnev period. The "bleeding wound" of Afghanistan served gradually to sap the fading imperial will of the Russian people at the same time as the emergence of the

[7] "Djilas on Gorbachev," *Encounter*, October 1988, 7.

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Solidarity movement in Poland represented a mortal threat to continued Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

At home, in the USSR, a complementary process was at work. As the Soviet specialist in interrepublican migration, Viktor Perevedentsev, has noted, a sudden break (*perelom*) in migration patterns became observable in the mid-1970s.[8] Up until then, there had been a marked net outflow of Russians to the other republics; around 1975, this pattern reversed, and a net inflow into the RSFSR became noticeable. To cite Perevedentsev's figures, during the years 1966–1970, the Russian Republic experienced a net outmigration of 598,000 persons; during the period 1971–1975, the figure was 195,000. In the years 1976–1980, by contrast, Russia experienced a net inmigration of 725,000; during the period 1979–1988, the net inflow was 1,767,000. Central Asia, on the other hand, which until the mid-1970s had been a recipient of large inmigration, began to witness a population outflow. Thus during the years 1976–1980, Central Asia (excluding Kazakhstan) experienced a net outmigration of 245,000; for the years 1979–1988, the figure was 850,000. The comparable figures for Kazakhstan were 414,000 and 784,000. From being a "donor" republic, the RSFSR had become the largest "recipient" republic in the Soviet Union.

The gradual loss of Russian "imperial will" during the draining war with Afghanistan was therefore accompanied by a dramatic end to ethnic Russian penetration into the periphery. Yurii Arutyunyan of the Institute of Ethnography in Moscow believed that this dramatic outmigration from the periphery was due, in significant part, to the fact that the "socio-professional" status of Russians in the minority republics was steadily declining. "In Tbilisi," he reported,

> the Russians presently find themselves with lower socio-professional status than the indigenous population. For a long time, they have essentially not competed with the Georgians, who perform more qualified and prestigious work. In Tallinn, the coefficient of occupational prestige for Russians and the indigenous groups are equal, because of the high competitive abilities of the Russians and Estonians. In Kishinev, radical changes have been observed: in the 1970's, the Moldavians had lower occupational prestige than the Russians, but this difference evened out by the 1980's. . . . In Tashkent, the Uzbeks in the 1970's were far behind the Russians in prestigious occupations; towards the 1980's the difference was evened out. . . .[9]

[8] Viktor Perevedentsev, "Mezhrespublikanskie migratsii naseleniya SSSR" (unpublished paper presented at Cortona conference).

[9] Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "The Russians Outside Russia." Here and subsequently, I have tampered with the English versions of the papers presented by Soviet participants in the Cortona conference. The aim has been to make the English more grammatical and readable.

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Losing their competitive advantage vis-à-vis the titular peoples of the periphery was a factor powerful in inducing Russians to contemplate returning to their home republic.

The tumultuous events of 1987–1991 came as a profound shock for ethnic Russians living in the periphery, whose numbers were already being depleted by significant outmigration. Suddenly, many of them found themselves deemed "foreigners" in what they had considered their own land. The following letter from Dushanbe, where some 190,000 Russians lived, captures the sense of panic and indignation which came over many Russians living in the periphery during the late 1980s.

> Dear comrades, mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters!
>
> The Russian-language populace of the capital of Tadjikistan, the city of Dushanbe, appeals to you!
>
> Agitated by the outrages of fanatical crowds, by the bloodletting, by the blind hatred, and by the pillaging, we appeal to you for help! The lives of children, women, and old men are under threat! The compromising tactics of the [Soviet] government and its fear to take decisive action to halt the disorders assist the raging of anarchy and of religious [i.e., Muslim] fanaticism.[10]

Or there is this letter describing the fate of ethnic Russians living in the republic of Azerbaijan:

> And now Russians have become refugees in their own country [note the implied assumption that Azerbaijan is Russian]. When has this ever happened?! Perhaps only during the time of the Great Fatherland War. . . . Our gratitude to the military! They evacuated the civilian population from Baku, both Russians and mixed families.[11]

The unexpected headlong collapse of the Soviet Empire, and, with it, of the historic Tsarist Empire during the period 1987–1991 came as an agonizing surprise to Russians living in the periphery as well as to those in the RSFSR. The fast-moving breakup of the empire placed Russians before a stark choice which historian Roman Szporluk has aptly described as one between "empire saving" and "[Russian] nation-building."[12] It was a choice which most Russians, including Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, had never expected to have to make.

[10] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 28 September 1990.

[11] *Sobesednik*, no. 6, 1990.

[12] See Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1989, 16–23.

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Gorbachev and the Russian Republic

Perhaps no Russian has ever been more taken by surprise by the lightning collapse of the "inner" Soviet empire than the Soviet president and Communist party general secretary. From the time of his accession in 1985, Gorbachev had repeatedly shown himself to be blind and insensitive to ethnic issues. An ardent "Soviet patriot," Gorbachev fought hard to preserve the "Russian"/"Soviet Union" identification in the minds of Russians which had served as vital cement for the unitary Soviet state during the pre-perestroika period.

Once glasnost and democratization had begun to loosen things up, Gorbachev found himself in an unexpected squeeze between two groups which thoroughly detested one another but for whom, for different reasons, the political and economic autarchy of the Russian republic was a high-priority desideratum. The first group was a conservative alliance of neo-Stalinists, National Bolsheviks, and conservative Russian nationalists who, in a sense, wanted to resurrect policies which had obtained during the reigns of Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas II. The decaying official ideology of Marxism-Leninism was to be boosted by potent doses of Russian imperial nationalism. As for the Russian republic, members of the conservative coalition insisted that it be granted the same institutions—and especially a Russian Communist party—as were enjoyed by the minority republics.

Another group, who were sworn opponents of the conservatives, also emerged to champion the cause of Russian autarchy. This was a coalition of so-called democrats, whose standard bearer was, of course, Boris Yeltsin, and who advocated turning the RSFSR into an economically and politically sovereign republic, with the USSR becoming a confederation of fully self-governing republics. (The conservative coalition, by contrast, believed that Russia should suppress the separatist leanings of the periphery, by force if necessary.) Throughout his period of rule, Gorbachev attempted to counter the agendas of these two powerful coalitions. Contrary to the wishes of the conservatives, he struggled to maintain the traditional structural asymmetries, whereby the RSFSR was denied institutions—such as its own Academy of Sciences—enjoyed by the other republics. Like Brezhnev before him, Gorbachev wanted to preserve the Russian/USSR linkup in the minds of ethnic Russians. Contrary to the goal of the increasingly powerful democrats, he struggled to maintain the USSR as a unitary state, permitting only a modest and largely cosmetic devolution of power to the republics.

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An important Party Central Committee plenum on the nationalities question which was held in September 1989 showed the extent to which Gorbachev was determined to resist the encroachments of Russian autarchy. The plenum's platform stoutly resisted the thesis that the RSFSR should be granted its own Communist party, advocating instead the resurrection of a body which had existed under Nikita Khrushchev: a bureau for RSFSR affairs at the USSR Party Central Committee.[13] Russia, it emerged, was to be denied the powerful post of first party secretary of the Russian Republic.

In an interview published in *Izvestiya*, Aleksandr Vlasov, a close Gorbachev ally who had been selected to chair the RSFSR Council of Ministers and, in May 1990, ran unsuccessfully against Yeltsin for the post of chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, defended the continued existence of such structural asymmetries.[14] The RSFSR, he said, should be given a Secretariat for Russian Affairs at the All-Union Central Trade Union Council and a Bureau for Russian Affairs at the All-Union Komsomol. These changes fell short of establishing parity with the positions of the minority republics, which possessed their own trade union and Komsomol organizations.

Another close Gorbachev ally, Central Committee Secretary Yurii Manaenkov, vigorously defended the maintenance of structural asymmetries between the position of Russia and of the other fourteen republics. Manaenkov pointed to the immense size of the RSFSR and its large population (146 million inhabitants) as justification for special treatment. The fact that there were 10.6 million Communist party members living in the RSFSR also constituted, he said, grounds for a special approach. "The formation of a Russian Communist Party . . . ," he warned, "could strengthen the centrifugal forces in the CPSU and, obviously, in the country as well. . . . As we know, V. I. Lenin stood for a federation of peoples but repudiated a federation within the party. The duty of communists is not to admit any divisions on national grounds."[15]

Despite vigorous and determined efforts on the part of Gorbachev and his followers, they were unable to plug the dike against the rising

[13] For the text of the platform, see *Pravda*, 14 September 1989. For an informative discussion of the debates preceding the Central Committee plenum, see Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the 'National Question': Restructuring the Soviet Federation," *Soviet Economy*, July–September 1989, 201–250.

[14] For the interview, see "Interesy Rossii," *Izvestiya*, 1 September 1989.

[15] In *Pravda*, 9 November 1989.

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waters of Russian autarchic sentiment. In 1990, over their objections, the conservative alliance brought into existence a Russian (*Rossiiskaya*) Communist party, under the leadership of outspoken neo-Stalinist tribune, Ivan Polozkov. In the same year, Russia also gained its own trade union organization, Komsomol, and Academy of Sciences.

Once Boris Yeltsin had succeeded in achieving election as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet—in late May 1990—and in declaring the republic's sovereignty, Gorbachev was forced grudgingly to acquiesce to the Russian Republic's gaining the trappings of a "normal" Soviet republic—its own KGB, MVD, and State Committee for Defense and Security; its own television channel and radio station, as well as newspapers officially published by the Russian Republic; and, finally, the activization of a previously dormant and largely symbolic RSFSR Foreign Ministry. These developments succeeded in bringing Russia into a state of rough ethnic parity with the other union republics.

In addition to struggling hard against the emergence of Russian autarchy, Gorbachev and his allies consistently sought to fragment the unity of the Russian Republic. The draft Communist party platform on the nationalities question had, for example, proposed that the RSFSR be divided up into large autonomous economic regions.[16] In the above-cited interview with *Izvestiya*, RSFSR Prime Minister Aleksandr Vlasov elaborated upon this scheme. New territorial formations, he stated, should take over certain of the functions of the RSFSR Communist party *obkoms*. The first such region to be established, he said, would probably be the Far Eastern Economic Region, which would unite the Primorskii and Khabarovsk *krais*, as well as the Amur, Kamchatka, Magadan, Sakhalin, and Chita oblasts. Similar large economic regions, he said, should be formed in Eastern Siberia, Western Siberia, the Urals, and in Central Russia. Each region would be headed by a deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The proposed economic restructuring of the RSFSR drew sharp criticism from Russian *obkom* secretaries, who understandably feared a diminution of their power and prerogatives, and from conservative Russian nationalists, who believed that a chopping up of the Russian Republic into autonomous economic units would serve to weaken the cohesiveness of the republic and possibly to undermine its very existence (which may have been Gorbachev's intention all along).

[16] The draft platform was published in *Pravda*, 17 August 1989.

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The party platform on the nationalities issue had also called for strengthening of the position of the autonomous formations within the union republics. Most of these formations were located in the RSFSR, where there were sixteen autonomous republics (or ASSRs), five autonomous oblasts, and ten autonomous districts. Like the plan to divide Russia into autonomous economic regions, this Central Committee plan to beef up the autonomous formations appeared to be aimed at fragmenting the unity of Russia.

Once Yeltsin had gained election as RSFSR chairman in May of 1990 and Russia had declared her sovereignty in June, the Gorbachev "center" began actively to encourage the Russian autonomous formations to declare their full sovereignty from the RSFSR. This strategy was presumably pursued to weaken the power of Yeltsin and of the democrats around him. In the words of one Yeltsin supporter, RSFSR People's Deputy Oleg Rumyantsev, executive secretary of the RSFSR Constitutional Commission: "[Gorbachev] would have earned a place in Russian history as a great reformer had he not made his principal error, the error of tearing Russia apart. Russia does not forgive such transgressions, for Gorbachev bears a great political blame for the anti-Russian direction of his politics."[17] Rumyantsev noted that "even prior to the first [RSFSR] Congress, a law conflicting with the RSFSR was drafted [by the center] to proclaim all autonomous areas located on the territory of the Russian Republic as subjects of USSR rule."

In this case, too, Gorbachev appears to have failed in a determined effort to fragment the unity of Russia. Among the autonomous formations of the RSFSR, only Tatarstan refused officially to participate in the elections for the RSFSR president, in June 1991, and only it refused to sign the union treaty as a part of the RSFSR. The Soviet president's concerted attempts to fragment the Russian Republic were no more successful than his frenetic efforts to preserve the unity of the USSR.

Boris Yeltsin and Russia

The leader and living symbol of the Russian democratic forces has been Boris Yeltsin, a former high-ranking party official, who channeled his uncommon energy, personal courage, and considerable political savvy

[17] Oleg Rumyantsev, "Russian Reform: The Democratic Position" (unpublished essay, March 1991).

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into a position rivaling, then surpassing, that of Gorbachev in terms of authority and power. Yeltsin's election as RSFSR president in June 1991 gave him the popular legitimacy that Gorbachev lacked. In a high-stakes contest, Yeltsin used his extraordinary popularity with ethnic Russians, as well as with the other peoples of the USSR, to force repeated concessions from the center.

The assumption of power in the Soviet Union's largest republic by a dynamic maverick who had officially broken with the Communist party and with its legitimizing ideology served to move the breakup of the "inner" Soviet empire along at a blistering pace. The Russian republic's declaration of sovereignty in June 1990 was the first important nail which Yeltsin drove into the coffin of the USSR, and his formation of a Confederation of Independent States with other republics in December 1991 buried the USSR for good.

One significant result of Yeltsin's election as head of the Russian Republic was that it induced Russians to begin to see the RSFSR as a discrete political and economic entity, something apart from and opposed to the USSR. In 1989, at the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies, conservative Russian nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin had attracted attention when he had exclaimed, "perhaps it is Russia which should leave the [Soviet] Union. . . ."[18] These words had been uttered carpingly, and their intention had been to underline the absurdity of such a development. One year later, Russia had declared its sovereignty and a separate political existence for Russia no longer seemed such an absurdity.

In directly challenging Gorbachev and the center, Yeltsin for the first time embossed the dichotomy Russia/USSR upon the minds of contemporary Russians. In a series of pitched battles with the center, Yeltsin, as had been noted, gradually acquired for Russia institutions already enjoyed by the other republics—a Ministry of Internal Affairs, television channel, and so forth. In May of 1991, after a crippling miners' strike, the center grudgingly agreed to transfer control of the mines in the Kuzbass, Rostov, and Komi regions to the jurisdiction of the Russian Republic. Each of these political victories served to advance the cause of Russian autarchy.

In addition to acquiring for Russia the trappings of a normal Soviet republic, Yeltsin also began to sign a number of treaties and economic agreements with the other union republics. In December 1990, for

[18] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 14 June 1989.

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example, a full year before the Confederation of Independent States, he signed an important treaty with the Ukrainian Republic in which the following was agreed to:

> The High Contracting parties
> —recognize each other as sovereign states . . .
> —protect the rights of their citizens residing on the territory of the other party;
> —recognize and respect the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the Ukraine within the existing boundaries in the USSR.[19]

This signed agreement between the RSFSR and Ukraine explicitly recognized the existing boundaries separating the two republics. Given the fact that the USSR was in the process of fragmenting into sovereign republics, the question of boundaries took on added importance. Unlike Yeltsin and his democratic allies, a number of ethnic Russians believed that the current borders separating the RSFSR and Ukraine, as well as those dividing Russia and other republics, were unfair and historically unjustifiable. They believed that the RSFSR represented a truncated entity which could in no way be considered the legitimate heir of prerevolutionary Tsarist Russia.

If his recognition of the other republics and of their extant borders got Yeltsin into hot water with some Russians, it understandably earned him the gratitude and admiration of many representatives of the minority republics. Referring to the 11 January 1991 treaty signed between the RSFSR and Estonia, two Estonian scholars have written: "This treaty is historically significant because it is the first bilateral agreement made between Estonia and her Eastern neighbor on the basis of equal rights after the loss of Estonian independence."[20] In May of 1991, Andrei Kozyrev, foreign minister of the Russian Republic, made the new relationship "official" when he formally accepted the accreditation documents of Estonia's newly arrived representative to the RSFSR, Evgenii Golikov.[21] In addition to signing agreements with the other republics, Yeltsin early on also upheld their right to secede from the Soviet Union if that should be the will of their populace.

Yeltsin's approach to the minority peoples of the RSFSR, who comprised approximately 18.5 percent of the republic's population, has been to be as accommodating and flexible as possible: "the autonomous [formations of the RSFSR]," he maintained in March of 1991,

[19] *Moscow News*, no. 48, 1990, 9.
[20] Kirch and Kirch, "Russians as a Minority."
[21] Announced on "Russian Radio," 12 May 1991.

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"can take as much sovereignty as they can administer. We can agree to all of that. But they will have independently to answer, of course, for the well-being of their people, We make one condition: they will have to take part in a federation treaty with Russia. I underline: we will not let anyone pull Russia down."[22] On the symbolic level, Yeltsin scored points with RSFSR minorities, and especially Muslims, by appointing a dynamic Chechen, Ruslan Khasbulatov, as his deputy chairman.

What was Yeltsin's view of the position of the twenty-five million Russians living outside the Russian Republic? "It is the duty of Russia and of its Supreme Soviet and leadership," he observed in March 1991,

> somehow to help them. But understand me: It is impossible to defend people with tanks. After that, their lives would be more complicated. It is necessary to put our relations with those republics on a juridical foundation, one of international rights, which we are presently doing. In that case, any fact of discrimination against the Russian populace [on the part of another republic] can be juridically resolved, and we can apply sanctions against this or that republic or state. For example, we have concluded treaties with Latvia and Estonia, and they are now amending their laws in a number of instances. . . .[23]

Given this changing situation, Yeltsin believed that Russians living in the periphery must choose what was most convenient for them: "If they want to return to Russia," he pledged, "then we will create proper conditions for them there." To which he added: "Incidentally, in our treaties with the [other] republics we provide compensation [to Russians] for loss of property incurred in the process of leaving that republic. . . ."[24]

To summarize, Yeltsin's role in recasting and redefining the role of ethnic Russians within the "inner" Soviet empire has been pivotal. By officially recognizing the sovereignty and the existing boundaries of the other republics, he contributed de facto to rendering Russians living in those areas "foreigners." From then on, Russians in the periphery had to decide whether to become, say, Latvian or Uzbek citizens, or to emigrate back to Russia. By opting decisively for Russian nation-building and by firmly rejecting empire saving, Yeltsin helped deal a death blow to the world's last major empire and also liberated Russians so that they can get on with the task of solving their monumental economic and social problems.

[22] *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 14 March 1991, 2.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

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The View from a Revived Russian Foreign Ministry

Under Brezhnev, the post of RSFSR foreign minister had been a symbolic one, since the Russian Republic's interests had been wholly subordinated to those of the USSR as a whole. In the fall of 1990, a young thirty-nine-year-old specialist in international affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, was appointed to the post of RSFSR foreign minister, and he immediately began to elaborate upon Yeltsin's view of a new role for Russians in a revamped confederation. In his numerous writings and public statements, Kozyrev has taken note of the fact that the tendency in Western Europe in recent decades has been toward integration, not disintegration. The task at hand, he believed, was to bring about a similar process of integration on the territory of the former unitary Soviet state, on the basis of full sovereignty for each constituent republic.

"Usually the opponents of this process," Kozyrev observed, "point to the fact that the [present] republican borders inaccurately represent the ethnic make-up of the population." His rejoinder to this argument: "Let this be the case. But does this mean that the republics must now carry on endless territorial disputes with one another? Germany and France conducted wars for centuries over Alsace and Lorraine until they finally understood the principles of a civilized resolution of an ancient conflict. They simply made the border conditional."[25]

Kozyrev expressed a firm conviction that a sovereign Russia had a good chance of reconstituting the present union, or at least a major part of it: "as Russia learns to stand on its own," he wrote in a piece which appeared in *The New York Times*, a "democratic Russia will become a national center of gravity for the older sovereign republics. . . ."[26] The new treaties and agreements which the RSFSR concluded with such republics as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan were, he maintained, intended to provide "an alternative to disintegration." De facto, the new agreements laid "the basis for a new union."[27]

One wonders whether Kozyrev's views on reintegration may not represent wishful thinking. Could the union in fact be reconstituted on the basis of granting full political and economic sovereignty to its members? Aleksandr Tsipko, deputy director of the Institute of International and Economic and Political Research of the USSR Academy of Science, was one who held that it cannot. "If the Federation Council

[25] *Novroe vremya*, no. 9, 1991, 91.
[26] *New York Times*, 25 November 1990.
[27] In *Stolitsa*, no. 6, 1991, 6-7.

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will rule the country," he predicted, "then, of course, the country will once again be ruled by the head of the largest republic, that is, by Russia."[28] Russians like Kozyrev, Tsipko believed, were suffering from "the inertia of imperial thinking." Not all the republics which sought full independence from the USSR would in the future opt for reintegration with Russia, and for the specific reason that Tsipko cited. Indeed, one wonders whether in the long run the paths of the USSR's three Slavic and its six Muslim republics lie in the same direction. Writing in the journal *Foreign Policy*, Graham Fuller, former vice chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, observed that

> In the wake of Gorbachev's revolutionary recognition of long suppressed national yearnings for greater autonomy, about 50 million Soviet Muslims will soon be re-entering the broader Muslim world, creating an entire new calculus of Muslim power and regional blocs. . . . Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey may well be competing for allies in the Muslim reserve of Soviet Central Asia, dramatically altering the weight and influence they have wielded in the Middle East.[29]

Finally, it appears to be far from certain that even the three Eastern Slav republics—Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus—will hold together over the coming decades.

The Hardliners and Russia

Together with the Gorbachev "center" and the Yeltsin "democrats," the so-called hardliners represented a third major political force impacting the future of the Russian Republic. With strong representation in such elite institutions as the KGB, the party bureaucracy, the military command, and the Soviet military-industrial complex, this group was in a position to attempt to impose its will on the Russian Republic and on the union as a whole. In January 1991, the hardliners seemed to have played the key role in attempting a putsch in the Baltic and they were, of course, supporters of the August 1991 coup. There was, however, as has been mentioned, a basic contradiction in their position. On the one hand, they were vehement champions of the unity of the Soviet state; on the other hand, paradoxically, they were ardent defenders of Russian autarchy, a stance which de facto served to weaken the very cohesion of the USSR which they sought to preserve.

[28] See "Spor o Rossii," *Novoe Vremya*, no. 13, 1991, 7.
[29] Graham Fuller, "The Emergence of Central Asia," *Foreign Policy* 78 (Spring 1990): 50.

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An example of the empire saving obsession of the hardliners was the open letter which a number of them wrote to Boris Yeltsin, in his capacity as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in January 1991.[30] The authors of this truculent letter included such well-known conservative Russian nationalist writers as Valentin Rasputin (who had served, at Gorbachev's request, as a member of his Presidential Council), Vasilii Belov, and Vladimir Krupin (chief editor of the journal *Moskva*), and National Bolshevik publicists Aleksandr Prokhanov, Eduard Volodin, and Karem Rash. The letter's signatories assailed Yeltsin for supporting the desire of the Baltic republics to secede from the USSR. Underlining the "historical rootedness of Russia in the Baltic lands," the authors maintained that Yeltsin's primary task as head of the Russian Republic was to safeguard ethnic Russians and Eastern Slavs living in the periphery.

Even worse than Yeltsin's perceived sins against the unity of the Soviet Union was, the authors believed, his conniving in the breakup of Russia itself. "Only a politician indifferent to the fate of the Fatherland," they wrote scornfully, "could hand out willy-nilly free economic zones and sovereignties on the territory of Russia, dismembering the Russian state. . . ." And they concluded sternly: "Taken as a whole, your [Yeltsin's] actions can be simply defined as the disintegration of the USSR and the destruction of Russia, neither of which was created by you, and it is not up to you to decide their fate."

For Russian nationalists like Valentin Rasputin and National Bolsheviks like Aleksandr Prokhanov, Russia and the USSR were the same thing. In such a reading, Latvia and Georgia, say, were as much a part of "Russia" as were the RSFSR cities of Moscow and Khabarovsk.

Another example of the empire-saving mentality characteristic of this group is an article by a certain Aleksandr Fomenko which appeared in *Literaturnaya Rossiya* in March 1990.

> An empire [Fomenko wrote] is a multi-national centralized state which is sufficiently strong and well-organized (for example, the British empire at the time of its flowering, or the present-day "democratic empire" of the USA). It guarantees to its subjects a clear-cut set of rights and, naturally, demands that they fulfill certain specific obligations. In such a state, snipers do not as a rule fire on passers-by, peaceful dwellers are not turned into refugees, and neighboring provinces, while they do not possess "sovereignty," also do not conduct military actions against one another. What is wrong [with such an empire]?[31]

[30] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 19 January 1991.
[31] *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, 16 March 1990, 4.

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In his polemic, which concentrated on the Baltic dimension of the Soviet nationalities problem, Fomenko emphasized that Russians and other Slavs have lived in the present Baltic region for a millennium. For him, the Baltic was therefore ipso facto Russian soil. He noted that the city of Yur'ev, now Tartu, in Estonia was founded in 1030 by Prince Yaroslav the Wise of Kiev. The Baltic lands, Fomenko contended, were too small to remain independent; they would either be ruled by Russia, Germany, or Poland. (Implicit in these remarks is a belief that neither the Germans nor the Poles have undergone any changes in the postwar period.)

In the eyes of the hardliners, thus, the Soviet Union and Russia were the same thing, an indivisible entity that had to be preserved, by force if necessary. Minority separatist leaders like Presidents Landsbergis of Lithuania or Gamsakhurdia of Georgia were seen as violent enemies of Russia who had to be removed from office. Some hardliners also advocated that the fourteen minority republics be abolished and replaced by American-style states which would belong to a "Pan-Russian Republic." In economics, some of them opposed all market reform; others countenanced a "Pinochet model" or "South Korean model" of authoritarian modernization. In summary, it should be clear that the hardliners sought to replace the Soviet empire, which was rooted in Marxism-Leninism, with a resurrected Russian Empire, such as the one that began to emerge in the Tsarist period during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. The bankruptcy of such a strategy was forcefully pointed out by Alain Besançon in 1983: "Once the ideological magic [of Marxism-Leninism] has been destroyed," he wrote,

> there would be only one source of magic left—the imperial or colonial legitimacy of the Russian people in a world that today is entirely decolonized. This anachronistic legitimacy would immediately stimulate the resistance of the non-Russian nations, who would call forth their own legitimacies, necessitating military occupations. The Russian people is not sufficiently populous for that task.[32]

The Failed Quest for a Russian Popular Front

While powerful popular fronts emerged in all of the minority republics in the USSR, a comparable organization did not emerge on Russian soil. In retrospect, it seems clear that the empire saving/nation-build-

[32] Besançon, "Nationalism," 11.

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ing split among contemporary Russians served to block the emergence of such an organization.

An aborted attempt to form an RSFSR Popular Front occurred in July of 1989, when delegates from nearly fifty Russian cites and towns journeyed to the provincial city of Yaroslavl' for a two-day conference. According to a report which appeared in *Moscow News*, the delegates were unable to come to agreement concerning the character of the proposed popular front.[33] One of the hotly debated issues was reportedly whether the proposed front should have a "Russo-centric" or "democratic" character. Since they were unable to reach agreements, the delegates decided to put off holding a constituent conference for the front.

In October 1989, the organizers made a second attempt, once again in Yaroslavl'. One hundred and sixteen delegates arrived from forty-one cities and towns in the RSFSR. Representatives from fourteen local popular fronts in Russia were in attendance.[34] Once again, the empire savers and nation-builders were unable to come to a meeting of minds. According to a report published in the Riga-based Russian language newspaper *Atmoda*, "The adherents of the faction which called itself patriotic spoke in favor of remaining a great power and of the salvation of Russia, one and undivided."[35] The "patriots" who were in attendance also called for a holding back of "separatist" passions in the Soviet Union, and agitated for a retention of the "inner" Soviet empire. The effort to found a Russian Popular Front therefore foundered on deep divisions separating ethnic Russian empire savers and nation-builders.

Solzhenitsyn's Program of Russian Nation-Building

In late 1990, three months after the Russian Republic had declared its sovereignty, two major Soviet newspapers, *Komsomol'skaya pravda* and *Literaturnaya gazeta*, published Nobel prizewinner Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's programmatic brochure *How Shall We Reconstitute Russia* in a print-run of over twenty-five million.[36] Given its huge

[33] See *Moscow News*, no. 29, 1989, 2.

[34] See the account in *Moskovskie novostie*, 29 October 1989, 2.

[35] In *Atmoda*, 27 November 1989, 6.

[36] The text of the brochure appeared in the 18 September 1990 issues of *Komsomol'skaya pravda* and *Literaturnaya gazeta*. For an analysis and a discussion of Russian reactions, see John B. Dunlop, "Solzhenitsyn Calls for the Dismemberment of the Soviet Union," *Report on the USSR*, 14 December 1990, 3–4.

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readership, the brochure inevitably served as a catalyst for ethnic Russians to begin thinking about the future of the Soviet empire.

On the subject of the future of the USSR as a unitary state, Solzhenitsyn sided decisively with Yeltsin and the democratic nation-builders against Gorbachev and the hardliners. The Soviet Union, he contended, had no future as a single state. Centrifugal developments and separatist tendencies together, he believed, proceeded to a point where the union could be held together only at the cost of enormous bloodshed. An additional factor, he noted, was that Russians had been so debilitated by seventy years of communist rule that they simply lacked the strength to maintain an empire. "We have to choose firmly," Solzhenitsyn declared, "between an empire that first of all destroys us [ethnic Russians] ourselves, and the spiritual and bodily salvation of our people." He noted that Russia became stronger once it had cut Poland and Finland loose and that postwar Japan surged in vigor after abandoning its expansionist dreams.

Unlike Yeltsin and the democrats, Solzhenitsyn believed that Russia herself should take the initiative in disbanding an empire that was sapping her strength and in fact killing her. He consequently urged that eleven of the Soviet republics be cut loose from Russia whether they wanted this or not. He held that Russia should concentrate on resuscitative nation-building uncluttered by debilitating alliances or confederations with former Soviet colonies.

While Yeltsin and the democrats were prepared to recognize the present boundaries separating Russia and the other republics, Solzhenitsyn, for his part, wanted to redraw some of those boundaries if that should prove to be the will of the populace, as expressed through plebiscites. Thus in the case of the Muslim republic of Kazakhstan, he believed that the republic's northern tier, which was heavily settled by Russians, should be ceded to Russia, while its southern part, largely populated by Kazakhs, should be free to choose to remain with Russia or to go its separate way. (Angered over Solzhenitsyn's views, crowds of ethnic Kazakhs reportedly staged burnings of those Soviet newspapers which carried the text of his brochure.)

With regard to the Eastern Slav republics of Ukraine and Belarus, Solzhenitsyn expressed a hope that their populations would choose to remain in union with their Russian brethren. He proposed the formation of what he called a Pan-Russian Union (*Rossiiskii soyuz*) to accomplish this purpose. (Yeltsin's adviser on nationalities' questions, RSFSR Congresswoman Galina Starovoitova, noted that the term "Slavic

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Union [*Slavyanskii soyuz*]" would be preferable for what Solzhenitsyn had in mind, "otherwise there is discrimination in the very title"[37]). Aware that separatist sentiment had been growing in Ukraine, especially in the republic's western regions, Solzhenitsyn stated categorically that the people of Ukraine should not be held in union with Russia by force. Rather, he contended, the populace should be free to express its will through the vehicle of referendums, on an oblast by oblast basis. Implicit in Solzhenitsyn's comments was a belief that Ukraine was likely to split, with its western regions voting for independence and its eastern regions electing to remain together with Russia. In Belarus, in his view, separatist tendencies were not strong at present.

As far as the non-Russian peoples of the RSFSR, Solzhenitsyn argued that those autonomous regions, such as Tatarstan, whose historical borders were fully enveloped by the Russian Republic, will have to share the future fate of the Russian people, though their ethnic, economic, and religious needs should receive maximum attention. The Russian Council of Nationalities — one of the few worthy Soviet institutions in Solzhenitsyn's opinion — should, he believed, serve as a forum for the enunciation of such needs. Those minority peoples of the RSFSR who enjoyed external borders could, in his view, secede from Russia if that should prove to be the will of their populace expressed through a plebiscite.

Solzhenitsyn took pains to warn that the dismemberment of the Soviet Union should not occur chaotically, "like the Portuguese fleeing from Angola," but rather in an orderly fashion carefully prepared by specialists. Particular attention, he emphasized, should be paid to ensuring the rights of all minority peoples, including ethnic Russians living in the Soviet periphery.

To conclude, Solzhenitsyn's anti-imperial model for the reconstitution of Russia had, of course, nothing in common with the vision of a unitary state promulgated by Gorbachev and the hardliners. It also, however, differed in significant ways from Yeltsin's concept of a "democratic" confederation of sovereign republics. Solzhenitsyn believed that such a body would likely serve to bog Russia down in imperial residue and would therefore slow down or prevent the recovery of her health. The answer, Solzhenitsyn contended, is for Russia fairly and democratically to adjust her borders with the neighboring republics and then get on with the business of nation-building unencumbered by deleterious alliances.

[37] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 3 October 1990, 4.

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Several Authoritarian Nation-Building Programs

Following in the wake of Solzhenitsyn's brochure, there have emerged other programmatic statements by ethnic Russians which, like the Nobel laureate's proposals, express a willingness to accept the loss of much of the current Soviet "inner" empire, but with an adjustment of the existing borders. Certain of these statements favor an authoritarian, rather than democratic, resolution of the border disputes.

Areas within the USSR in which Russians lived compactly have served as one source for such statements. The March 1991 issue of *Put'*, the newspaper of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, for example, carried a letter by A. N. Los', chairman of the Russian Society of Crimea, in which the author argues that the Crimea, which, he claims, was "unlawfully" given to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954, be returned to the Russian Republic. "Seventy percent of the population of Crimea," Los' wrote, "is made up of Russians, 24 percent of Ukrainians, and 6 percent of Crimean Tartars. Of the 24 percent who are Ukrainians, more than 90 percent have named Russian as their native language." And he concludes: "One would think that the question of returning Crimea to Russia should automatically be posed."[38] It should be noted that on 2 January 1991, the Crimean electorate voted 93.3 percent to reclaim that region's pre-1945 status as an autonomous republic, but this time within the Ukraine.[39] The Ukrainian government accepted this decision on the part of the Crimean voters.

Northeast Estonia, an area where Russians lived compactly, represents another point of tension. In early 1991, the city of Narva, the main urban center in the region, proposed that it be declared a free economic zone. If approved, this ploy would tie Narva's industry, energy plants, and raw materials into an economic conglomerate outside the control of the Republic of Estonia.[40] Some Estonians viewed this move as the first step toward the attempted secession of northeast Estonia.

The January 1991 issue of the newspaper *Put'* published an open letter which was signed by forty-three employees of the Laboratory for Theoretical Physics at the Combined Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubno.[41] This letter strongly protested Yeltsin's decision to recog-

[38] See A. N. Los', "Referendum po-bol'shevitski," *Put'*, March 1991, 2.
[39] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Daily Report*, 3 January 1991.
[40] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Daily Report*, 2 May 1991.
[41] See "Narodnym deputatam RSFSR," *Put'*, January 1991, 10.

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nize the existing borders separating Russia and Ukraine. "These borders," the authors maintain, "are historically unfounded. In the Russian Empire, a distinction was made between Little Russia [the Ukraine proper], on the one hand, and the New Russia region [the oblasts of Nikolaev, Odessa, Kherson, and Dnepropetrovsk] and Tavriya [the Crimea] on the other. The latter two areas were taken from the Turks on the strength of Russian arms. . . ." The authors advocate that New Russia and the Crimea be given back to Russia.

In May 1991, there took place the constituent congress of the so-called "Russian Party of the RSFSR," a conservative Russian nationalist organization. According to Russian Radio, the new radio station of Yeltsin's Russian Republic, the party's draft program called for the rebirth of the state of Russia, which was to be made up of the RSFSR, plus the predominately Russian areas of the other republics: the Crimea; the left bank region of the Dniester in Moldova; the northern tier of Kazakhstan, including the city of Alma Ata; and northern Kyrgyzstan, including the city of Frunze (Bishkek). The party's program also called for the creation of Russian autonomous formations in the other republics; for a unitary state structure in the RSFSR, without autonomous formations; and suggested the repatriation of all Jews from Russian territory.[42] While representing an aggressive and even racist program—that is, its position on the Jews—the document is interesting as a pioneering conservative Russian nationalist statement which implicitly acquiesces to a loss of those Soviet territories in which Russians do not live compactly: the entire Baltic region; the entire Caucasus; most of Central Asia, Ukraine and Moldova; and even, apparently, all of Belarus. This program therefore signaled a new realism on the part of conservative Russian nationalists. It also demonstrated, graphically, that the Russian empire was in the process of being redefined.

Russian Public Opinion on the Question of Retaining an Empire

Before the advent of glasnost, western analysts had little hard data at hand with which to assess the opinions of ethnic Russians living in the Soviet Union. To fathom the workings of the Russian mind, analysts were reduced to such arcane pursuits as scrutinizing the favorite novels of Russians; examining the comment book of an exhibit given

[42] In Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Daily Report*, 21 May 1991.

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by a popular Russian nationalist artist; and dissecting the films to which Russians flocked in great numbers.[43] Due to a lack of trustworthy information, Western observers at times succumbed to a temptation to exaggerate the significance of such lurid developments as the emergence on the political scene of a violently anti-Semitic organization called Pamyat in May of 1987. Some Western commentators speculated that Pamyat might represent the authentic voice of ethnic Russians in the USSR, and they warned gravely about the specter of Russian neo-Nazism.

Once the Soviet press began to publish the results of scientific polls—and this commenced in the fall of 1989—it soon became clear that Pamyat no more represented the voice of ethnic Russians than did, say, the Ku Klux Klan speak for most Americans. Thus, for example, a poll taken in May of 1990 by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (or VTsIOM for short) showed that Pamyat and similar extremist groups enjoyed the support of not more than 1–2 percent of the RSFSR populace.[44] This snapshot of Russian sentiment was further confirmed by the results of the March 1990 elections, and of the subsequent runoffs, to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies and to local Russian soviets, which demonstrated conclusively that there was little public support among Russians for the racist views of the extreme right.[45]

What about the opinions of Russians concerning the breakup of the "inner" Soviet empire? The polls showed persuasively that ethnic Russians were growing accustomed to the fragmentation of the empire and that they, by a significant margin, refused to countenance the use of force to hold it together. A rapid deimperialization of the Russian psyche has been occurring.

To demonstrate the speed of this shift, one need merely cite the results of a poll which was conducted in the Russian Republic by VTsIOM in the fall of 1989, and then contrast its results with two subsequent polls taken in the RSFSR in May and September of 1990. In the 1989 poll, the results of which were published in the weekly magazine *Ogonek*, 63.4 percent of the RSFSR citizens contacted gave

[43] See Klaus Mehnert, *The Russians and Their Favorite Books* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983); Vladislav Krasnov, "Russian National Feeling: An Informal Poll" in Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire*, 109–130; and "Two Films for the Soviet Masses" in *The New Russian Nationalism* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 60–74.

[44] For the poll, see *Moskovskie novostie*, no. 20, 1990, 9.

[45] On the March 1990 elections, see John B. Dunlop, "Moscow Voters Reject the Conservative Coalition," *Report on the USSR*, 20 April 1990, 15–17.

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a high priority to preserving "the unity and cohesion of the USSR."[46] By contrast, only 10.6 percent of Armenians, 10.2 percent of Balts, and 30.9 percent of Ukrainians accorded it a high priority. This poll therefore showed that empire saving sentiment remained strong among Russians in the fall of 1989.

Six months later, in May of 1990, shortly before Yeltsin was elected chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, VTsIOM conducted a new poll of 1,517 persons in twenty areas of the RSFSR.[47] This poll yielded markedly different results from the one in 1989. On the question of what the future relations of the RSFSR to the "center" should be, for example, the respondents held:

18 percent—that relations should remain the same as at present;
35 percent—that the economic and political rights of Russia should be expanded but that the final say in all questions should remain with the "center";
43 percent—that Russia should receive political and economic independence (up to and including leaving the USSR);
4 percent—other.

It seemed clear that a major shift in Russian public opinion had occurred. For more than 43 percent of RSFSR respondents, the bonds conjoining "Russia" and "the USSR" had been severed.

Another intriguing result of this poll was that, it emerged, growing number of ethnic Russians were prepared to countenance the granting of added political clout to the autonomous formations of the RSFSR:

20 percent—stated that the power of the autonomous regions in the RSFSR should remain the same as at present;
57 percent—stated that the economic and political rights of the autonomous regions should be broadened, but that the final say in all questions should remain with the RSFSR as a whole;
20 percent—stated that the autonomous regions should receive economic and political independence (up to and including leaving the RSFSR);
3 percent—other.

The responses to this question seemed to demonstrate that there was considerable popular support within the RSFSR for the position embraced by Yeltsin, namely, that the autonomous formations be offered broad self-rule in exchange for their remaining members of the Russian Republic.

[46] See *Ogonek*, no. 43, 1989, 4.
[47] See *Argumenty i fakty*, no. 21, 1990, 2–3.

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A poll taken by VTslOM four months later, in September 1990, showed an even more pronounced shift in public attitudes.[48] This poll contacted 1,458 persons residing in twenty-five population points within the Russian Republic. Here is what the respondents felt concerning the proper relationship of the RSFSR and the "center":

Should the organs of the Soviet Union have the right to revoke or halt the decisions of the Russian Federation?

They should have the right—23 percent
They should not have the right—52.5 percent
Difficult to answer—24.5 percent

Should the organs of the Russian Federation have the right to revoke or halt the decisions of the organs of the Soviet Union?

They should have that right—48.1 percent
They should not have that right—21.9 percent
Difficult to answer—30.2 percent

On questions which concerned the position of the autonomous formations within the RSFSR, the respondents were of the following opinion:

What variant of the organization of the Russian Federation seems preferable to you?

One historically formed state with special rights for the national-territorial formations—28.6 percent
A federation in which the national-territorial formations, regions, and oblasts enjoy full rights—47.8 percent
Difficult to answer—23.7 percent

The autonomous formations should have the right to leave the Russian Federation if a majority of their populace should favor it.

Yes—55.9 percent
No—27.8 percent
Difficult to answer—16.3 percent

On their own territory, the laws of the autonomous formations should take precedence over the laws of the Russian Federation.

Yes—26.5 percent
No—46.6 percent
Difficult to answer—26.8 percent

This September 1990 poll thus offered strong support for Yeltsin's policies of pursuing sovereignty for the Russian Republic and of of-

[48] See *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 40, 7 October 1990, 9.

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fering a broad degree of self-rule to the autonomous formations within the RSFSR. The respondents, as can be seen, were even prepared to let the autonomous formations secede from Russia, if their populace expressed such a preference through referendums.

Russians on the Use of Force to Retain the "Inner" Empire

The protracted, bloody war in Afghanistan appears to have gradually drained ethnic Russians of a willingness to support the use of Russian lives to preserve the so-called "outer" Soviet empire. By the beginning of the 1990s, this sentiment had spread to the issue of the forcible preservation of the "inner" Soviet empire. When, for example, the central authorities attempted to call up reservists in southern Russia for use in Azerbaijan in January of 1990, there occurred a revolt on the part of the reservists' mothers and families, and an organization called "mothers against mobilization" came into existence.[49] In August of the same year, the newspaper *Izvestiya* reported that conscripts' mothers had rallied in the Russian provincial city of Perm' to protest the failure of the commandant of the local military district to meet with them. The mothers had been demanding that their sons serve only in the RSFSR and not be sent to the Caucasus or to Central Asia.[50]

In January of 1991, when the "center" orchestrated a putsch against the lawfully elected Baltic parliaments and their presidents, similar anti-imperial sentiments emerged among ethnic Russians.[51] On January 16, just three days after "Bloody Sunday" in Vilnius, the polling organization VTsIOM contacted 962 persons living in thirteen cities of the RSFSR.[52] Their reaction to the attempted coup was:

Do you approve or do you condemn the actions of the troops?
Approve – 29 percent
Condemn – 55 percent
Difficult to answer – 16 percent

In Moscow and Leningrad, as it was still known, which represented the political "wave of the future" for much of the rest of the RSFSR, the

[49] On the January 1990 events, see "V Krasnodare posle mobilizatsii," *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, 28 January 1990, 1.

[50] In *Izvestiya*, 14 August 1990.

[51] On the attempted putsch, see John B. Dunlop, "Crackdown," *The National Interest*, Spring 1991, 24–32, and "The Leadership of the Centrist Bloc," *Report on the USSR*, 8 February 1991, 4–6. See also "Litva-yanvar' 1991: Otchet gruppy nezavisimykh voennykh ekspertov soyuza 'Shchit'," *Russkaya mysl'* (Paris), 22 February 1991, special app. i–iv. Excerpts from the "Shchit" report appeared in *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 9, 3 March 1991, 10.

[52] For the results of the poll, see *Komsomol'skakya pravda*, 18 January 1991, 4.

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reaction was even more decisive. Less than 15 percent of Leningraders came out in support of the troops' actions, while in Moscow the figure was 15.4 percent.[53]

Another important indicator was the feelings of young Russians, of the so-called upcoming generation. In early 1991, the magazine *Reader's Digest* asked the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences to conduct an RSFSR-wide poll of the attitudes of young Russians aged 18 to 25.[54] On the critical question of whether or not the minority Soviet republics should be permitted to secede from the union, the young Russians who were contacted felt as follows:

Yes – 70 percent
No – 19 percent
Undecided – 11 percent

The findings of such polls appeared to indicate a marked willingness on the part of ethnic Russians to let those republics who wanted to leave the USSR do so. It might be asked, however, how such results tallied with those of the March 1991 referendum, in which approximately 71 percent of RSFSR voters reportedly voted to preserve the union. (Approximately the same percentage, roughly 70 percent, voted to institute the post of president of the RSFSR, that is, supported Boris Yeltsin and his agenda.)

A first point which should be made is that the language in which the referendum was couched was deliberately vague. Voters were asked: "Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedom of the individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?"[55] This language was notably ambiguous and did not overtly contradict the "Yeltsin model" of a renewed confederation of fully sovereign republics. A second point to be made is that there may have been tampering with the vote in parts of the Russian provinces. One Soviet academic with whom I discussed this question told me that, in his opinion, the vote count in large Russian cities was probably accurately tabulated but that in the provinces, where conservative party bureaucrats retained great power, "it is a different matter altogether."

In the more politically advanced areas of the Russian Republic the referendum did quite poorly. In Boris Yeltsin's home base of Sver-

[53] *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 4, 1991, 8-9; and "Russian Radio," 22 January 1991.

[54] *Reader's Digest*, March 1991, 49-54.

[55] Ann Sheehy, "Updated Fact Sheet on Questions in March 17 and Later Referendums," Radio Liberty Report via *sovset'*, 14 March 1991.

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TABLE 1

Preferences Concerning the Future Political Status of Estonia (%)

	Estonians				*Non-Estonians*			
	1989		*1990*		*1989*		*1990*	
	April	*Sept.*	*Jan.*	*May*	*April*	*Sept.*	*Jan.*	*May*
The maintenance of the status quo	2	2	0	0	54	37	20	21
Estonia must stay in a reformed Soviet Union (confederation)	39	31	15	2	25	47	52	46
Estonia should be an absolutely independent state	56	64	81	96	5	9	17	26
Unable to answer	3	3	4	2	16	7	1	7

dlovsk city, for example, only 34.4 percent voted for Gorbachev's "renewed federation," while in both Moscow and Leningrad the figure was only slightly above 50 percent. This was hardly a ringing endorsement of the Soviet president and of his policies.

The Views of Russians Living in the Periphery

Like the views of ethnic Russians living in the core Russian Republic, the attitudes of Russians in the non-Russian periphery have been changing with considerable rapidity, and in a direction favorable to the interests of the titular peoples of the minority republics. In the republic of Estonia, for instance, where 475,000 Russians made up the bulk of the non-Estonian populace, polls taken in 1989 and 1990 showed considerable changes in attitude (see Table 1).[56]

By early 1991, when the regime attempted a coup in the Baltic, ethnic Russian sentiment had shifted even more decisively in the direction of sympathy for the independence of the Baltic republics. This shift was politically significant, inasmuch as Russians comprised 34 percent of the population of Latvia and 30.3 percent of the population of Estonia. (By contrast, they made up only 9.4 percent of the population of Lithuania.) In a critical February 1991 plebiscite of the populace of Latvia, 73.6 percent of those voting supported Latvian independence. Since only 54 percent of Latvia's population was ethnic Latvian, this meant that hundreds of thousands of Russians had to have supported the Latvians in their bid for secession. A similar result obtained in the Estonian referendum, with 77.8 percent of those voting supporting independence for the republic.[57]

[56] In Kirch and Kirch, "Russians as a Minority."

[57] *New York Times*, 5 March 1991.

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TABLE 2

Do the Russians Want to Flee?

Are you on the whole satisfied or dissatisfied that you live in precisely this republic?

Republic	*% Satisfied*	*% Dissatisfied*	*% Difficult to Answer*
Estonia	51	19	30
Latvia	75	7	18
Western Ukraine	36	21	44
Georgia	62	22	16
Azerbaijan	86	6	10
Kazakhstan	73	11	16
Kyrgyzstan	56	4	40
Takjikistan	61	25	14
Uzbekistan	64	11	25

Do you have the desire to leave Russia or would you like permanently to reside in this republic?

Republic	*% Leave for Russia*	*% Remain*	*% Difficult to Answer*
Estonia	23	50	27
Latvia	16	65	19
Western Ukraine	26	44	31
Georgia	37	36	26
Azerbaijan	5	68	27
Kazakhstan	20	63	17
Kyrgyzstan	31	42	26
Takjikistan	37	38	25
Uzbekistan	38	36	26

During approximately the same time frame, in January 1991, *Moscow News* published the result of a poll of 1,005 ethnic Russians living in nine minority republics and in one autonomous formation of the RSFSR, which had been taken in November and December of 1990.[58] The poll was conducted by the polling organization VTsIOM. Published under the heading "Do the Russians Want to Flee?" the poll offered a useful snapshot of ethnic Russian sentiment in the Soviet periphery (see Table 2).

In Central Asia (excepting Kazakhstan) and in Georgia approximately a third or more of ethnic Russians wanted to be repatriated to Russia. In Estonia, Western Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the percentage of Russians desiring to return to the RSFSR stood at 20 percent or higher. These figures suggest that the derussification of the pe-

[58] The poll appeared in *Moskovskie novosti*, no. 4, 27 January 1991.

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riphery will continue at a rapid pace in coming years; indeed, in certain republics, the process could snowball and result in "Russian flight" from areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus. According to ethnographer Yurii Arutyunyan, an outmigration of Russians from Moldova and the Baltic became observable during 1990 and 1991; Russians, increasingly, were coming "home" to the RSFSR.[59] The net result of this migration process was, of course, the demise of the Soviet Union as a unitary state. The devolution of power to the republics corresponded objectively to a retreat of Russians from the periphery.

The August Coup and After

If the entire Gorbachev period witnessed a rapid succession of dramatic events, then high drama continued in the Russian Republic in the second half of 1991. In June, the republic's bid for full sovereignty received a significant boost when Boris Yeltsin bested five opponents and was elected president of the RSFSR, with 57.3 percent of the vote.

After months of bitter rivalry, Yeltsin and Gorbachev had succeeded in April of 1991 in coming to rough agreement concerning the political and economic shape of a future Union of Sovereign States. The scheduled signing of the union treaty, which was set for 20 August, precipitated the failed coup of 18–21 August. That political earthquake, in turn, set off powerful aftershocks which would likely be felt for years.

Like the Bolshevik putsch of 1917, the failed August coup appeared to constitute a critical twentieth-century turning point. In its immediate aftermath, the Communist party was outlawed, the KGB was disassembled, and the Soviet "center" was marginalized to a point of irrelevancy. The Ukrainian vote for full independence on 1 December nailed down the lid on the coffin of what had until recently been the USSR.

The death throes of the Soviet center required that the Russian Republic step in and gradually assume many of its functions. This development, however, served to strain relations with the minority republics, which clearly suspected that the new confederation of sovereign states being championed by Yeltsin and his team was in fact a "mask" for increased ethnic Russian political and economic control. The prospects for a viable confederation appeared therefore to be dim at best.

Similarly, Yeltsin's expressed hope that the minority peoples of the RSFSR would prove to be satisfied with real autonomy ran into serious obstacles in the post-coup period. The Chechens declared their full

[59] From Yu. V. Arutyunyan, "The Russians Outside Russia."

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independence from Russia, and Yeltsin had to back down from an unwise declaration of emergency rule in Checheno-Ingushetia. Tatarstan, too, began to take steps toward achieving complete independence. The sole realistic democratic approach to this thorny dilemma appeared to be that counseled by Yeltsin's inter-ethnic affairs adviser, Galina Starovoitova: Yeltsin, she said, must stick to his original policy of being willing to grant as much autonomy to the autonomous regions as they wanted to assume. If that meant full independence, so be it. In the long run, Starovoitova argued, this enlightened approach would rebound to Russia's benefit.

The headlong breakup of the historic Russian and Soviet empires understandably served to shock and bewilder many present-day Russians. Writing in the no. 45, 1991 issue of the reformist weekly, *Moskovskie novosti*, Sergei Razgonov, for example, reflected despairingly:

> Let us total up the losses. We have given away the Baltic, ceded Crimea, and we are going to sell the Kurile Islands. . . . Lord, will we really once again be reduced to the size of Vladimir-Suzdal' Rus' or of the Serpukhovsk princedom? No, no, I am not weeping for the empire, although, of course, it is painful that it will soon not be easy to take a stroll along Tallinn's Vyshgorod, to sit with friends in the cafes of Tiflis, or to warm oneself on the beaches of Koktebl'. . . .

And Razgonov continued his lament:

> We [Russians] are no longer one-sixth of the earth's surface. . . . But we continue to carry within ourselves one-sixth of the globe—from Riga to Shikotan. It is a scale we have become accustomed to. Ah, how difficult it is to part with it. . . . From that former Homeland, we will be required to emigrate, all of us, to the last man.

This disoriented sense of loss experienced by contemporary Russians as they cast about for a post-imperial identity can, of course, serve as a breeding ground for extremist currents and ideologies. In the Russian presidential election in June 1991, a charismatic proto-fascist demagogue, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, came in a surprising third with 7.8 percent of the vote. Zhirinovskii's message was and is a crudely simple one: ethnic Russians should take back the empire and put the minority peoples in their place. Economic disintegration and gnawing remorse over the loss of empire could provide fertile soil for extremist activists like Zhirinovskii, publicist Aleksandr Prokhanov, and television journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov.

Consequently, one must hope that the pro-democracy forces in Russia, aided by perceptive and far-sighted Western statesmen and

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businessmen, will be able to find a way out from under the rubble of a collapsed communist system. A failure to do so could threaten the interests of the West as much as it would those of Russians themselves.

The tumultuous processes which resulted from Gorbachev's accession and his programs of glasnost and democratization have, for the first time in seventy years, required ethnic Russians consciously to define their relationship to the "inner" Soviet empire. As the various polls, plebiscites, and elections we have examined show, ethnic Russians with each passing month were increasingly resigned to a loss of empire. Faced with a choice between empire saving and nation-building, Russians were firmly opting for a resuscitative program of nation-building. In decisive numbers, they opposed the use of force to preserve the crumbling Soviet state. It was time, they appeared to believe, for Russia to get on with the task of solving its own severe economic, social, demographic, and spiritual problems. The long-term question concerning Russians, as James Billington has put it, "boils down to the question of whether [they] can find a non-Leninist and nonchauvinist identity for themselves: a way of feeling good about themselves without feeling hostile to others."[60] Together with the perceptive observer of contemporary communist societies, Milovan Djilas, one suspects that Billington's question can be answered in the affirmative. Referring to the Soviet Union's imminent loss of empire, Djilas comments:

> We are talking about the natural expiry of an unnatural and tyrannical regime which is bound to come, as surely as the British and French empires had to face their demise when the time was ripe. The Russian people would benefit the most. They would gain a free and more prosperous life and yet remain, undoubtedly, a great nation. . . . I firmly believe that a reduced but self-confident, opened-up democratic Russian state would induce much less brooding in the Russian people and make them a happier race. . . .[61]

Paradoxical as it may seem, the loss of the historic Tsarist and Soviet Empires could lead to the rebirth of Russia as a major Eurasian power with a successful economy and cultural achievements which would be the envy of the rest of the world.*

[60] *Washington Post*, 22 January 1990.

[61] *Encounter*, November 1988, 30.

* This article is adapted and updated from Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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Adolescent Pregnancy and Public Policy

DEBORAH L. RHODE

Although teenage pregnancy has recently emerged as a major social "problem," its frequency is by no means a recent social phenomenon. The appropriate age for sexual relations and parenthood has always been a matter of cultural definition, and in the United States it has varied considerably across time, region, class, race, ethnicity, and gender. Over the past two centuries, the age at which childbirth is biologically possible has declined, while the period of adolescents' economic dependence has increased. One result of these changes has been a growing cultural conflict over reproductive choices during the transition to adulthood. During the past two decades, the rising birth rate among unmarried teenagers has prompted increasing national concern but no coherent policy. Much of the problem stems from disputes over the nature of the problem. Is the primary issue morality, fertility, or poverty? What choices should adolescents make in sexual relationships, what role should the state play in shaping the choices available, and who should decide those questions?

This article explores public policies on adolescent pregnancy against their broader historical, legal, and socioeconomic backgrounds. Its central premise is that such policies have frequently misdescribed the

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problem and misled as to the solution. Too often, decision makers have located the problem at the individual level and faulted teens who want "too much too soon" in sexual relationships. Insufficient attention has focused on the societal level, on structures that offer female adolescents "too little too late": too little reason to stay in school, too little assistance in birth control, too little opportunity for childcare, health services, vocational training or decent jobs, and too little understanding of the responsibilities of single parenthood. Both legislative and judicial decision making have proceeded without adequate information on the experience of women or the consequences of various public policies.[1]

To understand the limitations of current frameworks, some historical background is useful. Since specific policies toward adolescent pregnancy are a recent development, their evolution must be understood in terms of broader reproductive, family, and regulatory patterns. An overview of those patterns suggests certain dynamics that are particularly relevant to contemporary debates: the variation in cultural norms concerning teenage sexuality and the class and racial biases in public policy responses.

An Historical Overview

Historical material on adolescent sexual activity is limited, in part because only in the last century has adolescence been recognized as a distinct developmental phase. However, research on premarital intercourse, premarital pregnancy, and out-of-wedlock births provides some indirect evidence of cultural norms.[2]

Until the nineteenth century, American attitudes toward early childbearing were relatively permissive. Pregnancy among very young adolescents was rare, since the average age of menstruation was 15 or older. Available evidence reveals no strong prejudice against teenage fertility when the couple was willing to marry and could become economically independent. Nor was premarital sexual intercourse among

[1] Sharon Thompson, "Search for Tomorrow: On Feminism and the Reconstruction of Teen Romance" in Carole S. Vance, ed., *Pleasure and Danger* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 350.

[2] Susan E. Harari and Maris A. Vinovskis, "Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing in the Past" in Annette Lawson and Deborah L. Rhode, *The Politics of Pregnancy: Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); John Demos and Virgilio Demos, "Adolescence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 31 (1969): 632.

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adolescents seen as especially problematic. Although many colonial communities made efforts to punish fornicators of all ages, intimacy during courtship met with somewhat greater tolerance, as the practice of bundling in New England and Middle Atlantic regions suggests. Because courting couples often lived at considerable distance from each other, in housing that had little heat, privacy, or extra space, they were often permitted to share the same bed as long as they remained fully clothed or kept a bundling board between them. Sexual intercourse was not expected to occur, but if it did the parties were expected to marry. The assumption was that a woman would go from her father's to her husband's household without any intervening period of independence. Bastardy was a serious offense in a culture that made families the central social and economic unit. The mother—and father if he could be identified—was subject to criminal penalties and social opprobrium, while the child experienced similar stigmas and various legal disabilities. Until the mid-eighteenth century rates of illegitimacy remained low, around 3 percent of all births, although rates of premarital pregnancy varied over time and region; an estimated one in three brides was pregnant among seventeenth-century Chesapeake immigrants and one in ten among New England residents.[3]

During the latter part of the eighteenth century, premarital pregnancies and out-of-wedlock pregnant births began to rise. The increase in part reflected greater geographical mobility and the breakdown of stable communities during the war and postwar periods. Formal enforcement of bastardy and fornication laws ceased, and informal sanctions weakened. For some young women, pregnancy also became a means of insuring that they rather than their parents controlled the choice of husband. By the late eighteenth century, an estimated 30 percent of brides were pregnant. Most premarital intercourse took place as part of courtship, but if pregnancy occurred and marriage did not, the costs were borne disproportionately by women. Paternity could be difficult to prove and fathers difficult to locate. Special hard-

[3] Maris A. Vinovskis, *An "Epidemic" of Adolescent Pregnancy?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3–21, 32; John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, *Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 10–28, 32–33, 43–46. For sanctions against fornication, see ibid., 13; Michael D. Freeman and Christina M. Lyon, *Cohabitation without Marriage: An Essay in Law and Social Policy* (Aldershot, England: Gower, 1983); Edmund S. Morgan, "The Puritans and Sex" in Michael Gordon, ed., *The American Family in Social-Historical Perspective*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 311.

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ships fell on indentured servants who were impregnated by already married masters.[4]

For women of color, sexual norms evolved out of different cultural traditions and, for blacks, out of different sociolegal constraints imposed by slavery. Many Native American tribes condoned premarital intercourse and among some a first birth usually preceded marriage. Under bondage, blacks had no formal right to marry and their African heritage often provided no sanctions against premarital sexual activity. In a plantation culture, early fertility increased women's value. Accordingly, many slave communities did not stigmatize premarital intercourse or childbirth, although couples typically preferred stable unions when possible.[5]

In the mid-nineteenth century, the growth of religious revival movements and moral reform societies, together with the culture idealization of domesticity, more actively discouraged adolescent sexual relations. Conventional medical wisdom, which assumed that early intercourse drained "vital life forces," also contributed to that trend. Rates of premarital pregnancy declined to 10 percent and in white middle-class communities a strong double standard prevailed. The increasing importance of education, particularly for males, counseled against early marriage, while for most young women pregnancy without marriage was disastrous; the inadequacy of work and welfare options for mothers made single parenthood difficult, if not impossible. Gender discrimination in employment was widespread, and until the Depression, public assistance programs provided meager subsidies, while frequently excluding unmarried or otherwise "unfit" mothers from coverage. The social stigma against "fallen" women added to these difficulties and

[4] Henry B. Parkes, "Morals and Law Enforcement in Colonial New England," *New England Quarterly* 5 (1932): 431, 442–43; Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 13; D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 32–33, 43, 73. For a discussion of sexual images of women, see ibid., 43–46; Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, *Good Wives: Image and Reality in the Lives of Women in Northern New England, 1650–1750* (New York: Knopf, 1982).

[5] D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 8, 13, 65, 87, 97–100; James Axtell, *The Indian Peoples of Eastern America: A Documentary History of the Sexes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 71–72; John Upton Terrell and Donna M. Terrell, *Indian Women of the Western Morning: Their Life in Early America* (New York: Dial Press, 1974), 116–17, 121; Herbert G. Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), 295–96; Eugene D. Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 461, 465–66; Daniel Scott Smith, "The Long Cycle in American Illegitimacy and Prenuptial Pregnancy" in Peter Laslett, Karla Oosterveen, and Richard M. Smith, eds., *Bastardy and Its Comparative History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 37; Dorothy Sterling, ed., *We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 32–33. See also sources cited in fn. 7 below.

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the law did little to cushion their impact. Judicial determination of paternity and enforcement of child support was available in theory but often inaccessible in practice, given the financial, procedural, and psychological burdens of litigation. For most female adolescents, marriage was the only respectable solution to an early pregnancy. However, at least from an economic standpoint, that solution generally did not represent a major sacrifice, since few women expected to develop the educational and employment skills that would permit financial independence.[6]

Among some groups of women, the sanctions against premarital sexual activity were less pronounced. Young urban working-class women were less subject to community or family oversight and accounted for most of the rise of premarital pregnancy rates, to around 23 percent at the close of the nineteenth century. Although relatively well-to-do blacks assimilated white middle-class norms of chastity, many lower-class and rural black communities condoned premarital intercourse and out-of-wedlock births. Particularly among tenant farming families, child labor was a crucial economic asset, and early fertility often enhanced rather than diminished a woman's standing. Such attitudes frequently persisted among migrants. Within these communities, young single mothers received support from kinship networks that mitigated the costs of nonmarital childbearing.[7]

[6] The nineteenth-century cult of domesticity is reviewed in Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820–1960," *American Quarterly*, 18 (1966): 151. For religious revivalism and the growth of moral reform societies, see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in Victorian America* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 109–28. For medical wisdom, see Edward Clarke, *Sex in Education: Or a Fair Chance for Girls* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1873), 104, 137; Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre English, *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women* (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1978), 113–18; Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 10, D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 178–84; Harari and Vinovskis, "Adolescent Sexuality." For social welfare policies, see Michael B . Katz, *In the Shadow of the Poor House: A Social History of Welfare in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Mimi Abramovitz, *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 145; Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 266–67, 307–08. Discrimination in employment is reviewed in Alice Kessler-Harris, *Out to Work* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Deborah L. Rhode, *Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 38–48. As Constance Nathanson notes, the sanctions for illegitimacy varied somewhat, depending on whether the circumstances suggested "innocence betrayed," mental deficiency, hereditary weaknesses, or original sin. Despite these variations, however, there was "scarcely any other way [in which] a woman [could] lose status so completely," as Constance A. Nathanson, quoting Kingsley Davis, writes in *Dangerous Passage: The Social Control Sexuality in Women's Adolescence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), 104.

[7] Kathy Lee Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 62, 70–71, 108–10; Christine Stansell,

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In the culture generally, rates of premarital sexual intercourse jumped sharply during the 1920s and then remained stable until the 1960s. A variety of forces contributed to the liberalization of sexual mores: urbanization, wartime experiences, media images, and rising opportunities for unchaperoned activities in college, automobiles, and recreation centers such as dance halls. Alfred Kinsey's 1948 study reported that about half of all women and 90 percent of men had engaged in premarital sexual intercourse. But until the late 1960s, most women, particularly white middle-class women, viewed such intimacy as a prelude to marriage, and the dominant culture retained strong sanctions against out-of-wedlock births. Adolescents received mixed messages; the popularization of Freudian psychology and the sexual imagery flooding the media made intimate relations seem more acceptable, while teen advice manuals, parental pressures, and socioeconomic constraints gave the opposite signal. Polls during the 1950s and early 1960s revealed that only a quarter of all Americans approved of premarital intercourse. Most adults were equally opposed to sex education programs, which were commonly accused of "teaching vice to little children." The dominant message was the one popularized by a leading guide, *Facts of Life and Love for Teens*: "anything beyond a good night kiss could lead to trouble."[8]

That trouble was experienced disproportionately by women. Outside of certain black communities, young women who became pregnant often faced grim alternatives: undesired marriages, illegal and unsafe abortions, social ostracism, and exclusion from educational programs. Some temporary support and vocational assistance were available through homes for unwed mothers. Adoption agencies also of-

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City of Women: Sex and Class in New York (New York: Knopf, 1986), 178–186; D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 199–200, 272–73, 299–300; Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 49–63. For contemporary discussion of these patterns, see Carol B. Stack, *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 108–15; Leon Dash, *When Children Want Children: The Urban Crisis of Teenage Childbearing* (New York: William Morrow, 1989), 238–62.

[8] D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 256, 262–66, 333; Joseph F. Kett, *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1790 to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 258–60; Alfred C. Kinsey, Wardell B. Pomeroy, Clyde E. Martin, and Paul H. Gebhard, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1948), 321–26; B. K. Singh, "Trends in Attitudes Toward Premarital Sexual Relations," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 42 (1980): 387; David B. Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, *Learning Together: A History of Coeducation in American Schools* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 223 (discussing instruction in "vice"); Patricia J. Campbell, *Sex Education Books for Young Adults, 1892–1979* (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1979), 93 (discussing conduct beyond a kiss).

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fered placement alternatives for their infants, an option that about 90 percent of all single mothers accepted, generally under varying degrees of pressure. However, services for unwed parents were highly inadequate and could not mitigate the public stigma, psychological trauma, and educational and economic disadvantages that often accompanied nonmarital births. Such costs were exacerbated by a legal system that treated "promiscuous" female (but not male) adolescents as delinquent, and visited additional penalties on illegitimate children, such as exclusion from insurance and governmental entitlement programs.[9]

As this overview suggests, American norms for adolescent sexual expression and childbearing reveal strong variations but certain common themes. During some eras and within some subgroups, early premarital intercourse has not been viewed as especially problematic, provided that any resulting childbirth remained within marital unions or, in many black communities, within a kinship network. Yet for much of American history, the dominant white, middle-class culture has also imposed substantial costs on premarital sexual activity. Those costs have been paid largely by women.

The Evaluation of Reproductive Rights Law

Legal doctrine reflected and reinforced these broader cultural patterns. Until the nineteenth century, there was little formal regulation of birth-control practices. Folk wisdom regarding contraceptive techniques was passed down across generations and during the antebellum period some devices began to be advertised publicly. Relatively few married couples, however, appear to have practiced birth control. Effective contraception often required male cooperation or technical knowledge not yet available, and social norms encouraged high birth rates. For unmarried women, the only reliable means of limiting fertility was abortion. Under early common-law provisions, it was permissible until "quick-

[9] Karen DeCrow, *Sexist Justice* (New York: Random House, 1974), 268–79; Herma Hill Kay, *Text, Cases and Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination* (St. Paul, MN: West, 1988), 375–81. Maris Vinovskis, "An 'Epidemic' of Adolescent Pregnancy? Some Historical Considerations," *Journal of Family History* 6 (1981): 205 (discussing adoption rates); Jane Gross, "Anti-Abortion Revival: Homes for the Unwed," *New York Times*, 23 July 1989; Harry Krause, *Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Edward Vincent, "Illegitimacy," *International Encyclopedia of Social Science* (1988), 7, 85, 88; Rickie Solinger, *Wake Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race before Roe v. Wade* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 168–86. See also sources cited in fn. 8.

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ening," the point at which a fetus moved in the woman's body and, according to ecclesiastical doctrine, acquired a soul.[10]

During the nineteenth century, the same ideological forces that made premarital sexual activity less acceptable made birth control less accessible. In 1873, Congress passed the Comstock Law, which prohibited dissemination of information about abortion or contraception. Over the next several decades, all but one state made abortion a felony, and many raised the age at which females could legally consent to sexual activity. Such restrictions responded to various concerns. Moral reformers worried that any separation of sex from procreation would result in increased veneral disease, "psychological derangement," and social instability. In addition, the decline in fertility rates among the "better classes" during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sparked fears of "race suicide." Many physicians shared these concerns, and also found restrictions on abortion and contraceptive services to be an effective means of undercutting their competitors—midwives and other lay practitioners who provided such services. Although the organized medical profession generally presented its campaign against birth control in moral and spiritual terms, nineteenth-century religious leaders were relatively uninterested in the effort.[11]

Yet neither did the newly emerging feminist movement actively oppose the physicians' campaign, despite the significance of reproductive

[10] Linda Gordon, *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York: Grossman, 1976), 45–53, 69–71. Plantation economies benefited from high fertility rates, but some slaves nonetheless resorted to folk methods of birth control, especially when they were subjected to coerced intercourse with white owners or overseers. See Jessie M. Rodrique, "The Black Community and the Birth Control Movement" in Kathy Peiss and Christine Simmons with Robert A. Padgug, eds., *Passion and Power: Sexuality in History* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 138. See also Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, *Abortion and Woman's Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom* (New York: Longman, 1990), 45–50; James C. Mohr, *Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800–1900* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 18–43.

[11] John P. Harper, "Be Fruitful and Multiply: Origins of Legal Restrictions on Planned Parenthood in Nineteenth-Century America" in Carol Berkin and Mary Beth Norton, eds., *Women of America: A History* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 246–65; James Reed, *The Birth Control Movement and American Society: From Private Vice to Public Virtue* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 40–41, 188 (quoting Alexander Skene); William Henry Chafe, *The American Woman: Her Changing Sexual, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920–1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 100; Sheila M. Rothman, *Woman's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 46; Nancy Woloch, *Women and the American Experience* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 394; Kristin Luker, *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 27–28; Gordon, *Woman's Body*, 59–60; Reva Siegel, "Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection," *Stanford Law Review* 44 (1992): 261.

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issues for women's independence. To some movement leaders, these issues seemed "too narrow . . . and too sordid." For others, they were too threatening. Contraception appeared to reduce the risks of extramarital sex and thus to jeopardize traditional domestic relationships. For the vast majority of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century women, marriage and motherhood were the best source of economic security and social status. To most white middle-class wives, any threat to the family was a threat not worth provoking, particularly if the major gain was to license sexual activity, which many had experienced as a duty rather than a pleasure. Although most leaders of the women's rights movement were committed to "voluntary motherhood," they wished to ensure that it remained within marital relationships and that birth control occurred through abstinence rather than through other, "degrading," methods. Feminists recognized unwanted pregnancies as a "problem," but assumed that the solution was to eliminate unwanted sex.[12]

As a result, the initial campaign for reproductive freedom remained largely independent of the organized women's movement. Moreover, that campaign often lost sight of egalitarian principles and concrete concerns of many groups, including young, low-income, and minority women, who most needed assistance. In attempting to broaden their movement's appeal, most early family planning activists emphasized eugenics and supported policies giving physicians control over the distribution of birth control materials. Since few doctors were willing to provide such materials to unmarried minors, and low-income and minority women often lacked access to physicians' services, this approach left many sexually active couples without protection. Yet most leaders, including Margaret Sanger, disavowed any support for abortion and presented their preventive approach as a sufficient alternative.[13]

Appeals to eugenics helped fuel the campaign for sterilization practices that resulted in involuntary fertility control for thousands of slightly retarded or impoverished women, particularly among minority groups. During the 1890s, the development of reasonably safe surgical

[12] Carrie Chapman Catt, quoted in Gordon, *Woman's Body*, 109–11, 238; D'Emilio and Freedman, *Intimate Matters*, 57–73, 80–81; Reed, *Birth Control Movement*, 132.

[13] Ellen Chesler, *Woman of Valor: Margaret Sanger and the Birth Control Movement in America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); David M. Kennedy, *Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 115–21; Angela Y. Davis, *Women, Race & Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 210–19; Petchesky, *Abortion*, 87–93.

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techniques laid the foundations for a wave of compulsory sterilization laws, which received Supreme Court blessing in 1927. In *Buck v. Bell*, the Court permitted the sterilization of Carrie Buck, an institutionalized and assertedly "feeble-minded" daughter of a feeble-minded mother, after she had given birth to an illegitimate feeble-minded child. Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes concluded that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Subsequent evidence exposed the risks of such decision making. Carrie Buck does not appear to have been mentally deficient; she was institutionalized to hide a pregnancy resulting from rape by one of her foster relatives.[14]

In the late 1930s and 1940s, the eugenic sterilization movement began to decline, partly in response to scientific evidence undermining its premises and to the lessons of Nazi Germany. Without overruling *Buck*, the Supreme Court cast doubt on its reasoning and limited its application in a subsequent decision that invalidated mandatory sterilization laws for habitual criminals. However, family planners, public hospital administrators, and welfare officials continued to condition assistance on "consent" to sterilization by poor and minority women, who were assumed to lack competence or motivation for other birth-control techniques. Coercive and uninformed sterilization remained a major problem until the 1980s, when well-publicized litigation and the promulgation of federal regulations finally began to curb abuses. Yet proposals to coerce certain groups of women to allow implants of a long-term contraceptive, Norplant, have rekindled earlier concerns. In light of this legacy, birth-control strategies have often provoked suspicion or resistance within minority communities, and the issue continues to raise broader questions of nationalism, separatism, and cultural survival.[15]

[14] See Thomas M. Shapiro, *Population Control Politics: Women, Sterilization, and Reproductive Choice* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1985); Petchesky, *Abortion*, 130, 180; *Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927); J. Ralph Lindgren and Nadine Taub, *The Law of Sex Discrimination* (St. Paul, MN: West, 1988), 413 (discussing Stephen Jay Gould's analysis of *Buck v. Bell*).

[15] Petchesky, *Abortion*, 130, 159, 179–80; Lindgren and Taub, *Law of Sex Discrimination*, 413–18; *Skinner v. Oklahoma*, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Hyman Rodman, Betty Sarvis, and Joy Walker Bonar, *The Abortion Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 74 (describing medical services conditioned on agreement to sterilization); Robert G. Weisbord, *Genocide? Birth Control and the Black American* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); Patricia J. Williams, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 218; Philip Reilly, *The Surgical Solution: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in the United States* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Rodrique, "Black Community"; *People v. Johnson* (Tulare Supr. Ct. No. 29290, 2 January 1991) imposes the implant of Norplant as a condition of probation for black woman convicted of child abuse; Faye Wattleton, "Perspective on Race and Poverty: Using Birth Control as Coercion," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 January 1991 (describing the proposal to use

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Throughout most of the twentieth century, the reproductive rights movement has reflected class and racial biases. The movement's earliest legal victories involved reinterpretations of federal statutes to permit prescription and distribution of birth-control materials where permissible under state law (for example, in order to prevent disease). The result was that women who could afford a sympathetic private physician could usually obtain contraceptives. Those with sufficient resources were also sometimes able to establish a physical or psychological justification for a legal abortion; alternatively, they could afford a relatively safe illegal one, or travel to a more permissive jurisdiction. For the young, poor, uneducated, or unsophisticated, the options were far more limited. Despite efforts by some community organizations to provide assistance for low-income and minority groups, misconceptions about conception as well as deaths from self-induced abortions were common.[16]

Legal restraints on birth control gradually weakened in response to various cultural forces: liberalization of sexual mores, efforts to prevent veneral disease, women's rising educational opportunities and workforce participation, and increasing economic pressures to curtail fertility. After 1960, the availability of an oral contraceptive helped liberalize public attitudes and practices, and concerns about global overpopulation had similar effects.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that both responded and contributed to these trends. In 1965, a majority of justices interpreted the due process clause to protect private use of contraceptives by married couples. Decisions in 1972 and 1977 extended that right to unmarried minors. Although the justices' reasoning differed, a majority found constitutional grounding for a limited right of privacy in matters related to procreation. According to the Court's opinion in *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, the state's interest in discouraging promiscuity could not justify bans on contraceptive sales to minors since it would be "unreasonable" to infer "pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [as an appropriate] punishment for fornication." Due process and equal protection concerns also con-

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Norplant to reduce the underclass); Tamar Lewin, "A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control," *New York Times*, 9 February 1991 (describing Kansas state legislator's proposal to condition welfare benefits on agreement to use Norplant).

[16] Rodman, Sarvis, and Boner, *Abortion Question*, 154; Davis, *Class*, 210; Luker, *Abortion*, 36–39; Petchesky, *Abortion*, 45–50; Solinger, *Wake Up Little Susie*, 4–5. See Discussion in the text accompanying fn. 34–38.

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vinced lower courts to begin striking down public school policies that excluded unwed mothers but not unwed fathers.[17]

During the 1960s, many of the same forces underlying liberalized contraception policy also encouraged abortion-law reform. As improvements in medical technology reduced the circumstances in which abortion was necessary to preserve a mother's life, the rigidity of existing statutes became more apparent. Women's increased employment and sexual activity also increased the number of unwanted pregnancies. Physicians faced growing pressure to evade both the letter and spirit of the law, and that pressure was reflected in abortion rates. By the 1960s, most estimates indicated that about a million abortions were performed annually, few of them legally; approximately one abortion occurred for every three to four live births. Abortion was the most frequent form of criminal activity after gambling and narcotics violations, and its perpetrators were also its victims. Procedures could be painful and dangerous if performed hastily or by unskilled practitioners. Somewhere between one and ten thousand women died each year as a result of botched abortions, and more suffered permanent physical or psychological injuries. Predictably, those most at risk were young, poor, and minority women. These human costs prompted increasing reform activity.[18]

Changes in public sentiment were apparent in state legislative initiatives, in national opinion surveys, and ultimately in Supreme Court rulings. In 1973, the Supreme Court issued its landmark decision *Roe v. Wade*. There, a majority of justices concluded that an adult woman had fundamental privacy interests entitling her to terminate a pregnancy without restriction during its first trimester. That ruling set off some of the most strident and sustained criticism in the Court's history. In its aftermath, the justices remained enmeshed in controversies over maternal health and funding regulations designed to restrict abortions.[19]

[17] *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); *Eisenstadt v. Baird*, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972); *Carey v. Population Services International*, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); *Ordway v. Hargraves*, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); *Shull v. The Columbus Municipal Separate School District*, 338 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Miss. 1972); *Farley v. Reinhard* (No. 15569, N.D. Ga., 22 Sept. 1971) in *Clearinghouse Review* 5 (1972): 620; Barbara A. Babcock, Ann E. Freedman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, and Susan E. Ross, *Sex Discrimination and the Law: Cases and Remedies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 1033.

[18] Luker, *Abortion*, 55–76; Frederick S. Jaffe, Barbara L. Lindheim and Philip R. Lee, *Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), 22–24.

[19] *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

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Beginning in the late 1970s, the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions upholding some of the most substantial restrictions. In *Maher v. Roe* and *Harris v. McRae*, a majority of justices sustained denial of public funds for abortion even for women entitled to childbirth subsidies. Subsequent decisions in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services* (1989) and *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey* permitted further constraints on reproductive choice. *Webster* upheld bans on abortion in public facilities and permitted requirements of costly tests to determine fetal viability in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* struck down spousal notification provisions as an undue burden on reproductive choice but sustained other requirements, including pre-abortion waiting periods, provision of information concerning fetal development, reporting procedures for abortion facilities, and parental consent for minors. Although the Court declined invitations to overrule *Roe* and return abortion issues to state legislatures, it clearly signaled greater tolerance for state restrictions on reproductive rights. Since adolescents are disproportionately likely to lack private funds for abortions and to delay the decision to abort until after the first trimester, they are particularly vulnerable to such restrictions.[20]

In upholding limitations on reproductive choice, the Court has been strikingly insensitive to the needs of young and poor women. Underlying the majority's analysis is a revived form of the much-discredited distinction between benefits and burdens. According to the court in *Harris v. McRae*, the government has

> place[d] no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. . . . By making childbirth a more attractive alternative, the state may have influenced a woman's decision but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortion that was not already there. . . . The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.[21]

This reasoning is problematic on several levels. The notion that the state has played no role in creating economic constraints on choice suggests an extraordinary degree of myopia: welfare, education, em-

[20] *Maher v. Roe*, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey* 112 Sup. Ct. 2791 (1992); Jaffe et al., *Abortion Politics*, 143–45.

[21] *Harris v. McRae*, 448 U.S. at 316. See also *Maher v. Roe*, 432 U.S. at 474.

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ployment, housing, tax, and innumerable other public policies always affect income distribution. It is of course true that indigency limits the exercise of many fundamental rights. Yet it is also the case that the right at stake was as significant as others for which the Court has required state assistance, such as court costs in divorce proceedings or free transcripts for defendants in criminal cases. Moreover, the usual justification for the government's failure to provide such assistance — conserving scarce resources — has been unavailable in abortion-funding cases. When these cases arose, the average cost of subsidizing childbirth was close to ten times that of underwriting abortions. Since many indigents' children would also require continuing welfare support, the statutes in question have been inexplicable as revenue-saving measures. Rather, the government has sought to accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly: to coerce women into completing unwanted pregnancies.[22]

Federal regulations have sought to impose further restrictions on reproductive choice by barring provision of information about abortion in government-funded health programs. In 1991, in *Rust v. Sullivan*, the Supreme Court sustained those regulations on reasoning similar to that in *Harris*. Under the *Rust* majority's analysis, it was irrelevant that indigent women would be unable to obtain abortion-related services; those individuals were in no worse position than if the government chose not to provide any assistance at all. Yet as dissenting justices noted, such a decision ran counter to well established precedents holding that federal funds could not be conditioned on content-based restrictions of speech.[23]

The targets of these abortion-related restrictions are the women least able to protect themselves through conventional political channels and least able to support an additional child. Although most indigent women have continued to receive subsidies after federal cutbacks through state or private sources, limitations on funding and lack of information about its availability impose significant barriers. Young, unsophisticated teenagers have been among those most at risk. States with adolescent pregnancy initiatives generally prohibit the use of public funds for abortion and impose other limitations on access. The result, as

[22] Jaffe et al., *Abortion Politics*, 143–45. See also dissenting opinions in *Harris v. McRae* and *Maher v. Roe*.

[23] The regulations affect Title X-funded facilities, which serve some five million low-income women. *Rust v. Sullivan*, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).

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subsequent discussion suggests, is to constrain reproductive choices and increase their physical risks and psychological trauma.[24]

When questioned about the justice of the government's selective attempt to coerce childbirth, President Jimmy Carter replied that "there are many things in life that are not fair." Why the state should amplify that unfairness remains unanswered. Moreover, the political conflicts that have constrained abortion decision making have been equally apparent in policies specifically directed toward adolescent pregnancy. And the costs have been equally substantial.[25]

The Emergence of Adolescent Pregnancy as a Social Problem

The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the first perception of teenage pregnancy as a major social problem. The increase in public concern was not a function of increases in adolescent fertility. In fact, rates of childbirth among females ages 15–19 dropped 45 percent between 1957 and 1983, largely because of liberalization of contraceptive and abortion policy. Although the birth rate began to rise again in the late 1980s, it still remained substantially lower than in the decade before the *Roe* decision. When teenage childbearing became a focus of attention, the reasons had less to do with its frequency than with a cluster of volatile issues involving sexuality, abortion, family values, and welfare policy.[26]

During the past quarter-century, although fewer teens were having children, more were having sex, more were becoming pregnant, and more were becoming single mothers. By the late 1980s, the United

[24] Jaffe et al., *Abortion Politics*, 143–46; Stanley K. Henshaw, Asta N. Kenney, Debra Somberg, and Jennifer Van Vort, *Teenage Pregnancy in the United States: The Scope of the Problem and State Responses* (New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1989), 56; Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League et al., in *Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists* (1985), 14 (and sources cited therein); Laura Nsiah-Jefferson, "Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-Income Women" in Sherrill Cohen and Nadine Taub, eds., *Reproductive Laws for the 1990s* (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1988), 23; Dorothy L. Roberts, "The Future of Reproductive Choice for Poor Women and Women of Color," *Women's Rights Law Reporter* 12 (1990): 59, 63n35.

[25] Jimmy Carter, quoted in Sylvia Law, "Rethinking Sex and the Constitution," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 132 (1984): 1016n219.

[26] Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 25; Elise F. Jones et al., *Teenage Pregnancy in Industrialized Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 37; National Center for Health Statistics, *Advanced Report of Final Natality* (1985) (in 1985 there were 51 births per thousand teens; in 1970; there were 68.3); National Center for Health Statistics, *Advanced Report on Final Natality Statistics, 1988* (1990) (from 1986 to 1988, the birthrate climbed 10 percent among 15-, 16-, and 17-year-olds).

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States had the highest teen pregnancy rate in the developed world. Approximately 45 percent of adolescent females were sexually active before marriage, an increase of over 15 percent since 1971, and substantial numbers used contraceptives intermittently or ineffectively. The result was a million teen pregnancies each year, and about four-fifths of these were unintentional. An estimated four out of every ten American women were becoming pregnant at least once before age 20, a rate that has doubled since 1950. About half of that group were carrying their pregnancy to term (20 percent of all adolescents), and half of those who did so were unmarried. By the late 1980s, estimates indicated that less than 5 percent of all unmarried teens and less than 1 percent of blacks were placing their children for adoption, a dramatic shift from earlier eras. The rate of teenage childbirth among blacks has become almost two and one-half times greater than among whites; among Hispanics, the rates have become almost twice as great. Over a quarter of single black women have had at least one child by the age of 18. Although teens under age 15 have accounted for only 2 percent of all adolescent mothers, their rate of pregnancy has been increasing.[27]

Although such patterns are widely assumed to constitute a social problem, there is no consensus on its cause or cure. At the risk of some oversimplification, it makes sense to distinguish two dominant positions in public debate. Most liberals "begin with the premise that teenagers should not have babies [while most] conservatives begin with the premise that single teenagers should not have sex." For conservatives, the problem involves primarily moral and fiscal concerns: premarital sexuality is not only objectionable in itself, it promotes other objectionable practices, such as abortion and the destruction of fetal "life," or nonmarital childbearing and the erosion of traditional values

[27] Jones et al., "Teenage Pregnancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications," *Family Planning Perspectives* 17 (1985): 53, 56–57; Janet Benshoff and Harriet Pilpel, "Minors' Rights to Confidential Abortions: The Evolving Legal Scene" in J. Douglas Butler and David F. Walbert, eds., *Abortion, Medicine and the Law* (New York: Facts on File, 1986), 137–44; Cheryl D. Hayes, ed., *Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy and Childbearing* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), 1, 15, 50, 52–67; Claire Brindis and Rita J. Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenting in California: A Strategic Plan for Action* (San Francisco: Center for Population and Reproductive Health Policy, University of California, 1988), 32–41 (discussing increase in sexually active teens and divergence in estimated adoption rates of .4 percent for black teens and 12.2 percent of whites); Gross, "Anti-Abortion Revival" (quoting the president of The National Committee for Adoption), A-25; Children's Defense Fund, *Teenage Pregnancy: An Advocate's Guide to the Numbers* (Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, 1988), 11, 22; "Young Teen-agers Have More Babies," *New York Times*, 31 August 1991.

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and financial self-sufficiency. For liberals, the problem involves primarily health and socioeconomic status: single parenthood is linked with disrupted education, reduced employment opportunities, and an increased likelihood of poverty for mothers, as well as heightened medical risks and developmental difficulties for their children.[28]

Each of these definitions of the problem is itself problematic on both descriptive and prescriptive levels. Most conservative and liberal accounts distort the dynamic they seek to counteract. Both constituencies have overstated the adverse consequences of adolescent pregnancy and understated the barriers to addressing it. Such distortions are in some sense endemic to the American political process. The most effective way of getting an issue onto the policy agenda is usually to paint it as a crisis that can be addressed without major political conflict or financial expenditure. Yet the construction of the issue best suited to attracting public notice and building coalitions for reform is often ill suited to generating adequate policy responses. This is clearly the case with adolescent pregnancy. Conflicting definitions of the problem have resulted in political compromises that are inadequate to serve societal needs.[29]

From conservatives' perspective, recent increases in teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and nonmarital childbirth are both a cause and consequence of deeper social difficulties. As growing numbers of adolescents reject conventional family patterns, more adults have viewed the situation with subdued "moral panic." In their view, the problem is immorality, not poverty, and stems from cultural permissiveness, a decline in parental authority, and a weakening of community sanctions against illegitimacy.[30]

[28] For conservative objections, see Carole E. Joffe, *The Regulation of Sexuality: Experiences of Family Planning Workers* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 45 (quoting Cunnaught Marshner); and sources cited in n. 30. For liberal perspectives see Dorothy I. Height, "What Must Be Done about Children Having Children," *Ebony,* March 1985, 78; Joycellyn Elders, Jennifer Hui, and Steff Padilla, "Adolescent Pregnancy: Does the Nation Really Care?" *Berkeley Women's Law Journal* (1989–1990): 170; Children's Defense Fund, *Teenage Pregnancy*. For discussion of the disadvantages connected with teenage pregnancy, see ibid. and Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 123–9.

[29] Evelyn L. Brodkin, "Teen Pregnancy and the Dilemmas of Social Policy Making" in Margaret K. Rosenheim and Mark F. Testa, ed., *Early Parenthood and the Transition to Adulthood* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, forthcoming).

[30] See Nathanson, *Dangerous Passage,* 16 (arguing that moral panic is particularly likely when normative violations are compounded by normative conflict over the legitimacy of traditional roles); Sonia L. Nazario, "Abortion Foes Pose Threat to the Funding of Family Planning," *Wall Street Journal,* 8 March 1990 (quoting Tom Phillips, president of Catholics Serving the Lord: "Whenever you increase accessibility, you increase use . . . [and] the problems that go along with use," and Joe Scheidler, founder of the Chicago Pro-Life Action League, claiming that clinics promote a "contraceptive mentality" in which "people are just having sex for fun").

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That position gained increasing public attention during the 1992 presidential campaign. Vice President Dan Quayle attracted substantial media coverage, first by calling for social sanctions against unmarried women (including a leading television-series character) who bear children and call it "just another lifestyle choice." He subsequently faced questions about how he would reconcile his absolutist antiabortion commitments with family values if his own daughter told him that she had decided to have an abortion. Initially he responded that he would "counsel her and talk to her, and support her whatever decision she made," although he hoped she would not choose an abortion. After widespread outcry from all points on the political spectrum, he backpedaled slightly. Both he and his wife, Marilyn Quayle, made it clear that if their daughter were to become pregnant now, at age 13, "she'll take the child to term." However, he reaffirmed his willingness to support whatever decision an adult daughter made. This compromise hardly mollified many commentators, who noted the hypocrisy of his support for a choice by his own family member that he would deny to women generally. Others noted the irony of his double standards, which are reflected in current abortion law. In the "Quayle world, an 18-year-old gets to be supported whatever her decision. A 13-year-old gets to have a baby. This is no joke. It's the foolishness that passes now for public policy."[31]

From conservatives' perspective, however, these policies are still too permissive. Public subsidies for birth-control programs are held accountable for legitimating conduct they should seek to prevent. According to New Right legislators such as former Senator Jeremiah Denton, author of the federal Adolescent and Family Life Act, "the most effective oral contraceptive yet devised is the word 'no.'" Under conservatives' analyses, any outreach program designed to prevent pregnancy rather than sex appears counterproductive; it encourages the activity that creates the problem.[32]

[31] Kevin Sack, "Quayle Insists Abortion Remarks Don't Signal Change in His View," *New York Times*, 24 July 1992; Ellen Goodman, "Abortion Double Standard," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 30 July 1992. Then presidential candidate Bill Clinton, who supports both choice and parental consent provisions, more deftly avoided confrontation with that double standard. When asked a similar question about what he would do if his 12-year-old daughter were pregnant, Clinton responded, "I wouldn't talk to the press about it." Sack, above (quoting Clinton).

[32] Petchesky, *Abortion*, 270 (quoting Orrin Hatch and Jeremiah Denton); Allan C. Carlson, *Family Questions: Reflections on the American Social Crises* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1988), 102–03 (blaming family planning clinics for increased sexual activity); Bob Gould, "Fear of Feminism: The Right Wing and Family Values," *Social Justice* 17 (1990): 141, 143.

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Most available research, however, fails to support such claims. Studies of contraceptive and abortion services generally find no evidence that their availability has increased sexual activity. The vast majority of adolescents seek assistance only after they have engaged in sexual intercourse. Comparative data underscore the point. Many European countries have rates of adolescent sexual activity equivalent to those in the United States, but substantially higher rates of contraceptive use and lower rates of adolescent pregnancy and abortion.[33]

Although liberals tend to be more permissive toward teenage sexual activity, they are typically no less judgmental than conservatives about teenage childbirth. Both groups share assumptions about the experience of adolescent pregnancy that rest on dubious factual premises. Most public debate conflates unintended with unwanted pregnancy and ignores data indicating that adolescent attitudes fall across a spectrum. The frequent caricature of children having children is highly distorted: two thirds of all births to teenagers are to 18- and 19-year-olds, and only a tiny percentage are to mothers under 16. The equally common assumption that early pregnancy constitutes a direct path to poverty is equally exaggerated. The leading longitudinal study by Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn, and Morgan, involving predominantly black adolescent mothers in Baltimore, found that the majority was eventually able to obtain a high school education, secure full-time employment, and avoid welfare dependency. About two thirds of the children have completed or are close to completing comparable levels of schooling and only a quarter have become teenage parents themselves.[34]

[33] Melody G. Embree and Tracy A. Dobson, "Parental Involvement in Adolescent Abortion Decisions: A Legal and Psychological Critique," *Law and Inequality* 10 (1991): 53, 58; Brigid Rentoul, "Cognitus Interruptus: The Courts and Minors' Access to Contraceptives," *Yale Law and Policy Review* 5 (1986): 212, 231–32nn99–100; Eve Paul and Dana Klassa, "Minors' Right to Confidential Contraceptive Services: The Limits of State Action," *Women's Rights Law Reporter* 10 (1987): 45, 45n11; Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr., *Poor Women, Poor Families: The Economic Plight of America's Female-Headed Households* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), 92–93; Ann Harper, "Teenage Sexuality and Public Policy: An Agenda for Gender Education" in Irene Diamond, ed., *Families, Politics, and Public Policy: A Feminist Dialogue on Women and the State* (New York: Longman, 1983), 220; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 153, 208; Jones et al., "Teenage Pregnancy," 57–58.

[34] See fn. 28 and Diana M. Pearce, "'Children Having Children': Teenage Pregnancy and Public Policy from the Woman's Perspective" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*. Compare Elders, Hui, and Padilla, "Adolescent Pregnancy," 170–71 (arguing that adolescent pregnancy eliminates "any glimmer of hope for [teenagers'] future," and that a "poor teenager with a baby is captive to a slavery the 13th Amendment did not anticipate") with Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, and S. Philip Morgan, *Adolescent Mothers in Later Life* (Cambridge, England) Cambridge University Press, 1987), and Frank Furstenberg, Jr., Mary Elizabeth Hughes, and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, "The Next Generation: Children of Teenage Mothers Grow Up" in Rosenheim and Testa, *Early Parenthood*. See also Sarah McCue Horwitz, Lorraine V. Klerman, H. Sung Kuo, and James

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So, too, many factors commonly assumed to be consequences of early pregnancy—educational difficulties, low self-esteem, poverty, and unemployment—appear to be partial causes as well. For example, although adolescent mothers are more likely to drop out of school than peers of similar socioeconomic backgrounds, it is unclear how much of this difference is due to childbearing and how much to lower academic commitment and competence. Recent studies suggest that most young mothers leave school before becoming pregnant rather than the converse and that mothers who give birth while in school are as likely to graduate as their peers. If such findings are confirmed, then labeling early parenthood the paramount problem will misrepresent the appropriate solution.[35]

A growing number of scholars has also suggested that early pregnancies are more adaptive for economically and racially subordinate groups than is commonly acknowledged. According to researchers such as Arline Geronimus, Mary Edwards, and Mark Testa, teenagers who are no longer in school may find advantages to having their most intensive parenting demands during a period when they have fewest employment opportunities and greatest access to free childcare assistance from their relatives. Since young black mothers are likely to live in an extended family, they often have better access to networks of kin support and childcare than older mothers. From a physiological standpoint, early motherhood is far less problematic than conventional accounts imply. Most health risks currently associated with teenage childbirth are attributable to socioeconomic status and the failure to obtain adequate prenatal care. If such care were available, some analysts believe that childbearing by poor women between ages 16 and 19 would

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F. Jekel, "Intergenerational Transmission of School Age Parenthood," *Family Planning Perspectives* (1991): 168 (reporting the longitudinal study finding that most children of teenage parents had not become teenage parents themselves and noting that studies finding correlation of early parenthood between mothers and offspring failed to control for relevant demographic variables); Sarah McCue Horwitz, Lorraine V. Klerman, H. Sung Kuo, and James F. Jekel, "School-age Mothers: Predictors of Long-Term Educational and Economic Outcomes," *Pediatrics* 87 (1991): 862.

[35] For discussion of interrelationships and causal ambiguities, see Frank Furstenberg, Jr. and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, "Teenage Childbearing: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies" in Linda N. Aiken and David M. Mechanic, eds., *Applications of Social Science to Clinical Medicine and Health Policy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 307, 316–17. See also Claire Brindis, "Antecedents and Consequences: The Need for Diverse Strategies in Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*. For school drop-out findings, see Dawn Upchurch and James McCarthy, "The Timing of First Birth and High School Completion," *American Sociological Review* 55 (1990): 224; Randall J. Olsen and George Farkas, "Endogenous Covariates in Duration Models and the Effect of Adolescent Childbirth on Schooling," *Journal of Human Resources* 19 (1989): 39.

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pose fewer risks to mothers or newborns than later childbearing because many medical problems associated with poverty increase with age.[36]

Such claims have become matters of considerable dispute. Some commentators challenge the conclusions regarding health difficulties and claim that if risks to infants after the first few months of birth are considered, early childrearing carries significant disadvantages. Recent research also suggests that a substantial number of young mothers remain outside of support networks and find family childcare inadequate. Even if, as the Baltimore study suggests, most adolescent mothers are eventually able to achieve financial independence, a significant number experiences enduring poverty and many face prolonged periods of severe hardships. So, too, children of teenage mothers have disproportionate difficulties, such as high rates of delinquency and low rates of educational attainment. Although it is unclear how much of their problem is attributable to socioeconomic variables and how much to parentage age and capacity, at least some evidence suggests that young adolescents are less well equipped for certain childbearing demands. In any event, the existence of such controversies points up the need for qualifications largely missing in current policy debates.[37]

Similar qualifications are necessary to assess conventional solutions for the adolescent pregnancy "problem." Recent data call into question the widespread assumption that economically and racially subordinate groups gain significant benefits from deferring parenthood until marriage or the completion of education. Divorce rates for such young

[36] Arline T. Geronimus, "On Teenage Childbearing and Neonatal Mortality in the United States," *Population and Development Review* 13 (1987): 245, 253, 260–62; Mary G. Edwards, "Teenage Childbearing: Redefining the Problem for Public Policy" (paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 30 August 1990); Mark Testa, "Racial Variation in the Early Life Course of Adolescent Welfare Mothers" in Rosenheim and Testa, *Early Parenthood*; Catherine Riessman and Constance Nathanson, "The Management of Reproduction: Social Construction of Risk and Responsibility" in Aiken and Mechanic, *Applications of Social Science*, 251, 262–63.

[37] Karen Pittman, *Special Report: A Rebuttal of Two Controversial Teen Pregnancy Studies* (Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, May 1990) (criticizing Geronimus's study for considering only neonatal morality while excluding risks to older infants and for relying on dated studies of caregiving networks); Cathy Trost, "Census Survey of Child Care Increases Concern about How Much Poor Can Pay," *Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 1990 (noting studies documenting many low-income women's preference for nonfamily childcare); Furstenberg, Brooks-Gunn, and Morgan, *Adolescent Mothers*; Furstenberg et al., "The Next Generation"; Anne C. Peterson and Lisa J. Crockett, "Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy and Childrearing: Developmental Perspectives" in Rosenheim and Testa, *Early Parenthood* (noting ambiguities concerning parental competence); Irwin Garfinkel and Sara McLanahan, *Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1986) (discussing parental competence).

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couples are substantial, and various factors, including relatively high rates of unemployment, violence, suicide, and substance abuse, have reduced the pool of eligible male partners. Although the extent to which such factors explain current racial differences in family formation remains subject to debate, it is clear that marriage is not an adequate solution for many pregnant adolescents.[38]

Moreover, because women of color remain concentrated in occupations that offer low pay and little return for completing secondary education, they often have relatively little to lose from early childbearing. Thus, some longitudinal studies have found little differences in the labor market position of black women who gave birth in their teens and those who did not. Similar findings have emerged from research comparing adolescents who became mothers with their sisters who delayed childbearing: deferral of parenthood and additional schooling did not significantly increase income or reduce welfare dependency. By contrast, a recent study of largely black Baltimore teenagers found that those who obtained abortions did better economically and educationally than adolescents who gave birth, even after controlling for various demographic and motivational factors.[39]

Although such conflicting data underscore the need for further research, one general point attracts widespread consensus. Childbirth patterns are responsive to socioeconomic and cultural forces that vary considerably across class, race, and ethnicity. Expectations about future opportunities play an important role in shaping collective norms and individual choices at both conscious and preconscious levels.

The point of this discussion is not, as Arline Geronimus emphasizes, that "in the best of all possible worlds, teen childbearing would be personally or socially optimal." It is, however, to suggest that "we are very far from the best of all possible worlds, and that there are serious flaws in the logic of current policy approaches intended to get us there."

[38] See fn. 39, below; William J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Margaret C. Simms, "Adolescent Pregnancy among Blacks in the United States: Why Is It a Policy Issue?" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*; Maris Vinovskis, "Teenage Pregnancy and the Underclass," *Public Interest* 93 (1988): 87.

[39] Compare Elaine McCrate, "Labor Market Segmentation and Relative Black/White Teenage Birth Rates," *Review of Black Political Economy* (1990): 37; Shelly Lundberg and Robert D. Plotneck, "Teenage Childbearing and Adult Wages," Discussion Paper 90–24 (Washington, DC: Institute for Economic Resources, 1989) (finding that premarital birth reduces wages for white but not black women); Arline T. Geronimus and Sanders Korenman, "The Socioeconomic Consequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered," Research Report 90-190 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Population Studies Center, Sept. 1990); and A. Steven Holmes, "Teenage Study Hints Gain for Those Having Abortion," *New York Times*, 25 January 1990.

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As the following discussion makes clear, conflict and confusion over the nature of the adolescent pregnancy "crisis" has seriously compromised societal responses.[40]

Adolescent Pregnancy as a Policy Issue

The central problem in formulating public policies on adolescent pregnancy lies in too narrow a definition of what the problem is. According to the most comprehensive cross-cultural data from Western industrialized nations, two key factors accounting for the high teenage fertility rate in the United States are the culture's "ambivalent, sometimes puritanical attitudes regarding sex" and the existence of a large population subgroup that is economically deprived. At the ideological level, the problem in formulating policy lies in cultural conflict about sexual expression, family authority, and reproductive choice. At the material level, the problem reflects an unwillingness to translate societal concerns into financial commitments and to invest in the necessary research and support structures for populations at risk.[41]

Much of the difficulty in designing adolescent pregnancy policy reflects deeper cultural ambivalence. Few if any societies exhibit a more perverse combination of permissiveness and prudishness in their treatment of sexual issues. A majority of Americans no longer view premarital intercourse as wrong, and the media bombards teens with scenes of sexual involvement and innuendo. Sex is often presented as a goal in and of itself, with little discussion of its risks or of responsible contraceptive behavior. Female adolescents remain subject to double standards that make spontaneous intercourse seem acceptable but suggest that adequate preparation is evidence of promiscuity. Conventional norms present casual sex as unacceptable but declare teenagers too young for serious relationships. On major television networks, sex sells everything from automobiles to laundry detergent but advertisements for birth control remain almost taboo. Our cultural imagery links masculinity with sexual prowess and femininity with sexual attractiveness. Yet we expect decision makers to pay homage to traditional values and accept policies that preach abstinence and restrict adolescent access to birth control.[42]

[40] Geronimus, "On Teenage Childbearing," 273n14.

[41] Jones et al., *Teenage Pregnancy in Industrialized Countries*, 230.

[42] Ibid., 58–62, 240; Brindis and Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenting in California*, 45–48; Patricia Voydanoff and Brenda W. Donnelly, *Adolescent Sexuality and Pregnancy* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), 22–27; see fns. 48–50, below.

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This cultural ambivalence over teenage sexual activity has been apparent in the increasing federal, state, and local policies that address the issue. In 1978 Congress passed the first national legislation specifically focusing on teenage pregnancy—the Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy Prevention Act. In essence, the act amended a prior statute to make federally funded contraceptive services (excluding abortion) available to adolescents. As reviews of that legislation make clear, congressional debate was ahistorical, uninformed, and more attentive to political pressures than to adolescent needs. By supporting contraception as an alternative to abortion, the act was able to unite pro-choice and pro-life constituencies. However, it provided such limited services for such a limited percentage of teens that its impact remained minimal. In addition, the statute's inadequate provision for evaluation prevented informed judgments about which subsidized services were most cost-effective.[43]

Three years later, Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which reflected a similar political compromise. The legislation secured support for pilot demonstration projects and their evaluation, but funding limitations again prevented adequate analysis of program impact. Moreover, the act focused on encouraging "chastity" and "sexual self-discipline" rather than on providing contraceptive services, and banned any use of federal funds for abortion counseling. Many programs receiving AFLA funds have been religious. Their instruction has included distribution of pamphlets on "Reasons to Wait," which remind readers that "God wants us to be pure," and advise them to "pretend Jesus was on [their] date." Despite evidence of widespread church-state entanglement, a 1988 Supreme Court decision sustained the act. Funding for AFLA programs has remained at low levels, and its limited availability reflects an uneasy political truce. Federal policy remains caught in the crossfire between liberals, who favor government-subsidized birth-control services for adolescents, and conservatives, who argue that providing such assistance undermines parental authority and legitimates sexual promiscuity.[44]

[43] Pub. L. No. 95-626. Tit. VI, 92 Stat. 3595–3601; Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 32–39.

[44] Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578, 42 U.S.C. paras. 300z ff; Maris Vinovskis, "The Use and Misuse of Social Science Analysis in Federal Adolescent Pregnancy Policy," *Social Science Research Institute* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Distinguished Lecture Series, November 1989); *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 27 June 1981, 1153; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 22–25; Appellee's Document No. 73, Docket No. 87-253, *Bowen v. Kendrick*, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). See also fns. 28, 30, above; Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 198–294.

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Similar political controversies have occurred at state and local levels and have resulted in similar policy constraints. During the 1980s, over two-thirds of the states developed initiatives regarding adolescent pregnancy, but only a few targeted contraception for significant efforts. Although about three-fourths of all high schools and junior high schools offered some form of sex education, only about a fifth identified adolescent pregnancy as one of their concerns. To avoid antagonizing vocal conservative minorities, many local decision makers have vetoed both contraceptive counseling and school-based clinic services. By the early 1990s, only about one hundred clinics were operating nationwide, and only about two dozen schools had condom distribution programs: over half of all sexually active teens lacked adequate reproductive health services. The cost, inaccessible locations, and nonconfidentiality of existing programs have imposed substantial barriers to contraceptive choice.[45]

A related limitation in existing policies involves federal inattention to male attitudes and behavior. Program design has often proceeded as if pregnancy occurs via the stork. Too little focus has centered on men who pressure their partners to have sex or to have a baby that will demonstrate their own virility but who are unable or unwilling to support a child. Particularly in low-income communities, rising rates of unemployment, school failure, drug use, and criminal activity have compromised opportunities for responsible parenting. Although federal policy has begun to give more attention to fathers, its scope has been severely constrained, and only a few states with adolescent pregnancy initiatives address such needs.[46]

[45] Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 194–203; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 143–45; Elders, Hui, and Padilla, "Adolescent Pregnancy," 177; Henshaw, Kenney, Somberg, and Van Vort, *Teenage Pregnancy*, 46, 65; Theodora Downs and Susan Solonka, *Background Briefing Report, Evolving State Policies on Teen Pregnancy and Parenthood: What More Can the Feds Do to Help* (Washington, DC: Family Impact Seminar, American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, 1990); Jacqueline Darroch Forrest and Jane Silverman, "What Public School Teachers Teach about Preventing Pregnancy, AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Diseases," *Family Planning Perspectives* 21 (1989): 65 (noting that on the average, schools devote less than two hours a year to contraceptive instruction, and many withhold all information concerning birth control); Carole Joffe, "Sexual Politics and the Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Worker in the United States" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*; Tamar Lewin, "Studies on Teenage Sex Cloud Condom Debate," *New York Times*, 8 February 1991. See also fns. 43–44, above, and 46–51, below.

[46] Children's Defense Fund, *Adolescent and Young-Adult Fathers: Problems and Solutions* (Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, 1988); 2–6, 16–18; Children's Defense Fund, *What about the Boys: Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Strategies* (Washington, DC: Children's Defense Fund, 1988); Catherine Chilman, "Feminist Issues in Teenage Parenting," *Child Welfare* 64 (1985): 225; Brindis and Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenting in California*, 133–34; Vinovskis, "*Epidemic*," 166–68. For discussion of the disjuncture between norms supporting parental responsibility and the

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The cost of these policy limitations is considerable. Restrictions on contraceptive services discourage contraception, not sex. Many teens grossly underestimate the risk of unprotected sexual activity and overestimate the risks of various forms of contraception. Given the increasing rates of unintended pregnancies, AIDS, and drug-addicted offspring among teenage populations, federal refusal to provide adequate outreach services carries enormous personal and social costs.[47]

Parental consent requirements in birth-control programs have reflected similar political compromises, and adolescents have paid the price. A 1981 regulation by the Department of Health and Human Services would have required parental notification for teens seeking contraceptives in all federally funded clinics. Although lower federal courts enjoined enforcement of that "squeal rule," subsequent surveys indicated that about a fifth of hospitals and well over a third of private physicians voluntarily have required parental consent before prescribing contraception. Many states and localities have similarly mandated parental involvement for minors seeking abortions, while over a third of hospitals and about a fifth of surveyed clinics have voluntarily adopted comparable rules. Such restrictions reflect another attempt to mediate between conservatives, who oppose any abortion or provision of birth control to adolescents, and liberals, who favor such assistance.[48]

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capacity of low-income fathers to provide assistance, see Mercer Sullivan, *The Male Role in Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting: New Directions for Public Policy* (New York: Vera Institute for Justice, 1990); Mercer Sullivan and the Study Group on the Male Role in Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting, "Absent Fathers in the Inner City," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (1989): 48; Henshaw, Kenney, Somberg, and Van Vort, *Teenage Pregnancy*, 51.

[47] See text accompanying fn. 33; Embree and Dobson, "Parental Involvement," 58; Catharine Chilman, *Adolescent Sexuality in a Changing American Society: Social and Psychological Perspectives* (Washington, DC: Dept. & Publications No. [NIH] 79-1426, 1979, 2nd ed. 1983); Kristin Luker, *Taking Chances: Abortion and the Decision Not to Contracept* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Kristin A. Moore, Margaret C. Simms, and Charles L. Betsey, *Choice and Circumstance: Racial Differences in Adolescent Sexuality and Fertility* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1986), 31–32; Dash, *When Children Want Children*, 68, 115, 127, 136. Also see fn. 58, below.

[48] 48 Fed. Reg. 3600, 3614 (1983); Rentoul, "Cognitus Interruptus"; *Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Schweiker*, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983); *State of New York v. Heckler*, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983); American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, *Minor's Rights to Abortion: The Challenge to California's Parental Consent Laws* (San Francisco: American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, 1991). See also fn. 52, below; American Civil Liberties Union, Reproductive Freedom Project, *Parental Notice Laws: Their Catastrophic Impact on Teenagers' Right to Abortion* (New York: American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 1986); Benshoof and Pilpel, "Minors Rights," 152n60; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 155. By the late 1980s, about twenty states had parental involvement mandates, but over half were not in force because of judicial or administrative determinations of unconstitutionality. See ACLU *Parental Notice Laws*.

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Litigation challenging parental notification and consent policies has also resulted in compromises, and they make little long-term sense. In a series of cases during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Supreme Court held that states could require parental consent or notification for abortion services to minors as long as adjudicative procedures were available to bypass such requirements under specified circumstances. To a majority of justices, parental involvement rules were justified by the "peculiar vulnerability" of adolescence and the importance of preserving family ties. However, a minor should be able to avoid consent and notice requirements by establishing in court either that she is sufficiently mature and well informed to make an independent decision concerning abortion or that, even if she is immature, the abortion would be in her best interest.[49]

In 1990, a sharply divided Court sustained further restrictions on adolescents' abortion rights. A majority of justices in *Hodgson v. Minnesota* upheld a requirement that both parents be notified before an adolescent's abortion if a judicial procedure is available to bypass that requirement under the circumstances previously identified. In *Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Services*, the Court sustained a legislative scheme that required physicians personally to notify one parent, placed heightened burdens of proof on minors seeking judicial bypass of the notice requirement, imposed delays of up to twenty-two days for bypass applicants, and failed to insure confidentiality. In upholding the reasonableness of these regulations, the majority concluded: "It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and mature. . . . It would deny all dignity to the family to say that the State cannot take this reasonable step in regulating its health professions to ensure that, in most cases, a young woman will receive guidance and understanding from a parent.[50]

On a symbolic level, this resolution is understandable. As one California legislator noted, most decision makers "are parents too." And most parents feel that they should be involved in matters that call for mature guidance. A notice-plus-bypass procedure affirms the value of parental involvement but also recognizes that in some instances such

[49] *Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft*, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); *H. L. v. Matheson*, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); *Bellotti v. Baird*, 443 U.S. 622, 634–35, 637–39, 643–44 (1979); *Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth*, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

[50] *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); *Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Services*, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).

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involvement may result in punitive or otherwise counterproductive measures. Yet on a practical level, this compromise carries significant costs, and the law has offered a poor forum for assessing them. Legislative and judicial decision making generally has proceeded without demanding or assembling adequate data on the effects of mandatory parental involvement. Do such requirements result in greater communication on matters involving sexuality and birth control? What are the consequences for teenagers? How many experience better parental relations, how many suffer increased physical risks from self-help or delayed decisions to abort, how many decide not to abort, and what are the effects of that decision? Finally, how well are legal procedures likely to function? How many minors evade consent requirements by seeking abortions out of state? Do petitions to bypass parental involvement result in thoughtful exercise of judicial discretion? Or should the resources consumed by courts and counsel in bypass cases be directed to more productive approaches, such as pregnancy prevention?[51]

Although initial legislative and judicial decision making proceeded without systematic evidence on these points, subsequent research has provided partial answers. Yet the data available have had disturbingly little policy impact. For example, parental knowledge does not correlate with more effective contraceptive practices on the part of adolescents. About half of all adolescents seek birth control services without informing their parents, and about half that group (a quarter of all teens) will not seek such assistance if parents must consent or receive notification. Only 2 percent of surveyed adolescents indicate that policies requiring parental involvement would cause them to restrict their sexual activity. Statutory notice requirements do not significantly increase the likelihood that teenagers will consult their parents on birth control matters.[52]

[51] Mark E. Rust, "Old Enough to Conceive, Old Enough to Abort?" *California Lawyer* 49 (March 1988): 30, 35 (quoting Maxine Waters); Robert M. Mnookin, "*Bellotti v. Baird:* A Hard Case" in Robert H. Mnookin, ed., *In the Interests of Children* (New York: W. H. Freeman 1985), 149. For a critique of the Supreme Court's approach to adolescent pregnancy issues, see Ruth Colker, "An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class," *Duke Law Journal* (1991): 324.

[52] Mnookin, "*Bellotti v. Baird,*" 149; Asta M. Kennedy, Jacqueline D. Forrest, and Aida Torres, "Storm over Washington: The Parental Notification Proposal," *Family Planning Perspectives* 14 (1982): 185, 190; Susan F. Newcomer and J. Richard Udry, "Parent-Child Communication and Adolescent Sexual Behavior," *Family Planning Perspectives* 17 (1985): 169, 189; Blum et al., "The Impact of a Parental Notification Law on Adolescent Abortion Decision-Making," *American Journal of Public Health* 77 (1987): 619–20 (showing that in Minnesota, which has a notification law, 65

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Nor have judicial bypass procedures usefully contributed to adolescent decision making. Of some 1,300 Massachusetts abortion cases involving petitions to bypass parental consent, courts found the adolescent to be mature in 90 percent of these cases and in all but five of the remainder held that abortion was in her best interest. Four of those cases were either overturned on appeal or resulted in abortions authorized by another judge. In the single case where the court refused to permit termination of the pregnancy, the petitioner accomplished that objective in another state. Although the frequency of adolescent abortion has declined in Massachusetts since the implementation of consent requirements, almost all the decline appears attributable to an increase in out-of-state abortions.[53]

Studies of other state notification procedures similarly find that all but a tiny percentage of bypass petitions are granted, but that the procedure itself imposes substantial barriers, particularly for poor, minority, and very young teenagers. As is true with other abortion restrictions, the individuals most adversely affected by parental involvement rules are those least able to bear the costs of early childbirth. Adolescents have often been deterred by the lack of information about legal assistance, the risks of public exposure, the costs of multiple trips to distant locations, and the fear of courtroom interrogations. That fear is understandable given the judicial questions some minors encounter, such as: How will you feel about having a dead child? Are you aware that abortion can jeopardize your future fertility? Would your parents be willing and able to raise your baby? Notice and consent requirements increase the risk of physical abuse, psychological trauma, medically threatening delays, and unwanted childbirths. In effect, such rules compound the "peculiar vulnerability" they are designed to address.[54]

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percent of parents were informed; in Wisconsin, which does not, 62 percent were informed). See studies cited in Benshoof and Pilpel, "Minor's Rights," 144–45; Nanette Dembitz, "The Supreme Court and a Minor's Abortion Decision," *Columbia Law Review* 80 (1980): 1251, 1255–58; Theresa M. Walker, "California's Parental Consent Statute: A Constitutional Challenge," *Hastings Law Journal* 40 (1988): 169, 200. See also Embree and Dobson, "Parental Involvement," 69–70 (noting few differences between adult and adolescent decision making on birth control).

[53] Mnookin, "*Bellotti v. Baird*," 239–40; Virginia G. Cartoof and Lorraine V. Klerman, "Parental Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law," *American Journal of Public Health* 76 (1986): 397.

[54] In Minneosta, only nine bypass petitions were denied between 1981 and 1986. See *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 497 U.S. 497, n21 (1990). See ACLU, *Parental Notice Laws*, 9–15; Patricia Donovan, "Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek Court-Authorized Abortions," *Family Planning Perspectives* 15 (1983): 259–60, 265, and "Your Parents or the Judge: Massachusetts' New Abortion Consent Law," *Family Planning Perspectives* 13 (1981): 224; *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 648 F. Supp. 756, 763–64 (D.C. 1988), *rev'd*, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); *American Academy of Pediatrics*

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Those involved in administering consent regulations express little support for their requirements. Criteria for assessing teenagers' maturity and best interests are arbitary and inconsistent, while judicial cross-examination often increases the guilt and misery that accompanies unwanted pregnancies. As the dissent in *Hodgson* recognized, and the results in bypass cases reflect, it is almost impossible to identify circumstances in which a minor is too immature to make an abortion decision for herself but in which her best interest lies in having a child she does not want. Given the increased medical and socioeconomic risks associated with carrying a fetus to term, on what basis could courts legitimately seek to compel childbirth? In case studies of Massachusetts and Minnesota regulations, participants in the legal process overwhelmingly agreed that resources now spent on obtaining judicial rubber stamps of bypass petitions should be allocated to more productive strategies.[55]

This is not to understate the value of fostering better communication between parents and children concerning responsible sexual behavior. It is rather to suggest that involuntary notification is an ineffective means of fostering such communication. Virtually every major professional study has concluded that compulsory parental involvement ill serves adolescent needs and family relationships. A preferable strategy would be voluntary parental outreach programs. Such programs seek to improve family communication and adolescent decisions making skills while avoiding the notice or consent requirements that deter teenagers from seeking assistance. Yet all too often legislative, judicial, and administrative analyses have proceeded without consideration of alternative strategies for parental involvement. As with other teenage pregnancy initiatives, policy makers have offered compromises more responsive to symbolic politics than to practical needs.[56]

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v. Van de Kamp, (Cal D. Ct. 1990), trial transcript, 273–74, 282–84, Brief for Respondents, 19–21; *Bellotti v. Baird*, 443 U.S. 634–35; Embree and Dobson, "Parental Involvement," 76 (noting that the small number of abortion providers and judicial decision makers in some communities multiplies barriers).

[55] For experts' views see Mnookin, "*Bellotti v. Baird*," 258; ACLU, *Parental Notice Laws*, 1, 13, 17; Donovan, "Judging Teenagers," 265–66; *Hodgson v. Minnesota*, 110 S. Ct. 2957–58 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part). For comparisons of the increased medical, psychological, and socioeconomic costs associated with childbirth in comparison with abortion, see sources cited in Walker, "California's Parental Consent Statute," 196–97; Gary B. Melton and Anita J. Pliner, "Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis" in Gary B. Melton, ed., *Adolescent Abortion: Psychological and Legal Issues* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986). For discussion of inconsistency and trauma resulting from judicial decision making, see sources cited in fns. 53–54.

[56] Kennedy, Forrest and Torres, "Storm over Washington," 195; ACLU, *Parental Notice Laws*, 1, 8, 17.

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Reformulating the Problem/Rethinking the Responses

In formulating more effective public policies, a critical first step is to convince decision makers and their constituents to rethink the problem that teenage pregnancy presents. No significant progress can occur as long as Americans view the issue in terms of individual rather than societal responsibilities and insist on policies that reflect traditional family values rather than contemporary adolescent needs. The alternative framework proposed here begins from different premises and demands different resource priorities. Its objectives are to enhance adolescents' capacity for informed and uncoerced choices and to expand the choices available. These objectives in turn require policy initiatives that not only increase birth-control information and assistance, but also respond more effectively to education, employment, health, and welfare needs.

A more promising policy approach will depend on more systematic research. Despite the recent attention to the adolescent pregnancy "crisis," we know surprisingly little about certain key issues. What factors predict effective use of contraceptives among sexually active teens? What strategies are most successful in promoting responsible sexual behavior and how do they differ across gender, class, age, race, and ethnicity? How much of the disadvantage for young mothers and their children is attributable to age and how much to other demographic and socioeconomic factors? What individual coping strategies and social programs are most effective in reducing that disadvantage?[57]

Yet despite these gaps in current understanding, we know more than enough about the inadequacies of current frameworks to identify more promising alternatives. The most obvious inadequacy involves birth-control information and assistance. Widespread ignorance among teenagers concerning the substantial risks of unprotected sexual activity and the relatively low risks of contraceptive use demonstrate the need for fuller information. Increasing rates of AIDS among adolescents further underscore the urgency of that need. Yet since existing educational programs have had little measurable impact on contraceptive behavior, more innovative campaigns are necessary from multiple sources, including schools, community organizations, and the media.[58]

[57] Riessman and Nathanson, "Management of Reproduction," 259; Furstenberg and Brooks-Gunn, "Teenage Childbearing," 319; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 231–59; Furstenberg, Hughes, and Brooks-Gunn, "The Next Generation."

[58] See sources cited in fn. 47; Andrew W. Boxer, "Adolescent Pregnancy and Parenthood in the Transition to Adulthood" in Rosenheim and Testa, *Early Parenthood*; Furstenberg and Brooks-

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Such campaigns should include greater attention to decision making skills for both sexes. Encouraging men to exercise greater responsibility in sexual relationships from an early age is a crucial part of reproductive freedom for women. More emphasis should also center on empowering female adolescents to resist pressures for unwanted sexual intercourse or parenthood. Many teenage women report engaging in sexual activity that they do not find pleasurable, and deciding to have a baby more because of peer and family influence than because of affirmative desires to rear a child. All too often, single motherhood becomes an ill-considered means to other ends: a way to assert independence, to punish parents, to gain prestige, or to win approval from their child's father. Better education, mentoring, peer counseling, and community outreach strategies should be available to help young women assess and assert their own best interests. Especially for young teenagers, abstinence can be a feminist strategy, but not on the terms conservatives usually offer. Rather, the objective should be a revived but reformulated understanding of what the nineteenth-century women's movement labeled "voluntary motherhood."[59]

To make reproductive choices truly voluntary will also require more accessible birth control. As noted earlier, a majority of sexually active teens lack adequate reproductive health services, and many are deterred by the cost, distance, nonconfidentiality, and stigma associated with existing clinics. To reduce unplanned pregnancies, we need to reduce the barriers to reproductive planning, such as parental notification and consent requirements, harassment of clinic users, and shortages of free or low-cost services. Comprehensive health programs located in or near schools are among the most promising outreach strategies, for they can avoid singling out participants who request contraceptive assistance and can offer accessible follow-up services. Development and distribution of alternative birth-control technologies, such as RU 486, should become higher public priorities.[60]

Gunn, "Teenage Childbearing," 321–22; Voydanoff and Donnelly, *Adolescent Sexuality*, 96; Douglas Kirby, *Sexuality Education: An Evaluation of Programs and Their Effects* (Santa Cruz, CA: Network Publications, 1984), 95–100.

[59] Joffe, *Regulation of Sexuality*, 157–58; Dash, *When Children Want Children*, 121–25, 216, 220, 265; see Sara Ruddick, "Procreative Choice for Adolescent Women" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*; Elijah Anderson, "Sex Codes and Family Life Among Poor Inner-City Youths," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (1989): 59.

[60] Brindis and Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy*, 104–05; Jones et al., *Teenage Pregnancy in Industrialized Countries*, 236–38. See, generally, Hayes, *Risking the Future*. For discussion of the inadequacy of contraceptive alternatives, see Cohen and Taub, *Reproductive Laws for the 1990s*.

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Yet if we are serious about not just removing the obstacles to choice but expanding the choices available, further initiatives are necessary. First and most fundamental, we must find ways to improve school programs and reduce dropout rates. Particularly in low income communities, the current educational structure seems irrelevant to immediate needs and promises little economic security. Female adolescents who lack confidence in their own abilities and future prospects often see little to lose from early pregnancy and childbearing. Low expectations about educational and vocational opportunities readily become self-fulfilling prophecies. Young women who leave school are disproportionately likely to become pregnant, to have multiple pregnancies, and to experience poverty and welfare dependency.[61]

Breaking this cycle will require changing adolescents' aspirations and experience. More programs are needed to expand life-planning options, build self-confidence, improve school performance, increase literacy, and strengthen vocational skills. Additional support is necessary for scholarships and bilingual assistance. These initiatives must be coordinated with other opportunities for vocational training, job placement, and higher education, so that participants can see ways to achieve status and self-worth apart from early parenthood. We cannot respond effectively to teenage motherhood without responding also to the broader range of social problems that make motherhood seem to be a teenager's best option. Nor can we address the inadequacy of paternal support without also addressing the inadequacy of unemployment, education, and drug treatment opportunities.[62]

[61] Jewell Taylor Gibbs, "The Social Costs of Teenage Pregnancy and Parenting in the Black Community: Implications for Public Policy" in Rosenheim and Testa, *Early Parenthood*; Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*; n. 35, above and accompanying text; Brindis and Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy*, 48–49; Hayes, *Risking the Future*, 125–28; Denise F. Polit and Janet R. Kahn, "Early Subsequent Pregnancy among Economically Disadvantaged Teenage Mothers," *American Journal of Public Health* 76 (1986): 167.

[62] Gibbs, "Social Costs"; Brindis and Jeremy, *Adolescent Pregnancy*, 85, 88–89; Marion Wright Edelman, *Families in Peril: An Agenda for Social Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 58–60; Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*; William Wilson and Kathryn M. Neckerman, "Poverty and Family Structure: The Widening Gap between Evidence and Public Policy Issues" in Sheldon H. Danzig and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 232, 252–59; Tom Joe, "The Other Side of Black Female-Headed Families: The Status of Adult Black Men," *Family Planning Perspectives* 19 (1984): 74; Sullivan, *The Male Role*; Sullivan and Study Group, "Absent Fathers"; Hortensia Amaro and Barry Zuckerman, "Psychoactive Substance Use and Adolescent Pregnancy Compounded Risk among Inner City Adolescent Mothers" in Mary Ellen Colten and Susan Gore, *Adolescent Stress: Causes and Consequences* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991); Center for Population Options, *Teenage Pregnancy and Too-Early Childbirth: Public Costs and Personal Consequences* (Washington, DC: Center for Population Options, 1991).

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The importance of some of these initiatives has attracted growing attention. Recent changes in federal welfare regulations require adolescent AFDC recipients to obtain job training and skills instruction if childcare is available, and to participate in continuing education if they lack a high school degree. Although the effectiveness of these requirements has yet to be assessed, past experience with similar vocational programs suggests grounds for caution. Participants typically register minor income gains in comparison with program cost. So, too, recent efforts to increase paternal child support for AFDC families are likely to be of limited effectiveness, given most fathers' inadequate financial resources. Significant progress for adolescent parents is likely to require broader macroeconomic interventions and antipoverty initiatives, such as increases in minimum wage, job-creation strategies, and expanded health, housing, childcare, family counseling, and income-transfer policies.[63]

More emphasis must also center on expanding prenatal services and coordinating responses to various risk-taking behaviors, including drug and alcohol abuse, as well as unprotected sexual activity. The necessity of such initiatives is underscored by the increasing number of infants who are deformed or disabled as a result of maternal addictions. Recent efforts to prosecute addicted mothers rather than provide adequate treatment programs again point up the risks in placing blame at the individual rather than societal level. It is neither just nor effective to condemn teenage mothers who make tragic choices while ignoring the constraints on choices that are available.[64]

All these policy initiatives must be formulated with greater community involvement and more responsiveness to variations within and

[63] David Ellwood, "Conclusion" in David T. Ellwood and Phoebe H. Cottingham, eds., *Welfare Policy for the 1990s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 269, 272 (noting that supported work programs that cost over $13,000 per participant produced earnings gains of only $1,500); Gary Walker, "Comment" in Ellwood and Cottingham, *Welfare Policy*, 141; Gina Adams, Karen Pittman, and Raymond O'Brien, "Adolescent and Young Adult Fathers: Problems and Solutions" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*; Michael B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1989); Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*; Diana M. Pearce, "The Feminization of Poverty: A Second Look" (Washington, DC: Institute for Women's Policy Research, 1989); Erik Eckholm, "Forcing Welfare Fathers to Pay Up Hits Stumbling Block: Lack of Jobs," *New York Times*, 20 July 1992.

[64] Roberts, "Future of Reproductive Choice," 64n39 (describing gross inadequacy of treatment facilities and the growing trend toward prosecution of addicted mothers). See Lisa Maher, "Criminalizing Pregnancy: The Downside of a Kinder, Gentler Nation?" *Social Justice* 17 (Fall 1990): 111; Amaro and Zuckerman, "Psychoactive Substance Use"; Dorothy Roberts, "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy," *Harvard Law Review* 104 (1991): 1419.

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among ethnic groups. Third-generation Puerto Rican women have different concerns from those of recent emigrees from Mexico, and blacks from urban ghettos face different constraints from those of teenagers from middle-class suburbs or impoverished rural communities. Public policies need to take fuller account of culturally specific attitudes and kinship support structures affecting early childbirth. No single set of interventions will be equally effective with all subgroups; rather, we need multiple strategies that directly enlist families at risk.[65]

The policy alternatives identified here do not constitute a modest agenda. But neither can we expect major progress until we translate our rhetorical concerns into resource commitments. Coherent policies on teenage pregnancy require a redirection of adult priorities.*

[65] Children's Defense Fund, *Teenage Pregnancy*; Linda M. Burton and Carol B. Stack, "Conscripting Kin: Reflections on Family, Generation, and Culture" in Lawson and Rhode, *Politics of Pregnancy*; Nsiah-Jefferson, "Reproductive Laws," 23; Brindis, "Antecedents and Consequences"; Edelman, *Families in Peril*; Francis Ianni, *The Search for Structure: A Report on American Youth Today* (New York: Free Press, 1989).

* The comments of Annette Lawson and Michael Wald and the research assistance of Joan Krause and Wendy Olsen are appreciated. This article is adapted and updated from Annette Lawson and Deborah L. Rhode, *The Politics of Pregnancy: Adolescent Sexuality and Public Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

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The Platform-Writing Process: Candidate-Centered Platforms in 1992

L. SANDY MAISEL

One never knows what to make of party platforms. On the one hand, they are the most important document that a political party produces. The platform tells you what the party stands for; it defines in explicit terms why partisans deserve to be elected. On the other hand, they are worthless pieces of paper. How many citizens can tell you what is in the parties' platforms? Who knows where the differences really lie? Who cares?

Political scientists express this same ambivalence. Those who favor responsible political parties see the platforms as central to the parties' missions; they give citizens reasons to support the parties' candidates. They lay the foundation for the policies that the parties will adopt if elected. Voters can measure party performance against party promises and hold future candidates accountable for past actions.[1] Gerald Pomper and Jeff Fishel have both demonstrated that platforms do matter, that the two major parties' platforms can be used to distinguish the parties and that, once elected, party officeholders enact significant

[1] American Political Science Association (APSA), Committee on Political Parties, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

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portions of what was in their platforms.[2] In the broadest terms, you can tell what will happen after an election by examining what the platforms say before the election.

But others feel that reading platforms is not a rational way to determine how one should vote. Morris Fiorina and others claim that past performance is a much more rational way to judge how a candidate will act in office than is reliance on future promises.[3] And this approach has a certain intuitive appeal. After all, regardless of what the data on enactment of platform promises say, how many prospective voters really believe campaign promises and campaign rhetoric?

In 1992, even those who doubt the importance of platforms generally acknowledged that the differences between the Democratic and Republican party platforms were so broad that the electorate had to take notice. The Democratic party platform was moderate and pointedly inclusive; liberal rhetoric of the past gave way to pragmatic appeals to voters who had deserted the party in recent years. The Republican platform was more extreme than many believed wise for political purposes; the document seemed to go to great lengths to exclude those who disagreed with conservative doctrine, particularly on social issues. The journalists covering the campaign were nearly unanimous in their belief that the religious right wing had taken over the Republican party—and that this image, so vividly displayed throughout the Republican National Convention in Houston, hurt President George Bush's reelection campaign.

Thus, whatever one's view of platforms generally—or of their utility in predicting future legislative and administrative actions—most agree that the platforms produced in 1992 had an impact on the presidential election. Furthermore, again regardless of the view one holds of the importance of platforms, we know very little about how they are produced. That which we do know concerns the process at the pre-1968

[2] See Gerald M. Pomper, "Controls and Influence in American Elections (Even 1968)," *American Behavioral Scientist* (November-December 1969): 216–228; Pomper, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970), 149–170; Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1952–1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June 1972): 415; Pomper, *Party Renewal in America* (New York: Praeger, 1980); Pomper with Susan S. Lederman *Elections in America*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Longman, 1980); and Jeff Fishel, *President and Promises* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1985).

[3] Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Fiorina, "Retrospective Voting" in L. Sandy Maisel, ed., *Political Parties and Elections in the United States: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1991).

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reform conventions and is often based on anecdotal knowledge.[4] This article aims to fill that gap in our knowledge. In examining how the 1992 platforms were produced, I hope to shed light on differences between Democrats and Republicans as they go about their party business. I further hope to show why the two platforms differed so greatly —and to such an important effect—in 1992.

In looking at how the two processes differed and at whether the Republicans could have avoided the political error many believed they made, this article will look at three separate aspects of the process. First, I will describe the formal process followed by each party in 1992; in many ways the formal process, which varies from election to election as well as from party to party, tells a great deal about the outcome. Each party's platform went through several drafts; the second section of this article will explore the differences among the drafts to determine how the various stages in the formal process influenced the eventual outcome. Obviously, if little changed at a stage in the process, that stage was not very important. On the other hand, if noteworthy changes occurred at one stage or another, the significance of that stage would follow logically. Third, I will attempt to come to some understanding of the influence of key individuals. Again, the platform is a finished product, but it started somewhere, was amended somewhat, and emerged eventually. If one can identify the stages in the process that were most significant, then one has a better opportunity to identify those whose influence was most profound at those stages. The article will conclude with a discussion of the impact of the process—and of party rules—on the outcome and of how the postreform process, at least as seen in 1992, differs from the process as it existed prior to the reforms.

The Platform-Writing Process

Most analysts have noted that Republican and Democratic party rules differ philosophically.[5] The Republicans believe that local units should

[4] See, as examples, Edward McCheney Sait, *American Parties and Elections*, rev. ed. (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1939), 563–573; Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952: Volume I: The National Story* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954); David Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1960); and Judith H. Parris, *The Convention Problem: Issues in the Reform of Presidential Nominating Procedures* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1972), 109–141.

[5] L. Sandy Maisel, *Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 252–253.

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operate with relative autonomy. Thus, the national party rules impose few restrictions on state and local party organizations. The Democrats, on the other hand, view the role of the national party as more central to their mission and, therefore, impose more rules on the constituent units. These differences have been noted frequently when rules for choosing delegates to national conventions are under examination. They are just as relevant for the platform-writing process.

The Democrats

Appointment of the platform committee. Democratic National Committee Chairman Ronald H. Brown appointed the co-chairs of the Platform Committee for the Democratic National Convention relatively early in the political year, at a time at which the party nomination was still in doubt. Brown's goal was to organize the convention in such a way as to give the eventual nominee the best possible chance in the November election. Thus, he appointed co-chairs who were party centrists, who shared his goal of building a platform around which all Democrats could unite.

So much for the best-laid plans. Brown's designees were Colorado Governor Roy Romer and Ohio Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar from Cleveland. Romer and Oakar began planning the convention process, including calling a national platform in Cleveland in May to hear witnesses testify on proposed platform planks. Then the House bank scandal broke, and Congresswoman Oakar was marked as a frequent bank abuser. Quickly, but with little fanfare, she was replaced by her colleague in the House, Nancy Pelosi from California.

The Democrats also name vice chairs of the committee. Somewhat typically, the Democrats name a large number—ten in all—who are appointed for highly symbolic reasons. The 1992 vice chairs included a former governor, two mayors, one United States senator and a candidate for the Senate, and three United States representatives and a candidate for the House. Reflecting the diversity of the Democratic party, the group was half male and half female and included two African-Americans and one Hispanic-American.

In addition to the officers, by party rules the Democratic Platform Committee is comprised of 161 delegates apportioned among the states and the territories according to population and Democratic strength, and twenty-five additional party leaders and elected officials (PLEOs). The PLEOs are appointed by the party chair to assure that certain

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groups important to the Democratic party feel that they have representation at the Platform Committee level. Thus, the PLEOs include representatives of the Democratic mayors and other elected officials, representatives of the Democratic state chairs, the congressional leadership, major party donors, as well as labor, African-Americans, and other groups the chair feels deserve recognition.

The representatives from the various states are chosen by the state delegations to the national convention in proportion to the delegate strength of the candidates for president. In small states, which are permitted only one or two delegates, this is not possible. In those cases, the apportionment among the presidential preferences is carried out among the three convention committees—Rules and Credentials as well as Platform. Thus, from Maine in 1992, the Tsongas delegates had the state's delegate on the Platform Committee, the Clinton delegates on the Rules Committee, and the Brown delegates on the Credentials Committee. Some states had not selected convention delegates—and many state delegations had not had time to meet—before the national hearing was held in Cleveland on 18 May. Those states chose temporary delegates who attended that hearing and reported back to their states' permanent delegates when they were named. The role of delegates listed the 161 delegates from the states plus the additional 122 who were named as temporary delegates.

In some ways, this listing of all of the delegates is a reflection of their importance. Service on this committee is largely honorific. Members are given credentials to at least one session of the national convention, have their names published in the report of the committee, and sit in on various meetings. However, because they are elected to reflect specific presidential preferences, and because each of the presidential candidates monitored the proceedings closely and informed their representatives of how they wished them to vote, the committee members played minor roles as individuals. Much the same can be said of the PLEOs; the symbolic value of their appointments was greater than the actual value of any actions they took as individuals.

The Platform Committee rules specify that the national chairman will also appoint a Drafting Committee to prepare an initial draft of the party platform for full committee consideration. In earlier years, the Democrats worked through a series of subcommittees in a manner parallel to that described for the Republicans below. Under the current rules, the Drafting Committee prepares the document that the entire committee then works on. Chairman Brown named New Mexico Con-

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gressman Bill Richardson as chair of the Drafting Committee early in the process, but he did not name the other members until early June, well after the nomination of Bill Clinton was assured. The appointment of Drafting Committee members reflected Brown's desire that the convention be run in such a way as to enhance the nominee's chances in November. Thus, Brown permitted the Clinton staff to dictate roughly half of the members of the committee. He in turn used the remaining committee slots to guarantee representation by those groups, important to the party, that he did not want to slight.

The Drafting Committee included nine men and seven women; four African-Americans, two Hispanic-Americans, and an Asian American; a United States senator, four representatives in Congress, a secretary of state, two mayors, and a county supervisor; a Democratic National Committee (DNC) officer and a state chair; four labor leaders, a number of strong supporters of Israel, and one gay activist. Appointments were highly sought and bitterly battled over. In the end, Brown named a number of ex-officio members, in addition to the representatives from the presidential campaigns whose role is designated in the party rules, in order to keep peace within the party. Even then, the congressional party leaders were denied representation and many were disappointed.

The composition of this committee represented an important statement for the Democrats. The Drafting Committee, deemed to be most influential by those structuring the process, was comprised with two goals in mind: assuring domination by the Clinton forces so that the platform would reflect the views on which the nominee wanted to run and including groups thought to be critical for the building of a winning Democratic coalition in the general election.

Information gathering. The hearing phase of the platform process is a public way to gather information. In essence, hearings allow those with a stake in the process to air their views. No one pretends that hearings have much to do with determining the content of the platform; they are part of the politics of platform writing, providing interested parties an opportunity to be heard. The Democrats held only one public hearing in 1992. The meeting held in Cleveland in mid-May was a marathon affair. Approximately one-hundred committee members listened to testimony from early in the morning until after midnight. Witness after witness came before the committee, presented statements, and answered questions; most also filed written documents, as did hundreds of others.

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The national hearing revealed a good deal about the platform process. The morning witnesses were divided into four panels dealing with opportunity, responsibility, community empowerment, and national security. That division, with minor rhetorical changes, remained intact throughout the process. The platform reflected themes presented in the Democratic Leadership Council's earlier statements of policy goals for the future, themes never substantially altered throughout the process. Among the key witnesses were Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) leaders and staff, each of whom reiterated Clinton campaign goals.

In addition, the Cleveland hearing presented those outside of the Democratic mainstream an opportunity to be heard. Jesse Jackson was given prominent billing, as was Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson, representing the Rebuild America Coalition, and Pennsylvania Governor Robert Casey, the Democrat's leading anti-abortion activist. But mostly this was the opportunity for witness after witness—from the Americans for Democratic Action to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to the Arab American Institute, from the American Petroleum Institute to the Sierra Club—to be heard. For many it seemed that the process of being heard defined having an impact. What Judith Parris concluded about this aspect of the process two decades ago remains true today: "There is virtual unanimity among politicians and among writers on politics that the platform hearings have been, in Walter Bagehot's terms, more formal than efficient."[6]

The staff draft. Before the Drafting Committee convened, the staff prepared a working paper to structure discussion. The organization of the Cleveland hearing and the comments of the platform committee leaders clearly indicated that this draft had been under consideration for some time. The key variable here was that Bill Clinton had been assured the party nomination and Brown was intent on solidifying the party under the nominee's leadership.

Clinton had been a leader of the Democratic Leadership Council, a group of moderate Democrats united in the belief that the party could regain the White House with a platform and a candidate not emphasizing the most liberal positions. The DLC had presented its policy initiatives at a number of different meetings, the most noteworthy being its own national meeting in New Orleans. The parallels

[6] Parris, *The Convention Problem*, 115.

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between the working paper on the platform and DLC documents were striking.

Platform Committee documents do not list specific staff members by responsibility; however, nearly forty individuals were singled out for thanks. Among these were a number of policy analysts associated with the DLC and the Clinton campaign effort. Bruce Reed, the policy director for the DLC, and Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner, president and vice president of the affiliated think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, clearly played major roles in drafting platform language. So too did Sandy Berger, who later headed the Clinton foreign policy advisory staff. In addition, Congressman Richardson consulted closely with John Holum, a longtime Clinton friend and supporter in working out the final details of the draft. The staff draft was a team effort, but it was a Clinton team. Many individuals had input to specific sections, but the overall control was evidently closely held. The long-term DLC strategy for Democrats regaining the White House was to be played out carefully.

One clear example of a group seeking and achieving influence was the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). That AIPAC testified in Cleveland is incidental to the overall effort the Israel lobby put into achieving a plank strongly supporting Israel. The effectiveness of this effort can be seen in pro-Israel appointments to the Drafting Committee, as PLEOs, and as members of the full committee, and in every draft of the platform. AIPAC worked just as hard and just as effectively on the Republican platform, standing as one of the few groups obviously successful in achieving its goal at both conventions.

The Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee, under the leadership of Congressman Richardson, met in Sante Fe on June 12 and 13. The site was chosen not only to show off New Mexico's hospitality but also to keep away all but the most interested. The entire group at the Drafting Committee sessions, including members, staff, media, and those seeking to influence the draft, numbered around seventy; for a process of this nature, that was laboring in relative obscurity.

The procedures at the Drafting Committee sessions were somewhat unique. Bill Richardson led the committee through the entire draft, with members able to comment on each section. John Holum, serving as executive director of the Drafting Committee, took copious notes on each comment as the draft was discussed. However, no amendments were offered, much less voted upon. Various members of the committee voiced concerns and suggested changes or additions, but no

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attempt was made to draft platform language. At each point Richardson noted the opinion of the committee member and stated that he would take their views under advisement. Richardson was often seen looking toward the Clinton staff in attendance, particularly toward Harold Ickes, who was leading the Clinton team. Eventually a code developed through which committee members came to understand whether Richardson would take views under advisement and include them or take them under advisement never to be seen again. But all decisions were made informally. The Drafting Committee members, all experienced politicians, knew that they would have to work behind the scenes to assure the success of their proposals.

Two other items of note occurred during these sessions. First, three staffs were much in evidence. The DNC staffers were running the meeting administratively; they were visible and seemed to be impressed with their own influence. The Clinton staff were much less visible but obviously more influential. Richardson's staff served as a link between the two, monitoring that the meeting went well and ensuring that their boss's views were taken into account at every stage. Governor Roy Romer and Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi also brought key staff people to this meeting. They worked closely with the chair of the committee to be certain that the draft that emerged would be acceptable to their bosses. Both of the co-chairs were worried that the draft platform was too general and too inclusive, that defining issues were not stressed. The conflict between these views was one of the subthemes of the entire deliberation.

In addition, Paul Tsongas's representative to the Drafting Committee, Ted Van Dyk, pressed for specific accommodations to his candidate's view on economic matters. He was given a good deal of attention, but the response to his presentation made it clear that the entire committee—those appointed by Brown as well as those designated by the Clinton campaign—were Clinton advocates. If Tsongas were to receive any concessions, they would be granted by the Clinton forces for political reasons, not because of the influence of Tsongas supporters on the process. On the other hand, Jerry Brown's camp took a different tack. Governor Brown himself addressed the group and then held a press conference attacking the platform; his representative on the Drafting Committee played virtually no role. The governor's actions all but guaranteed that no concessions would be granted toward his policy agenda.

Full committee deliberations. The full Platform Committee met in Washington two weeks after the Sante Fe meeting of the Drafting

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Committee. In that two-week period Bill Richardson and John Holum took the views of the Drafting Committee members, as well as others with whom they consulted, into account as they produced the Drafting Committee's draft. The members of the Drafting Committee had scant chance to see and no chance to have formal input into the Holum draft after the group left Sante Fe. However, many members were consulted frequently on individual sections in which they had interest.

That the full committee was only given one day in which to work its will is indicative of the importance of that group. The full committee worked under rules that required seconding by fifteen members before an amendment to the draft could be considered. That the Clinton forces were clearly in charge was evident from the start. Each candidate's supporters caucused the night before the full committee meeting. The Clinton delegation constituted a clear majority; they were unified enough to be able to work their will on any amendments proposed. As each item came up, Jim Brady, a DLC leader and the chair of the Louisiana Democratic party, who was serving as Clinton's floor leader, rose and stated his campaign's view on the amendment. His side lost no votes on which they had an opinion, though on an expansion of the abortion language to the health care plank they were forced to go along against their initial inclination.

A number of delegates to the full committee complained that the process was a done deal. Brown delegates were able to win some concessions on environmental issues, but the issue amateurs, who believed that Governor Brown represented a new wave of politics that was inescapable, were swept under the Clinton breaker before they knew what hit them. Despite their pleas to the contrary, the Platform Committee is not a deliberative body, and the full committee meeting is not a time for informed, rational debate to convince opponents of the merits of one's views. In 1992 this meeting was clearly the final step in a process that had been carefully orchestrated well in advance.

Adoption of the platform. Minority reports to the Democratic platform can only be filed upon request from a requisite number of Platform Committee members. Neither the Tsongas nor the Brown delegates had enough committee members to force a minority report; the views of the two camps were so far apart that they could not work together.

The Clinton campaign was in no mood to compromise with Brown, who had shown no inclination to come in line with the winning nominee. However, they were willing to accept overtures from the Tsongas delegation in exchange for pledges of future support. Eventually the

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Clinton camp asked their delegates to sign petitions for four minority planks, with proposals to stimulate economic recovery, put forth by the Tsongas camp, so that they could be debated by the full convention. The Clinton campaign thought that some debate on the platform would enliven the convention, though eventually the Tsongas forces withdrew all save one of their proposals. For the most part, the presentation of the platform to the national convention was an opportunity to showcase party leaders and to discuss the candidate's views. The platform as adopted by the Platform Committee was passed unamended by the full convention.

The Republicans

Appointment of the Platform Committee. The Republican Platform Committee, technically called the Committee on Resolutions, is comprised of a chair, two co-chairs, four vice-chairs, and 107 delegates chosen at the state level (a man and a woman from each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and one delegate [all male in 1992] each from American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands).

The officers of the committee are appointed by the Republican national chairman. When the party's incumbent president is running for reelection, as was the case in 1992, the appointment of the officers is in fact dictated by the president's reelection committee. The 1992 Committee on Resolutions was chaired by Senator Don Nickles from Oklahoma, who also served as chair of the Republican Policy Committee in the United States Senate; the co-chairs were Governor John Ashcroft of Missouri and Florida Congressman Bill McCullum. The appointment of these committee leaders, among the most conservative Republicans holding each of the offices they held, signaled that the Bush-Quayle committee thought it important that the conservative wing of the party knew it had a candidate with whom it could be comfortable. The committee officers were appointed at a time when Pat Buchanan's candidacy was proving an irritant to President Bush's march toward renomination. The appointments served to undercut the claim that the president was not conservative enough for his party.

The vice-chairs serve the same roles for the Republicans as they do for the Democrats. These are largely honorific roles; however, the vice-chairs are highly visible to those watching the proceedings, and thus their appointments are considered symbolic as well. Two of the four vice chairs for the 1992 Committee were women—Cheryl Lau, the secretary of state from Nevada, and Leanna Brown, a New Jersey

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State Senator; Lau is also Asian-American. A third vice-chair Orange County, California, Supervisor Gaddi Vasquez, in addition to being an Hispanic-American, is also a former police officer. The fourth vice-chair was Greg Lushutka, an Ohio mayor; presumably he represented the so-called Reagan Democrats now in the Republican party, and, like Brown, he was from a pivotal state. Lau and Vasquez played prominent roles throughout the platform-writing process and in the presentation of the platform to the convention, perhaps signaling more prominent roles for them in years ahead.

In accordance with the rules of the Republican party, the members of the committee from the various states were appointed by the states as the individual states saw fit. Most of the appointees were prominent and experienced politicians in their states—two governors and a former governor; two United States senators and a candidate for the Senate; five U.S. representatives and a former representative; eleven state legislators; eight members of the Republican National Committee; and four state chairs. Most states appointed at least one very prominent individual, though sixteen were represented by somewhat lesser figures. Less well known representatives from the states tended to fall into three categories—those representing prominent figures, such as the chief of staff to Governor George Voinovich of Ohio or the former chief legislative assistant to Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina; long-time party activists or contributors, many of whom had served on this committee at past conventions; or Pro-Life activists.

A vast majority of the delegates favored Bush for renomination, though a small minority did caucus with the Buchanan representatives present at the committee deliberations. Because Bush had little competition for the nomination, a number of committed issue activists were appointed as Bush delegates, though their primary allegiance might well have been to causes, not the party nominee. The lack of a contest in the Republican party seems to have had the effect of allowing "issue amateurs" to enter the process in prominent roles because of the laxity of Republican rules on nominee control over delegates pledged to them. Thus in an ironic twist, issue activists whose prime concern was not with winning the election but rather for specific policies came to play a key role in a Republican convention because of lack of candidate competition, the exact opposite circumstance under which issue purists gained prominence in the Democratic party.[7]

[7] See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Dismantling the Parties* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978); Kirkpatrick, *The New Presidential Elite: Men and Women*

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Information gathering. Platform writing is a political process, and the decisions on how to hold hearings, as a step in that process, are political decisions. In most recent years the Democrats have held hearings around the country in order to appear inclusive, while the Republicans have viewed the platform writing process as "in house" and have held relatively few public sessions, most often at the convention site just before the committee convenes. In 1992, however, the Republicans took their show on the road, holding hearings in San Diego, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, and Washington, DC, in advance of the Houston committee gathering. The cities were carefully chosen—Washington for national exposure and three Republican strongholds. The most controversial hearing, that at which the abortion plank was open for discussion, was held in Salt Lake City, an obviously wise choice by those who did not want bad publicity from popular protests in the host city.

The Republicans sought to make political capital from the openness of their process, contrasting their process with the Democrats, in which only one hearing was held. In fact, Chairman Don Nickles's opening remarks to the national convention on 17 August cited the field hearings around the country and claimed, "Unlike the democrats, more than *one hundred people testified*, hundreds more wrote us with their suggestions. . . . [O]ur process was prolonged, often passionate and very public."[8]

The staff draft. As had been true of the Democrats' Drafting Committee, when the Republican Committee on Resolutions began its work in Houston the week before the National Convention was to convene, it too began with a draft platform, a working paper, prepared by staff. Who the staff was, where they came from, how they worked, and how they interacted with the presidential campaign were all somewhat mysterious. But there was nothing new about this mystery. More than half a century ago, Edward Sait noted that the basis of work by the resolutions committee was "a draft which someone has brought in his

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in National Politics (New York: Russell Sage, 1976); Denis G. Sullivan, Robert T. Nakamura, Martha Wagner Weinberg, F. Christopher Arterton, and Jeffrey L. Pressman, "Exploring the 1976 Republican Convention," *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (Winter 1977–1978): 531; Sullivan, Pressman, Arterton, Nakamura, and Weinberg, "Candidates, Caucuses, and Issues: The Democratic Convention, 1976" in Louis Maisel and Joseph Cooper, eds., *The Impact of the Electoral Process* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1977); Sullivan, Pressman, and Arterton, *Explorations in Convention Decisionmaking: The Democratic Party in the 1970s* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976).

[8] Republican Platform Committee press release, 17 August 1993. (Emphasis in original.)

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pocket."[9] Even then commentators had only vague ideas as to the document's author.

Committee on Resolutions documents for 1992 list an executive director (William Martin) with an immediate staff of five, three staff members assigned to the chair and the co-chairs, an editorial staff of four, a legal counsel, and twenty-one staff members including six lawyers assigned to the six substantive subcommittees. None of these staff have prominent names, but many are familiar to those who have worked with Republican party committees over the years. What was clear from interviewing a number of the staff members was that many people knew something about the process, but few seemed to have a clear picture of the entire enterprise. Certainly Martin's role was important, but mainly administrative. Martin and platform editor-in-chief, William Gribbin, played roles in drafting the original working paper, but they did not work alone.

Two important names appeared on no committee documents—Republican campaign strategist Charles Black and Washington attorney and former Bush Cabinet secretary, Jim Cicconi; they were more involved in writing the first draft than anyone else, writing some themselves, shopping out portions to others, caring for the tone as well as the content. Similarly the name Jim Pinkerton does not appear as a committee staffer, but he too had a key role, eventually crafting the preamble as well as monitoring the platform to assure it rang the right neoconservative bells.

The draft platform, the starting point for committee deliberations, was carefully crafted to make the right appeals. Cicconi was the Bush-Quayle Committee's man on the scene, working with staff to assure that the platform said what they wanted; he reported to Black, who only intervened at crucial times. They worked to achieve a tone consistent with the rhetoric Pinkerton had been producing for the new right; they worked through Martin and Gribbin and the other staff to achieve their ends. When the committee convened in Houston, they were presented with a document of over seventy pages divided into six sections for subcommittee deliberations and amendments. The basis of a platform was in place.

Subcommittee meetings. The draft platform was presented to six subcommittees that met in Houston just before the full committee convened the week before the national convention. Committee on

[9] Sait, *American Parties and Elections*, 566.

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Resolutions members were appointed to subcommittees by the chairman of the full committee, again after careful planning by the operatives from the Bush-Quayle Committee.

Thus, it was not by happenstance that thirteen of the twenty-one members of the Subcommittee on Individual Rights, Good Homes, and Safe Streets were female. Nor was it by chance that this subcommittee, which dealt with the controversial abortion plank, was chaired by Mary Potter Summa, an assistant district attorney from Charlotte, North Carolina, the former chief legislative assistant to Jesse Helms and a woman who according to the biography provided by the committee staff was "currently expecting her second child." Thirteen of the members were strongly pro-life, while only two expressed pro-choice views; the strongest advocate for choice on the subcommittee, Vermont State Senator John Carroll, was absent from subcommittee deliberations.

Similarly, thirteen of the eighteen members of the Subcommittee on Family Values, Education, and Health Care, including the chair and vice chair, were female. By contrast, sixteen of the twenty-one members of the Subcommittee on the Economy, Trade, Jobs, and the Budget were male; a majority of their views favored most conservative economic positions.

The role of the subcommittees was to debate and amend the draft prepared by staff and to report a new draft to the full committee. The subcommittees were given two days to accomplish this task. Unlike the Democrats' Drafting Committee, the Republican subcommittees followed formal parliamentary procedures. The process resembled a mark-up session in the Congress. The one noticeable difference was that subcommittee staff members left the room after each substantive amendment was proposed, heading for the full committee's staff room to assure that Jim Cicconi approved of the new language.

Full committee deliberations. The full committee meeting followed immediately upon the heels of the subcommittee deliberations. Shown nationally on C-SPAN, the full Committee on Resolutions debated the entire platform section by section. Nickles opened the first session but had to return to Washington for important Senate business. Ashcroft and McCullom chaired most of the first day's deliberations.

The procedure was rather straightforward. Amendments had to be submitted in writing. They were debated and voted on, generally by voice vote or by a show of hands. Only on the abortion amendment was a roll call vote required. Ashcroft and McCullom gave the committee

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members a good deal of leeway in debating proposals; when he returned to the chair, Nickles exerted considerably tighter control. His attempt to speed the process resulted in some disgruntled committee members but allowed the group to finish its work in time for the social events that were obviously an important part of the pre-convention week.

Adoption of the platform. The final step in the process was adoption of the platform by the full convention. The Committee on Resolutions draft was presented to the full convention by the chair. In turn, each subcommittee's section was presented by that group's chair. Minority planks required support from twenty-seven members of the Committee on Resolutions or from a majority of the convention delegates from six states. Only sixteen committee members supported the pro-choice alternative on the roll call vote, so the logical path to a minority report was through the state delegations. Two pro-choice groups, the Republicans for Choice and the National Republican Coalition for Choice, both of which were very active in gaining public attention throughout the platform writing week, strove to reach this goal, but they fell short. Press reports emphasized that the Bush-Quayle Committee worked hard to deny the minority an opportunity to embarrass the campaign with an open floor debate on national television. Thus, the platform was adopted by the full committee without substantive debate and without amendment.

Commentary: Comparing Rules and Influences

A few distinctions should be noted. First, the rules of the two parties led to differences in the platform-writing process. The members of the Platform Committee elected in the various states were the only ones involved in adopting the Republican platform. In the Democratic party the Drafting Committee, a committee appointed by the chair of the party with substantial input from the winning camp in 1992, played a major role. Related to this difference is the fact that the Clinton delegates to the Democratic platform committee caucused as a group and saw it as their mission to stand united against the delegates favoring the other candidates, while the Bush delegates—the vast majority in the Republican process—were less united behind Bush (against Buchanan) for they were committed to their own individual policy agendas.

Second, staff influence was very important in both cases. Democratic Chairman Ron Brown successfully structured the process so that the

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winning nominee could use the platform as another opportunity to bring the party together under his leadership. The Bush-Quayle Committee staff was in control of the Republican process, but they were less focused on how they wanted to use the platform in a strategic sense. When the leaders were chosen and the draft written, the committee seemed concerned about the Buchanan candidacy and about cementing the party's right wing against a challenge from Ross Perot. At the time at which the platform was amended and adopted, Perot had dropped out and the platform committee seemed unnecessarily bent on excluding moderates from the Republican camp. This perception carried over into the general way in which the Republican National Convention was run and the picture portrayed for the nation.

The Influence of the Participants

Each party's platform went through three public drafts. Staff produced one draft; that draft went respectively to the subcommittees of the Republican Committee on Resolutions and to the Drafting Committee of the Democratic Platform Committee. The second draft emerged from the Republican subcommittees and the Democratic Drafting Committee. The third draft emerged from the two full committees and in each case was adopted by the national convention without amendment.

Methodology

The means used for analyzing the various drafts was detailed content analysis. The unit of analysis for this study was the paragraph. Each party platform was divided into major sections—six for the Republicans and four for the Democrats—and subsections within these major headings. Some subsections were quite long, others only a sentence or two. Longer subsections tended to be broken into paragraphs, each of which dealt with one specific idea. The normal unit of analysis for a platform is a plank, but planks on which the entire platform is built are largely rhetorical fictions. The paragraph is the unit that can be defined and defended most rigorously.

Each paragraph in each draft of the two platforms was analyzed against the parallel paragraph in the subsequent draft. The comparison was characterized on a six item scale: no change; minor stylistic changes (word order, verb tense, individual words); major stylistic changes (expansion of ideas, inclusion of political rhetoric but not alteration

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of the policy advocated); substantive changes (different policies advocated); deletion; or addition (which were characterized as major or minor in terms of the scope of the policy advocated).

Three separate researchers read and characterized each paragraph, analyzing changes. When differences in coding occurred, the three of us discussed those differences and resolved them to our mutual satisfaction. Fewer than 5 percent of the total paragraphs analyzed were coded differently. In addition, a running tally was kept of changes in subheadings. These changes were all rhetorical, not substantive. Little significance could be attributed to them.

The Republicans

The first conclusion one draws from looking at the content analysis of the drafts of the Republican platform is that there were very few changes at all. Over half of the paragraphs in the staff draft emerged unchanged from the subcommittees; almost another third of the paragraphs underwent only stylistic changes, and nearly half of those were only minor stylistic changes. An example of a minor stylistic change would be substituting the word "tenet" for "principle" when "principle" had been used in the sentence before. A more major change would be one such as the following:

> Staff draft:
> The kind of future is not a matter of chance; it is a question of personal responsibility. Barbara Bush captured the importance of that stewardship when she said, "In order to grow, you must choose a cause to serve larger than yourself."
>
> Subcommittee draft:
> The kind of future is not a matter of chance; it is a question of personal responsibility. Barbara Bush captured the importance of that stewardship when she said, "At the end of your life you will never regret not having passed one more test, not winning one more verdict, or not closing one more deal. You will regret time not spent with a husband, a child, a friend, or a parent."

One could certainly conclude that even this major stylistic change was only a minor change in the nature of the platform, highlighting again how few changes of substance were in fact made.

Of the fifty-five paragraphs added to the platform, most would be considered minor. Frequently two or three paragraphs were added on the same subject, first laying out the general area to be discussed and then stating the specific proposal. An example of this is the following

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two-paragraph addition (the first deemed minor and the second major) on the subject of education:

> Recognizing what every parent knows, that our current educational system is not educating our children, President Bush is leading an education revolution. We applaud the President's bold vision to change radically our education system. Our parents want it, our communities want it, our States want it, and our children want it – but the Democrat leadership in the House and the Senate continue to thwart the will of the American people for radical change in the way we educate our children.
>
> The Republican strategy is based on sound principle – that parents have the right to choose the best school for their children; that schools should teach right from wrong; that schools should reinforce parental authority, not replace it; that we should increase flexibility from federal regulation; that we should explore a new generation of break-the-mold New American Schools; that standards and assessments should be raised, not reduced to a lowest common denominator; that communities should be empowered to find what works; that the pursuit of excellence in education is a fundamental goal; that good teachers should be rewarded for teaching well; that alternative certification can bring desperately-needed new people into the teaching profession; and that America needs public, private, and parochial schools.

These paragraphs were quoted at length because they demonstrate the kinds of additions to the platform deemed minor and major. Essentially the first paragraph is a lead-in to the entire issue of choice in the schools and the ways in which the Republicans view their ideas as different from the Democrats.

A high percentage of the changes in the draft made by the subcommittees were changes wrought by the Subcommittee on the Economy, Trade, Jobs, and the Budget. This subcommittee, which included among its members two members of Congress who had been critical of Bush's handling of the economy (Robert Walker of Pennsylvania and Vin Weber of Minnesota) and a number of other staunch economic conservatives, got away from the control of the Bush-Quayle forces. At one point the subcommittee adopted a paragraph saying that Bush had made a mistake in agreeing to the budget compromise that led to a tax increase. Charles Black decided that that language would not be acceptable in a Republican platform and worked with the subcommittee leaders and Bush critics to find compromise language. Eventually the subcommittee, which had concluded its business, was called back into session to adopt the compromise and rid the draft of direct criticism of the president. Thus, many of the changes, including many

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TABLE 1

Changes in the Drafts of the Party Platforms

Republicans	*Paragraphs*	*Same*	*Minor Stylistic*	*Major Stylistic*	*Substantive*	*Deleted*	*Added*
Changes by Subcommittees							
Family values, education, and health care	64, 70	31	15	14	1	3	9
Individual rights, good homes, and safe streets	43, 40	31	5	4	0	3	0
Economy, trade, jobs, and the budget	65, 83	32	13	10	0	7	25
Reforming government and the legal system	45, 50	24	12	9	0	1	6
Our land, food, and resources	50, 59	30	4	16	0	0	9
Foreign policy, national defense, and intelligence	85, 91	56	13	14	0	0	6
Total	352, 394	204	62	67	1	14	55
Changes by Full Committee							
Family values, education, and health care	70, 76	58	8	4	1	0	6
Individual rights, good homes, and safe streets	40, 43	32	2	4	0	1	4
Economy, trade, jobs, and the budget	83, 90	52	19	7	0	1	8
Reforming government and the legal system	59, 55	43	2	6	0	0	5
Our land, food, and resources	59, 65	51	3	5	0	0	6
Foreign policy, national defense, and intelligence	91, 92	72	8	10	0	0	1
Total	394, 421	308	42	36	1	2	30

Democrats	*Paragraphs*	*Same*	*Minor Stylistic*	*Major Stylistic*	*Substantive*	*Deleted*	*Added*
Changes by Drafting Committee							
Opportunity	16, 17	0	4	8	1	3	4
Responsibility	16, 11	0	7	2	2	5	0
Community	20, 18	3	7	3	0	7	5
National security	30, 32	9	5	10	2	4	6
Total	82, 78	12	23	23	5	19	15
Changes by Full Committee							
Opportunity	17, 21	10	4	2	1	0	4
Responsibility	11, 11	5	4	2	0	0	0
Community	18, 18	13	2	3	0	0	0
National security	32, 33	28	1	2	1	0	1
Total	78, 83	56	11	9	2		5

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of the major changes and half of the deletions, were the result of the efforts of a small group to force the party to accept their view of the state of the economy, past as well as future.

Changes made at the full committee level are even more interesting to note. Those observing the process noted how democratic the entire process seemed. Any member of the full committee was able to amend the platform at any point. Those who had attended the Democratic Platform Committee's meeting in June saw a somewhat ironic contrast in that the Republican process appeared to be more open and more democratic than was that of the party renowned for opening its process to all comers. In point of fact, few of the changes made by the full committee were substantive at all. In fact, fewer than a fifth of the over one hundred amendments passed by the full committee could be deemed substantive. Most were stylistic and nearly a half were very minor in nature.

While observers were first impressed with the democratic nature of the Republican process, by the end of the two-day meeting, the most common remarks dealt with how amazing it was that so many people sat still for so long debating items of so little consequence. Virtually the entire Committee on Resolutions—senators, members of Congress, state legislators, as well as less prominent individuals—sat for hour after hour debating changes such as whether the words "the peace and security of the Middle East" should be added after "world peace" in the sentence, "Without the leadership of President Bush, Iraq would today threaten world peace and the very survival of Israel with a huge conventional army and nuclear weapons." Some important changes were made at the full committee meeting, for instance, the addition of a plank calling for the line item veto. However, the vast majority of the amendments, and the vast majority of the time debating the proposed amendments were spent on quite trivial matters, often a preference for one person's style and rhetoric over another's.

Nearly three-quarters of the paragraphs that the subcommittees submitted to the full committee emerged unchanged. Over 95 percent of the paragraphs did not change substantively. The only conclusion one can reach is that the full committee, despite its hours of work and the presence of a relatively large number of prominent Republicans, did very little. The staff draft, with some additions by the subcommittees but little change in the substance of the remaining paragraphs, became the Republican platform. Praise or blame should rest with the Bush-Quayle Committee operatives who appointed the committee leadership, drafted the platform, and established subcommittee membership so that those with incentive to change the draft were not able to do

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so. The religious right and the economic conservatives might have dominated the Committee on Resolutions, but the platform they approved came from the presidential campaign, not from right-wing bastions.

The Democrats

Comparison with the Democrats is instructive. First, the Democratic platform in 1992—at every stage in the process—was much shorter than that of the Republicans. On the other hand, the 1992 Democratic platform was much longer than that in 1988. The goal was to strike a balance between offering something for everyone—and in so doing not really setting priorities—and saying so little that the platform did not appeal to those who needed to hear its appeals.

Second, relatively little of the Democratic platform remained intact after the staff draft. Only twelve of the eighty-two paragraphs in the staff draft remained in the version that emerged from the Drafting Committee. But most of the changes, forty-six of the eighty-five, were stylistic, not substantive changes. That follows logically from the process. John Holum crafted the first draft and the second. In many ways the staff draft presented to the Drafting Committee was an unfinished product. Holum had another shot and edited and revised his own work. Unlike the Republican platform, which was amended only through the formal process of amendment proposing and votes, the Democratic platform was amended by its principal author and editor.

At the same time, five of the eighty-two paragraphs were substantively changed, nineteen were dropped, and fifteen new ones were added. That is a substantial amount of amendment by the Drafting Committee.

Again, examples are important. The Drafting Committee version included a long and detailed paragraph on "The Cities" that was absent in the staff working paper. Related to that were paragraphs on drug counseling and housing. The Drafting Committee document had a paragraph on immigration absent in the earlier version; under "National Security" a paragraph dealt with human rights, again missing from the earlier version. The paragraphs on industrial relations were substantially altered, again bringing in matters not previously included.

At the full committee the major additions dealt with agriculture and rural policies, a glaring omission from the earlier drafts, and with additional material on equal and civil rights. Also a number of environmental planks were altered or in one case added, but they generally dealt with noncontroversial, traditional Democratic positions that had

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previously been excluded, but probably assumed. Roughly two-thirds of the paragraphs remained intact when the full committee reviewed the Drafting Committee's version. Another quarter were changed stylistically, while only two paragraphs were altered substantively and five new ones were added.

The obvious conclusion from Table 1 seems to be that the Democratic platform was a draft in progress before it went to the Drafting Committee in Sante Fe. The members of the Drafting Committee had the opportunity for input and exercised that opportunity, but mainly to add material that had been missing, not to change that which was present. The clear impression from committee discussion was that much of the deletion and tightening was at the behest of the full committee chairs, who were of the opinion that the first document was too long and not focused enough.

Who Influenced the Process?

This analysis leads naturally to a number of somewhat unexpected conclusions. First, conventional wisdom held that the religious right and, to a lesser extent, the economic conservatives, gained control of the Republican Committee on Resolutions and saddled President Bush with an extremist platform on which he had difficulty running. In fact, while those groups were present in large numbers and could have had control over the platform writing process had they exercised the power inherent in their numerical domination, the Bush-Quayle operatives who drafted the original version of the platform had most influence. Their original draft survived in large part without amendment. When the economic conservatives sought to amend the draft, they were beaten back by the president's advisers pleading for party unity. In the Republican party it is clear that the drafters had the most influence, not the vocal and visible representatives of the party's right wing.

While this conclusion flies in the face of the conventional journalistic wisdom regarding the 1992 Republican Convention and the role that the religious right played in Houston, it is not out of line with previous scholarly examinations of the platform process. In 1960, Paul David, Ralph Goldman, and Richard Bain commented on White House control of the process when an incumbent president was seeking reelection, "The actual drafting is performed by a relatively small group of leaders and specialists—in the case of the party in power usually with active White House participation. . . ."[10]

[10] David, Goldman, and Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions*, 407; see also, Parris, *The Convention Problem*, 121.

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In both parties one is left to question the importance of the political struggles for seats on the platform committees. The members of the two full committees had relatively little to say about the substance of the documents that emerged from the two national conventions. In normal years this conclusion would not be surprising for the party that controls the White House, especially with an incumbent president seeking reelection. Conventional wisdom holds that a president in power can control his national committee and presumably his national convention. That conventional wisdom was challenged in the Republican party in 1992, because many felt that the right wing had captured the organizational mechanisms of the party. That conclusion might well be valid if one looks at state committees and even at some state delegations to the national committee. It also might be valid for the Committee on Resolutions and even for the national convention delegations of state after state. But if the platform represents a party's effort to define itself, to state what it stands for, then the conclusion has limited relevance. The 1992 Republican platform was a statement of what the Bush-Quayle Committee, for political reasons that only the committee's strategists can explain, felt was best for their candidate. If the platform was a flawed document for political purposes, it was flawed because of miscalculation and/or neglect, not because of dominance by GOP extremists. Of course, one can only speculate whether the Committee on Resolutions would have played a more active role—moving the platform to the ideological right—had the Bush-Quayle campaign presented it with a more moderate draft. Surely in the past the committee members have played important roles on such controversial issues as civil rights in both parties in 1960.[11]

In normal years the conclusion that seats on the Platform Committee are not positions of any influence would seem surprising for the party out of power. Generally, one thinks of representatives of contenders for the party nomination fighting for symbolic victories in the platform long after they have lost their bids for nomination. "While incumbent presidents standing for election have dominated their conventions and obtained platforms that pledge to continue the policies of their administrations, other presidential candidates have not been in such a commanding position. . . ."[12] One thinks of fights for the soul of the party—battles between George McGovern's delegates and more traditional Democrats in 1972, between Jimmy Carter and Morris Udall delegates

[11] See Parris, *The Convention Problem*, 126–128.
[12] Ibid., 123.

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in 1976, Carter and Ted Kennedy delegates in 1980, Michael Dukakis and Jesse Jackson delegates in 1988. The examples in the Republican party are less clear, because the moderates have never had enough influence to effect platform change. However, the fight over the abortion plank in 1988 is a pertinent example, albeit one without a presidential contender as champion.

In 1992 the scenario was different for at least two reasons. Ron Brown's role and his influence deserve special attention. First, early in the process he sought to assure peace within the party. He brought the contenders together to set ground rules for the intraparty battle well before the first ballot was cast. He facilitated meetings between Clinton (and his representatives) and each of the other candidates as one after another they dropped out. He built bridges between the defeated candidates and the eventual nominee. Bill Clinton was assured of the Democratic nomination relatively early in the process. Brown's efforts contributed to Clinton's ability to build a unified campaign for the future.[13] After the nomination was assured, but before either Senator Paul Tsongas or Governor Jerry Brown had officially dropped out, Ron Brown worked hard to make certain that the party came together behind the Clinton candidacy and that the convention was a coronation, not a cat fight. Partially as a result of that effort, various elements of the Democratic party worked together on platform, not in opposition to each other.

Second, the process stressed the importance of the Drafting Committee. Members were appointed by Chairman Brown either on the direct nomination of the Clinton camp or, in the case of appointees who represented key components of the Democrat's coalition, with the approval of the Clinton camp. Drafting Committee members did have influence, and they worked hard for their own constituencies. But they also had in common a commitment to the candidacy of Bill Clinton, and they did not carry their fights to the extreme of threatening to disrupt the unity behind that candidacy. Ron Brown's choices, his influence, and his firm commitment to work with Clinton all contributed to this harmony.

A third conclusion deals with informal as opposed to formal influence. In the Republican party Vin Weber and his allies on the Subcommittee on the Economy could muster the requisite number of votes in subcommittee to challenge the White House's view of past economic

[13] Martin P. Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity" in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell, eds., *The Politics of Divided Government* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).

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challenges. But they could not maintain their view in the face of pressure from Charles Black and the Bush-Quayle campaign.

In the Democratic party, Drafting Committee members worried that they might express their concerns but that changes would not follow. However, a number of changes were indeed made; the careful observer can trace those changes to the influence of key participants: Mayor Kurt Schmoke of Baltimore, who was worried that the cities' views were not adequately expressed; Congressman (and later Agriculture Secretary) Mike Espy of Mississippi, who had similar concerns on agriculture policy; County Supervisor (and later HUD Assistant Secretary) Roberta Achtenberg from San Francisco and Professor Mary Frances Berry, who fought for language on women's health care and on equal and civil rights; Ken Young of the AFL-CIO and the other labor representatives who were concerned about industrial relations. Membership on the Drafting Committee meant that individuals could have influence on the shape of the final platform.

However, even that influence was at the margin. For more than anything else, the 1992 Democratic platform was a done deal. It was the platform on which Bill Clinton had run his entire campaign. In a meeting at Democratic Leadership Council headquarters on the eve of the full committee's deliberation, DLC President and Executive Director Al From polled DLC leaders on how they should react to all of the changes wrought in "their program" by the Drafting Committee. He worried that the changes had whittled away at DLC's coherent plan. One of those present pulled out a *New York Times* analysis of the platform, an examination that concluded that DLC fingerprints were scattered throughout the document. The conclusion of the assembled leaders? Declare victory. Let others have their small prizes, for the platform was a victory for moderate Democrats' view of how to capture the White House.

Conclusions

Finally, what does this analysis say about the role of the platform in the American political process? First, in 1992 at least, the platform writing process represented another example of the appearance but not the reality of democracy. Writing a platform was not a case of intraparty democracy. It was not a case of fighting for the soul of the party. It was not a case of intraparty battles over the direction the country will take. Someday those descriptions might be appropriate for a party not controlling the White House, if there is a pitched battle

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for the nomination. But platform fights, indeed all platform drafting, is done in the context of the presidential election, not as an independent political action.

And that statement leads directly to the second conclusion. Under current practices, platforms really are not party platforms; rather, like the election process itself, they are now presidential candidate-centered platforms. They are the platforms on which candidates feel comfortable running. They are platforms that party leaders allow, even encourage, the nominees' staff to write. In essence, they are the ultimate indication that the parties exist to win the presidential election, not to push policy agendas. The policy content of party in this view is contained in the belief that the candidates of the two parties really are different in fundamental ways, but that the spectrum of issues on which a candidate runs is so broad that he or she ought to be able to define those due for emphasis. In today's political world that is perhaps how it should be, for the parties are seen in terms of their presidential candidates, not the other way around.

Of course, this conclusion does not seem surprising for the party of an incumbent president seeking reelection. Incumbents have always been able to control their conventions and to run on a platform of their choosing, emphasizing the accomplishments of their term of office. In 1992 the journalistic wisdom was that Bush did not exercise that kind of control. In fact, he did. If the platform and the convention hurt his campaign, the blow was self-inflicted.

The conclusion does seem somewhat odd for the nonincumbent candidate, especially for the nonincumbent candidate whose party does not control the White House. Lame duck presidents have been quite successful at having their parties draft platforms that support the accomplishments of their administrations, even if some of those policies caused controversies. For example, Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy was endorsed, albeit with a floor fight on a minority plank, by the 1968 Democratic Convention. Remember other recent Democratic examples: George McGovern's nominating convention was dominated by platform fights, and similar battles were prominent features of Jimmy Carter's 1976 convention and Mike Dukakis's 1988 convention. But circumstances play important roles. According to Edward Sait, "Bryan dictated the 1908 platform over long-distance telephone."[14] And David, Goldman, and Bain remind us of the early years of platform writing: "The platform-drafting function had evolved out of the occasional efforts to prepare 'an address to the people,' and had be-

[14] Sait, *American Parties and Elections*, 564.

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come accepted as a normal part of the convention routine [by 1860]. Early platform-drafting, when it occurred at all, was usually deferred until after the nomination had been made."[15] Thus, when we conclude that the platform-writing process has become candidate-centered, and if we believe that that seems innovative for the party out of power, we are well advised to remember that recent history is not all of party history, that common views of the process do not necessarily conform with more rigorous studies.[16]

The conclusion that platforms in 1992 were candidate, not party platforms in turn leads to another. If platforms are candidate platforms, then we should not be surprised that victorious candidates attempt to implement their platforms and that congressional parties of victorious candidates support major items in the platform. These issues define the candidate, and to members of Congress it is significant that they define the winning candidate. The priority items in the platform are the issues that the public, who voted for the winner, associates with the winner. And, despite the fact that neither the public nor party regulars *qua* party activists determine how the platform planks were drafted, it is totally appropriate that the victor and the victor's party be judged on their ability to implement their platform and on the extent to which the items called for in the platform address the problems confronting the nation.*

[15] David, Goldman, and Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions*, 29.

[16] See Mathew D. McCubbins, "Party Decline and Presidential Campaigns in the Television Age" in Mathew D. McCubbins, ed., *Under the Watchful Eye: Managing Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992).

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Carter and the Failure of Foreign Policy Reform

DAVID SKIDMORE

The 1970s were a period of aborted change in U.S. foreign policy. The pervasive post-World War II consensus among foreign policy elites crumbled under the weight of the Vietnam war and global economic travails. New policy paradigms such as détente and liberal internationalism not only stirred debate but often served as the basis for marked policy departures. Richard Nixon was the first American president to challenge past orthodoxy when he took bold steps toward improving relations with both the Soviet Union and mainland China. Yet the influence of new schools of thought was most evident during the early years of the Carter presidency. Jimmy Carter and his advisers believed that many of the traditional rationales that had guided U.S. foreign policy for over a generation were now outmoded and inappropriate to altered world realities. By the end of the decade, however, these new orientations had largely been abandoned in favor of policies reminiscent of the cold war era. Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 only confirmed the passing of this liberal interlude in U.S. foreign policy.

This article offers a frankly revisionist (though admittedly partial) explanation for the failure of policy reform during the Carter years. Contrary to many observers, I argue that Carter's initial foreign policy design was neither confused and incoherent nor simply a reflection

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of Carter's personal moralism. I also reject the view that the primary sources of policy change during Carter's term were international. Instead, at the core of Carter's early policies lay a pragmatic strategy of adjustment to declining U.S. global power. Carter's policies were responsive to ongoing changes in the international structure of power, and Carter achieved considerable success abroad where he pursued his early reform initiatives in earnest.

Carter's wholesale retreat from this initial approach and the confusion into which his foreign policies eventually descended stemmed principally from his inability to gain domestic legitimacy for the administration's early world view or the policies associated with it. The evolution of Carter's foreign policies was therefore driven by contradictory sets of international and domestic pressures. International incentives, arising from the dynamics of U.S. decline, initially pulled the administration toward a strategy of adjustment to external change. Domestic constraints favoring policy rigidity, however, eventually forced Carter to abandon much of his early reformist approach in an effort to salvage his dwindling domestic popularity.

Although Carter's poor leadership skills certainly complicated his task, a more important source of Carter's failure to rally popular support stemmed from structural conflicts between the substantive features of the administration's world view and the imperatives of domestic foreign policy legitimation. The complexity of the administration's liberal internationalist paradigm as well as the pragmatic flexibility demanded by its strategy of adjustment rendered Carter's policies difficult to sell to the American public. I outline the essential points of this argument below, beginning with a critique of existing perspectives on Carter's foreign policies.

Evaluating Existing Interpretations

Interpretations of the Carter administration's early foreign policies commonly fall into one of two general schools of thought. Some see only incoherence and inconsistency in Carter's initial policies. The administration's confusion is usually attributed to its failure to develop a central world view, though Carter's own inexperience as well as divisions among his advisers are also often cited as either independent or related factors.[1] Others credit the administration with a coherent

[1] For examples, see Richard Barnet, "Carter's Patchwork Doctrine," *Harper's*, August 1977; Kenneth Adelman, "The Runner Stumbles: Carter's Foreign Policy in the Year One," *Policy Review* 3

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yet naive and ineffective world view – one founded upon the president's own misplaced moralism.[2]

Virtually all observers agree that the Carter administration's foreign policies changed over time, although disagreement exists over the degree and nature of this shift. Perhaps the most popular view holds that Carter's increasingly tough approach toward the Soviet Union and national defense was dictated by a harsh and threatening international environment, which undermined Carter's earlier optimistic assumptions and forced the administration in more conservative directions.[3]

While each contains useful insights, none of these interpretations provides an adequate overall understanding of the basic purposes underlying Carter's foreign policies or the reasons why these policies changed over time. Those who argue that the administration lacked a coherent world view fail to distinguish between coherence and complexity. Carter and his advisers believed that a bipolar view of the world failed to account for the increasing complexity of the international system. The diffusion of international power and the growth of interdependence both created the need for a more subtle and differentiated approach to U.S. foreign policy. Many observers have mistaken the complexity of Carter's world view for confusion or incoherence. Yet many of the apparent inconsistencies to which others have pointed disappear when Carter's policies and beliefs are interpreted as related aspects of a complex strategy of adjustment to hegemonic decline.

Some observers trace alleged policy incoherence to failures of leadership and policy coordination. While there is little doubt that these sorts of problems hampered the conduct of Carter's foreign policies, it is easy to exaggerate their significance. The intellectual and bureau-

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(Winter 1978); Arthur Schlesinger, "The Great Carter Mystery," *New Republic*, 12 April 1980; Walter LaFeber, "From Confusion to Cold War: The Memoirs of the Carter Administration," *Diplomatic History* 8 (Winter 1984); Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," *Foreign Policy* 29 (Winter 1977) and "A View from Home: The Perils of Incoherence," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 1978* 57 (1979); and Donald Spencer, *The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1988).

[2] For examples, see Robert Osgood, "Carter Policy in Perspective," *SAIS Review* 1 (Winter 1981); Gaddis Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Coral Bell, "Virtue Unrewarded: Carter's Foreign Policy at Mid-Term," *International Affairs* 54 (October 1978); and Linda Miller, "Morality in Foreign Policy: A Failed Consensus," *Daedalus* 109 (Summer 1980).

[3] See LaFeber, "From Confusion to Cold War"; Osgood, "Carter Policy in Perspective"; Robert Tucker, "America in Decline: A Foreign Policy of Maturity," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 1979* 58 (1980); and "Reagan Without Tears: His 'Simple' World View Is Truer than Carter's 'Complex' One," *New Republic*, 17 May 1980; and Norman Podhoretz, *The Present Danger* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980).

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cratic complexities of managing the multifaceted foreign policies of a great power are always considerable. And while presidents have varied in their political and management skills, one can find bountiful examples of bureaucratic bungling, personal rivalries, and mismanagement in even the most successful administrations. For such factors to be considered decisive in the Carter case, we would have to accept as plausible the notion that a more politically skilled president might have achieved considerably greater success with the same general program pursued by Carter. Although Carter certainly lacked in leadership skills, this argument nevertheless misses the substantial structural impediments that would have plagued any adjustment oriented administration.

Moreover, an emphasis on Carter's poor management and political skills does little to explain the direction of policy change under Carter. An argument stressing Carter's haphazard management style might lead us to expect random fluctuations in policy. Yet the direction of change in Carter's policies across a variety of issue areas veered consistently from a liberal strategy of adjustment toward a more conservative strategy of resistance.

Other observers correctly attribute a coherent world view to the administration but err in viewing Carter's foreign policies as uniquely a product of the president's own admittedly moralistic personality. Despite the idealistic rhetoric in which Carter chose to wrap them, virtually all of his administration's initial policies reflected ideas widely advocated among liberal foreign policy specialists on purely pragmatic grounds. Furthermore, Carter's moralistic embrace of human rights was motivated not only by his own intense moral convictions but also by the belief that these sorts of appeals would bolster his own political fortunes and win support for his foreign policy reforms. An overemphasis on the Carter administration's idealism is, therefore, misplaced.

Foreign policy change during the Carter period is usually attributed to inconsistencies between Carter's initial assumptions and objective international trends and realities. Most often, Carter's increasingly tough policies are seen as belated responses to threatening Soviet behavior, including a rapid military buildup as well as aggressive Third World activities.[4]

[4] For versions of this argument, see Tucker, "America in Decline"; "Reagan Without Tears"; Podhoretz, *The Present Danger*; Colin Gray and Jeffrey Barlow, "Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the 1970s," *International Security* 10 (Fall 1985); Bayard Rustin and Carl Gershman, "Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power," *Commentary*, October 1977; Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," *Commentary*, November

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This argument, however, rests upon a series of factual inaccuracies. Rather than accelerating, Soviet military spending actually slowed substantially during the Carter years, while the overall NATO versus Warsaw Pact military balance, both nuclear and conventional, remained tilted slightly in favor of the West.[5] While both superpowers became embroiled in various Third World conflicts during the 1970s, the Soviets initiated few, if any, of these clashes and exercised restraint in several. Though the Soviet Union gained influence in some Third World countries, it lost ground in others. Overall, U.S. gains in the Third World outweighed Soviet gains, especially if pro-Western shifts by Egypt and China are considered. Finally, Carter's early emphasis on diplomacy often proved an effective means of preempting or countering Soviet influence.[6]

Carter's Foreign Policies: Adjusting to Decline

If the interpretations reviewed so far are lacking, then how should we understand Carter's policy reforms? The presidents of the 1970s, Carter in particular, were principally concerned with adjusting U.S. foreign policy to account for declining American power. Their policies

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1979; Keith Payne, "Are They Interested in Stability? The Soviet View of Intervention," *Comparative Strategy* 4 (Spring 1981); and Charles Tyroler II, ed., *Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984).

[5] On changes in the rate of Soviet military spending, which shifted from 4–5 percent annual growth before 1976 to roughly 2 percent from 1976 through 1982, see Arthur Macy Cox, "The CIA's Tragic Error," *New York Review of Books*, 6 November 1980; Leslie Gelb and Richard Halloren, "CIA Analysis Now Said to Find U.S. Overstated Soviet Arms Rise," *New York Times*, 3 March 1983; and Hedrick Smith, "CIA Report Says Soviet Arms Spending Slowed," *New York Times*, 19 November 1983. On the East-West military balance, see Franklyn Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" *International Security* 5 (Spring 1980); Richard Stubbing, "The Imaginary Defense Gap: We Already Outspend Them," *Washington Post*, 14 February 1982; Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Overarming and Underwhelming," *Foreign Policy* 40 (Fall 1980); and Robert Komer, "What 'Decade of Neglect'?" *International Security* 10 (Fall 1985). Also see various essays in both Steven Miller, ed., *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Steven Miller, ed., *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[6] On U.S.-Soviet competition in the Third World during this period, see Posen and Van Evera, "Overarming and Underwhelming"; Samuel Huntington, "Renewed Hostility" in Joseph Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Robert Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* 59 (Spring 1979); Wayne Smith, "A Trap in Angola," *Foreign Policy* 62 (Spring 1986); John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978); Fred Halliday, *Soviet Policy in the Arc of Crisis* (Washington, DC: The Institute for Policy Studies, 1981); George Kennan, "The Soviet Threat: How Real?" *Inquiry*, 17 March 1980; and Ken Booth and Phil Williams, "Reagan's Myths About Detente," *World Policy* 2 (Summer 1985).

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were aimed at addressing what Samuel Huntington has called the "Lippmann Gap": the growing imbalance between dwindling resources and static commitments.[7]

This imbalance emerged naturally as rival states gradually narrowed the enormous military and economic lead enjoyed by the United States during the early post-World War II era. Its existence was made apparent to many foreign policy elites during the 1970s by the elusiveness of victory in Vietnam, the growth of Soviet military power, the weakness of the dollar, and the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). These indicators of America's relative decline and strategic overextension signaled the emergence of a more constraining international environment.[8]

Since reversing the dynamics of decline is a difficult task, the operative problem for policy makers becomes that of narrowing the gap between resources and commitments to manageable proportions. As Huntington points out, "Unlike the decline in relative power, the imbalance in policy can be corrected."[9] This may be accomplished by either reducing commitments or finding less costly and risky ways of maintaining them. As Kenneth Oye notes, "A degree of retrenchment is the first element of a strategy of adjustment."[10] Like Nixon and Ford, this is precisely what Carter attempted to do as he adjusted U.S. policies in response to changing configurations in the international distribution of power. Oye argues that all three presidents:

> narrowed the definition of American interests and commitments in peripheral regions, shifted some of the burdens of containment to China, Western Europe, and the Third World, and acted on limited areas of mutual interest with the Soviet Union. . . . Their rhetoric was attuned to the politics of limits, and their actions were rooted in a strategy of adjustment.[11]

[7] Samuel Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World, 1987–88* 66 (1988).

[8] The American experience conforms to a broader historical cycle of rising and declining hegemonic powers. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); and George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20 (April 1978).

[9] Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," 455.

[10] Kenneth Oye, "Constrained Confidence and the Evolution of Reagan Foreign Policy" in Kenneth Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber, eds., *Eagle Resurgent? The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 22.

[11] Ibid., 4.

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Public statements by Carter and his aides revealed an acute awareness of the emerging constraints on U.S. power. In mid-1977, Carter noted that "Both the United States and the Soviet Union have learned that our countries and our people, in spite of great resources, are not all-powerful." The world, Carter believed, was "too large and too varied to come under the sway of either one or two superpowers."[12] At Notre Dame in May 1977, Carter stated that "we can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful. . . ."[13] Before the United Nations in October, Carter proclaimed that "Power is now widely shared. . . ." For the United States, this meant that "However wealthy and powerful the United States may be—however capable of leadership—this power is increasingly only relative, the leadership increasingly is in need of being shared."[14]

Under the guise of liberal internationalism, Carter and his aides shaped a set of policy responses to declining U.S. power that departed substantially from the cold war paradigm. Carter sought to narrow the Lippmann Gap by reducing U.S. commitments in peripheral areas, sharing burdens more evenly with friends and allies, and seeking accommodation with adversaries. The Carter administration believed that a favorable international structure of interests would allow retrenchment to be carried out without serious damage to vital U.S. interests. To achieve its objectives, the United States would rely less upon brute power and more upon diplomacy geared toward exploiting the existence of shared interests with other states. In basic purposes, the continuities between the Nixon/Ford years and the early Carter period were substantial, although significant differences in approach and emphasis arose, including Carter's initial inclination to downplay U.S.–Soviet relations while devoting greater attention to preventive diplomacy in the Third World. The specific policies associated with Carter's strategy of adjustment are indicated in Table I.

Carter's adjustment strategy produced some important diplomatic successes including the Panama Canal Treaty, the successful transition to black rule in Zimbabwe, the Camp David Accords, the recognition

[12] Jimmy Carter, "United States–Soviet Relations" (address before the Southern Legislative Conference, Charleston, South Carolina, 21 July 1977), reprinted in Elaine Adam, ed., *American Foreign Relations, 1977: A Documentary Record* (New York: New York University Press, 1979), 192.

[13] Jimmy Carter, "Foreign Policy and the National Character" (commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, 22 May 1977), reprinted in Adam, ed., *American Foreign Relations, 1977*, 174.

[14] Jimmy Carter, "Major Dimensions of Peace" (address before the 32nd United Nations General Assembly, 4 October 1977), reprinted in Adam, ed., *American Foreign Relations, 1977*, 201–2, 208.

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TABLE 1

Components of Carter's Initial Adjustment Strategy

Reducing Commitments:
- —Restrain overall defense spending and shift priorities from strategic and Third World intervention forces to NATO forces.
- —Withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea.
- —Reduce U.S. arms sales and military aid abroad.
- —Restrict CIA covert actions.
- —Avoid military entanglements in peripheral regions.

Shifting Burdens:
- —Urge NATO allies to spend more on defense.
- —Improve relations with Communist China.
- —Court regional influentials in the Third World.

Accommodating Rivals:
- —Pursue détente and arms control with Soviet Union.
- —Normalize relations with radical states (China, Vietnam, Angola, Cuba).
- —Apply preventive diplomacy to solve regional conflicts (Camp David Accords, transition to black rule in Zimbabwe, Panama Canal Treaties).

of mainland China,[15] and the signing (though not ratification) of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II Accords with the Soviet Union. Huntington points out that these diplomatic achievements:

> significantly reduced the Lippmann gap: consider how different the world would look and what the demands would be on U.S. resources if China were threatening aggression against American interests in Asia, if Egypt were a Soviet ally and military base, and if the Panama Canal were under intermittent attack by guerrilla-terrorists.[16]

Reversing Gears: From Adjustment to Resistance

Despite these individual successes, Carter clearly failed in his larger effort to institutionalize reform and adjustment in U.S. foreign policy. Carter began to retreat from his reformist aspirations as early as 1978; by 1980, his foreign policy was geared more toward resisting the implications of decline than adjusting to them.[17] Defense spending rose;

[15] See Banning Garrett, "China Policy and the Constraints of Triangular Logic" in Kenneth Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 245-51; and Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance and Brzezinski Differ Again on Peking Tie and Effect on Soviet," *New York Times*, 16 January 1979.

[16] Huntington, "Coping With the 'Lippmann Gap'," 457.

[17] For quantitative evidence based upon content analysis and events data, see Jerel Rosati, *The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987).

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SALT II was shelved; arms sales climbed; expensive new strategic systems were approved; rapid deployment forces designed for Third World duty were readied; plans to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea were dropped; recognition of radical states such as Vietnam, Cuba and Angola was left undone; preventive diplomacy was dormant; détente was abandoned, and containment was back. The election of Ronald Reagan doomed what little remained of Carter's adjustment strategy and accelerated processes that were to once again broaden the gap between U.S. resources and commitments during the 1980s.

Why were Carter's adjustment oriented reforms so quickly abandoned? Although a variety of factors played some role, I argue that domestic politics must lie at the heart of any explanation for Carter's dramatic turnabout. Carter's strategy of adjustment encountered intense opposition on the part of vested interests with material, professional, and intellectual stakes in perpetuating cold war policies, along with broad ideological resistance in the society at large. While Carter succeeded in fashioning a strategy for adjusting to external decline, he failed in finding a formula for establishing the domestic legitimacy of his new policies in competition with the institutional and intellectual legacies of past policies.

Part of the explanation for Carter's turnabout has to do with conservative elite mobilization during the 1970s. Groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger and the American Security Council, along with their congressional allies, mounted broad, intense, and often successful campaigns against Carter's initiatives. Politically skilled, highly organized, and well funded, conservative organizations used populist rhetoric, elite connections, and media attention to seize control of the foreign policy agenda and place the administration on the defensive with respect to a host of high profile issues including the Panama Canal Treaties, the SALT II Accords, defense spending, and Third World unrest. Although liberal groups attempted to counterbalance these pressures, they largely failed because of their lack of numbers, funding, organization, and grassroots ties. Carter, therefore, faced an asymmetrical interest-group environment in which pressures originated overwhelmingly among those opposed to reform.[18]

Yet interest-group opposition was not the sole nor perhaps the most important source of domestic constraint on Carter's reforms. Presi-

[18] See Jerry Sanders, *Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment* (Boston: South End Press, 1983).

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dents, after all, can isolate and overcome elite opponents if they succeed in rallying the public behind their preferred policies. Carter's manifest failure to win this sort of popular support proved his real undoing.

Although, as Carter took office, the cold war paradigm stood partially discredited as a result of Vietnam, polls showed a gradual shift in opinion toward more traditional orientations over the ensuing years. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, surveys revealed growing support for higher defense spending, CIA covert actions, military aid, the use of military force, and containing communism. Liberal internationalist positions such as détente, arms control, and economic aid, by contrast, suffered a loss in public support.[19] The public not only opposed the Panama Canal treaties[20] and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea,[21] but also, despite early support, eventually turned against the ratification of the SALT II treaty.[22]

While traditional cold war orientations did not in all cases command majority support, the trends were clear. Using data from surveys conducted in both 1974 and 1978 for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR), William Schneider found a relatively strong correlation ($r = .47$) between net changes in public support and classical cold war dispositions.[23] Another indication of liberal internationalism's unpopularity was that the proportion of the public approving of Carter's handling of foreign policy issues, according to Harris surveys, dropped from 48 percent in July 1977 to 22 percent in July 1978 during a period of intense debate over his new policies.[24] The political signifi-

[19] See John Rielly, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1975* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975); John Rielly, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1979* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979); and Daniel Yankelovich, "Cautious Internationalism: A Changing Mood Towards US Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion* 1 (March-April 1978): 12–16.

[20] See Michael Hogan, *The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the Evolution of Policy* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 200–207; and George D. Moffett, III, *The Limits of Victory: The Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), 112–137. Also see Bernard Rushco, "The Polls: Polling on Panama-Si; Don't Know; Hell No!," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42 (Winter 1978): 551–62.

[21] Larry Niksch, "US Troop Withdrawal from South Korea: Past Shortcomings and Future Prospects," *Asian Survey* 21 (March 1981): 329.

[22] George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1979* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1980), 272.

[23] William Schneider, "Conservatism, Not Interventionism: Trends in Foreign Policy Opinion, 1974–82" in Oye, Lieber, and Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant*, 44–45.

[24] "Opinion Roundup: Americans and the World," *Public Opinion* 2 (March/May 1979): 29.

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cance of these trends was not lost on the White House, and Carter steadily moved to align his policies with them.

Explaining Policy Change

Why was Carter unable to transform his liberal internationalist philosophy into a vehicle for legitimating change in U.S. foreign policy? It is tempting to attribute Carter's troubles to simple political incompetence. The president's early speeches, for instance, were hardly inspirational or visionary. Indeed, Carter's pronouncements often took the form of lists of problems and solutions.[25] In one early foreign policy address, Carter touched upon human rights, allied relations, arms control, the Middle East, nuclear proliferation and arms sales, North-South relations, normalization of relations with China and, finally, South Africa.[26] Although emphasizing the need for policy change and distancing the administration from America's role in Vietnam and the secretiveness and amoralism of the Nixon era, little effort was made to tie together the various elements of policy or the particular rationales offered for them under an overall doctrine.

More than a lack of political savvy, however, is necessary to account for the self-consciously nonideological political style adopted by Carter and his aides. The exception to this unrelenting pragmatism was Carter's stress on human rights. Carter's apparent political ineptitude stemmed most fundamentally from contradictions between the imperatives of external adjustment and the requisites of internal legitimation: adjustment oriented policies could not easily be legitimated while policies that lent themselves to legitimation were incompatible with adjustment. Thus Carter's vigorous early efforts at external adjustment were accompanied by the lethargic and ineffective pursuit of domestic legitimation. Likewise, as the administration became more concerned about domestic legitimacy later during Carter's term, it began to abandon critical aspects of its early adjustment strategy.

These tensions must be understood, in part, as consequences or legacies of the means by which officials went about bolstering support for U.S. foreign policies during the cold war period. The relevant literature suggests that policy makers relied upon four primary techniques of legitimation: cast policies into doctrinal form so that specific

[25] James Fallows, "The Passionless Presidency," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1979, 33–46, 48.
[26] Carter, "Foreign Policy and the National Character," 171–78.

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policy responses appear to flow from the application of generally accepted principles; create simple, declarative explanatory rationales; rely upon symbolic language to link specific policies with consensual ideological values; and overstate threats and oversell solutions.[27] These highly ideological legitimative practices created domestic commitments which tied U.S. policy makers to rigid, categorical foreign policies. The process by which policies were sold at home, in other words, influenced the substance of the policies themselves. Infused with moralism, universalism, and other distinctive ideological traits, U.S. foreign policy became gradually less responsive to international change and increasingly more responsive to the demands of domestic legitimation.

The Carter administration's largely apolitical rhetorical style represented an attempt to avert this trap. Carter's adjustment strategy called for a pragmatic, flexible, case-by-case approach to foreign policy making. Pursuing this course required a conscious departure from the legitimative routines of the past. Because they were tied to past policies and in any case promoted policy rigidity, the ideological legitimation strategies of the cold war period were considered inconsistent with the foreign policy adjustments the administration believed a changing international environment demanded.

Yet in rejecting the tried and true techniques of the cold war period, the Carter administration left itself without a coherent strategy of legitimation. Carter's emphasis on human rights was a failed attempt to devise an alternative strategy for rallying domestic support. Without an effective means of selling his overall strategy to the American people, Carter's pursuit of reform led to substantial domestic political costs. When these costs eventually became intolerable, Carter fell back upon both the legitimative techniques and the associated policies of the cold war era in an effort to shore up his political position at home. Once domestic priorities became paramount to the administration, it had little choice but to abandon much of its early foreign policy agenda. The remainder of this article pursues this argument by examining four

[27] See Katarina Brodin, "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 7 (1972): 97–112; Alexander George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy" in Alexander George, Ole Holsti, and Randolph Siverson, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 233–62; Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1979); and B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (September 1975): 251–84.

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points of contradiction between the imperatives of external adjustment and traditional requisites of internal legitimation.

Doctrine/Flexibility

The first contradiction confronting the Carter team took the form of a trade-off between flexibility and the political imperative of building support for currently favored policies. Carter and his advisers concluded that reliance upon doctrine was dangerous. However helpful in winning public support, a doctrinal foreign policy hampered adjustment to international change. Carter's initial shopping list approach to presenting policies to the public was designed, by contrast, to maximize flexibility in the pursuit of external adjustment, despite its recognized political costs.

Prominent members of the Carter team believed that the ideological potence and alluring simplicity of the traditional containment doctrine had blinded policy makers and the public to the growing weaknesses and limitations of the policies associated with it. In a rapidly changing world, they were reluctant to risk repeating this mistake. Journalist Leslie Gelb, before joining Carter's State Department, argued that past policy makers had used doctrines as "public relations exercises designed to limit rational and critical discussion of policy." The danger in this practice, Gelb believed, was that doctrines "demand too much consistency" and perpetuate "intellectual rigidity."[28]

The need for policy flexibility as a requirement of external adjustment was rooted in the diffusion of international power and the growth of interdependence. Both conditions served to expand the foreign policy agenda, heighten the potential for conflicts among policy objectives, and increase the tension between existing commitments and available resources. While a doctrinal foreign policy may have sufficed to cope with the relatively simple bipolar international structure of the early postwar period, these changes had created an environment that by the late 1970s was perceived as too fluid and complex to be adequately dealt with by policies rooted in fixed principles, grand schemes, or doctrinal formulations.

In 1977, Gelb, echoing his earlier themes, argued that "the environment we are looking at is far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine

[28] Leslie Gelb, "Dissenting on Consensus" in Anthony Lake, ed., *The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York: New York University Press, 1976), 113, 115.

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in the tradition of Post-World War II American foreign policy. Indeed, the Carter approach to foreign policy rests on a belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine, but that there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all."[29] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, put it similarly: "We did not wish the world to be this complex; but we must deal with it in all of its complexity, even if it means having a foreign policy which cannot be reduced to a single and simplistic slogan."[30]

In maximizing policy flexibility, the Carter administration placed serious constraints upon its ability to make the kind of appeals needed to mobilize domestic political support. A doctrinal foreign policy can inhibit efforts to deal subtly with conflicting objectives or to fashion new and appropriate responses to unexpected international change.[31] Yet, without doctrine and the consensus it helps to mold, policy makers may find themselves immobilized by conflicting bureaucratic and societal pressures.

Simplicity/Complexity

The usefulness of doctrine is rooted not only in its appeal to principle but also in its simplicity as an explanatory device. If the pragmatism resting at the core of liberal internationalism limited its ability to function as a doctrine in the traditional manner, its complexity did so as well. As Alexander George has noted, the "complex objectives and strategy" of détente contrasted sharply with the "stark simplicity of the cold war."[32]

Carter viewed the U.S.-Soviet relationship, for instance, as one founded upon a mixture of shared and conflicting interests: "I remain fully aware that American-Soviet relations will continue to be highly competitive—but I believe that our competition must be balanced by cooperation in preserving peace and thus our mutual survival."[33] Be-

[29] Leslie Gelb, "National Security and the New Foreign Policy," *Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College* 7 (Fall 1977): 75.

[30] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "American Policy and Global Change" (address before the Trilateral Commission, Bonn, West Germany, 30 October 1977), reprinted in Adam, ed., *American Foreign Relations, 1977*, 460.

[31] Brodin, "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy," 105-108.

[32] George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change," 251.

[33] Jimmy Carter, "Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy" (address before representatives of United Nations member states, 17 March 1977), reprinted in Adam, ed., *American Foreign Relations, 1977*, 161.

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yond the sphere of superpower relations, liberal internationalists contended that the U.S. role of world policeman was both costly and untenable. The United States would have to learn to distinguish among vital and peripheral interests, to tolerate radical change in certain parts of the world, to avoid the temptation to view all Third World conflicts in East–West terms, and to adopt more subtle and sophisticated means for protecting American interests in a world marked by nationalism, turmoil, and change.[34]

Given their belief in a complex and differentiated world, Carter officials asked Americans to tolerate a degree of policy inconsistency and to substitute pragmatism for principle. As Anthony Lake, director of policy planning in the State Department, explained, "Our approach is to make constant, pragmatic, case by case decisions, seeking the most constructive balance among our interests and adjusting our tactics as circumstances change."[35] Carter himself pleaded with the public to understand that "We live in a world that is imperfect and which will always be imperfect—a world that is complex and confused and which will always be complex and confused."[36]

Brzezinski implicitly acknowledged the difficulty of gaining public support for this sort of approach when he noted that

> . . . after World War II our foreign policy, by necessity, was focused primarily on issues connected with the Cold War. This gave it a sharp focus, in some cases making it easier to mobilize public opinion. Today we confront a more difficult task, which calls for support based on reason. We must respond to a wider range of issues . . . stemming from a complex process of global change. A concentrated foreign policy must give way to a complex foreign policy. . . .[37]

Both Carter's break with universalist tradition in U.S. foreign policy and the domestic difficulties this shift created are well illustrated in remarks by Paul Kreisberg, the deputy director of policy planning in Carter's State Department. In an interview with Richard Melanson, Kreisberg rejected the notion that "if the Soviets gained influence in,

[34] The most revealing statement of the administration's approach toward the Third World can be found in an address by Undersecretary of State David Newsom, "The Challenge of Political Change" (address before the American Whig-Cliosophic Society, Princeton University, 22 March 1979), reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), document 10.

[35] Anthony Lake, "Managing Complexity in U.S. Foreign Policy" (speech before World Affairs Council of Northern California, San Francisco, 14 March 1978), distributed by U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Speech Series.

[36] Carter, "Foreign Policy and the National Character," 174.

[37] Brzezinski, "American Policy and Global Change," 465.

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for example, Ethiopia or South Yemen, . . . that this (a) was irreversible and (b) would transform fundamentally the strategic balance. . . ." Kreisberg noted that "the notion that the Soviets were moving again and that we had to draw a line and say 'here, no further' was really, from the State Department's point of view, alien to our basic thinking about the world." The Carter administration's complex view of Soviet activities in the Third World reflected the notion that "the world is a place that is in constant flux, things are never totally black or white, and, on balance, Soviet influence has been diminishing in recent years in a whole series of countries that seemed to be firmly in the Soviet camp." "The trouble," Kreisberg lamented, ". . . is that it is a very subtle policy, and subtlety is a characteristic that is hard to sell politically."[38]

Kreisberg's complaint reinforces Alexander George's point that the cold war was "easier to legitimate because it rested on a simple negative stereotype—a devil image of the Soviet leaders. Détente policy, on the other hand, had the more difficult task of getting people to view the Soviets as a limited adversary; but just what that was—neither friend nor foe, something in between—was not easy for many people to understand."[39]

Moralism/Pragmatism

Despite its misgivings about doctrine, the Carter administration did not entirely ignore the necessity of developing an overarching ideological rationale for its new approach to foreign affairs. If anticommunism was the core value around which the containment doctrine revolved, human rights served as the central moral rationale for Carter's liberal internationalism. Unfortunately for Carter, however, human rights did not possess the ideological power, as anticommunism once had, to unite the country around a common vision. Unlike anticommunism, the concept of human rights was often ambiguous, sometimes proved divisive, lacked high salience, and held only a tenuous relationship to many of Carter's more pragmatic policies. Because of these weaknesses, human rights failed to provide a consensually accepted core value around which the public could rally.

Anticommunism served the function of uniting broad segments of the public around the central tenets of American foreign policy for

[38] Richard Melanson, *Writing History and Making Policy: The Cold War, Vietnam, and Revisionism* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 103.

[39] George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change," 252.

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over two decades after World War II. From the standpoint of domestic legitimation, anticommunism held many attractions: it appealed to deeply held liberal values, focused opposition on a particular kind of threat associated with the more concrete interests of containing Soviet power and revolution in the Third World, and could be used to rationalize a broad range of policies.

The Carter administration, however, found anticommunism inconsistent with its new outlook. Moreover, anticommunism, while still powerful, no longer served as a universally accepted basic for American foreign policy. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy, especially during the Nixon era, had come to lack a widely recognized and accepted moral core. The moral skepticism with which the public came to regard U.S. foreign policy in the years after Vietnam threatened America's continuing ability to play a role of global leadership. Carter hoped that the theme of human rights would restore the basis for American activism in the world by convincing onlookers at home and abroad that the United States was once again a force for justice and progress in the world.

In 1976, before he joined Carter's White House team, Zbigniew Brzezinski elaborated the rationale that underpinned Carter's later emphasis on human rights. Brzezinski argued that ideological ascendancy can be as potent as other more commonly acknowledged forms of international power and that the ideological appeal of America's liberal values had well served the United States in past decades. Brzezinski believed, however, that recent years had witnessed the deterioration of America's image and ideological influence. Given the rise of egalitarianism and hostile ideologies in much of the world, the United States faced the prospect of "philosophical isolation" in the absence of a concerted effort to reassert the relevance of liberal values.[40]

Perhaps more important than the challenges this presented abroad, the specter of philosophical isolation threatened to undermine the domestic basis for a constructive American role in the world. Domestic resentment toward the rejection of American values abroad might give rise to isolationism or policies based upon destructive hostility and intolerance.

> Most Americans have . . . believed that the American type liberal democracy was a potential model for the rest of the world. Yet implicit in the emergent new mood was the sudden recognition that . . . the American system was no

[40] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," *Foreign Policy* 23 (Summer 1976).

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> longer the carrier of a universally applicable message . . . the sudden fading of the underlying sources of the system's legitimacy could prove destabilizing and it could prompt many Americans to take refuge in the reassuring simplicity of the notion of the Hostile World as the successor to the Cold War—with both notions substituting political dichotomy for global complexity.[41]

Brzezinski feared that anticommunism was giving way to a jingoistic unilateralism, which might lead to an even less appropriate American posture in the world. His answer was to come up with a new central organizing principle appropriate to a liberal and internationally activist set of foreign policies. In his memoirs, Brzezinski recalls that he entered office with the hope that by emphasizing human rights the administration could "overcome the spreading pessimism, which in the realm of action is particularly dangerous because it can become a self-fulfilling prophesy."[42] Ten months into Carter's presidency, Brzezinski argued that this concern with human rights had "played a significant role in overcoming widespread popular disillusion and cynicism about foreign policy, thus enabling the United States again to play a more constructive role across a broad range of international issues."[43]

Brzezinski was not alone in believing that the pursuit of human rights could play a critical role in the administration's efforts to win domestic legitimacy for its foreign policies. Gaddis Smith asserts that Carter's own motives included not only "his own sincere moral beliefs" but also "the accurate perception that the issue was good politics in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam war."[44] Midway through 1977, Leslie Gelb defended Carter's human rights policies as a necessary means of winning back public trust in American foreign policy. Gelb acknowledged that "There are a lot of people who feel uneasy that the United States is taking such a bold and direct position on human rights." To such critics, Gelb replied that it was "absolutely essential to reestablish the confidence of the American people in the Executive Branch of government—in its conduct of foreign policy—to make clear that the Administration shares the basic values of most Americans."[45]

The ability of human rights, however, to fill the moral, ideological, and political void left by the Carter team's rejection of anticommunism

[41] Ibid., 81–82.

[42] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–81* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983), 3.

[43] Brzezinski, "American Policy and Global Change," 456.

[44] Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, 50.

[45] Gelb, "National Security and the New Foreign Policy," 70.

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proved limited. Like anticommunism, human rights appealed to widely shared liberal instincts. Unlike anticommunism, however, the standards of human rights could potentially be applied to countries across the political spectrum—friend and foe alike. When applied to Third World allies, Carter was accused of allowing ideals to interfere with self-interest. When not applied to these countries, the administration found itself accused of inconsistency and selectivity by a different set of critics.[46]

While there was broad support in principle for the American promotion of human rights abroad, this support eroded considerably when it came to applying such principles to real cases. According to the 1978 CCFR survey, 67 percent of the public and 78 percent of leaders agreed that the United States should put pressure on countries that systematically violate human rights. When asked, however, whether the United States "should take an active role in opposing the policy of apartheid—that is, racial separation—in South Africa," only 40 percent of the public agreed. Fifty percent of the public and 30 percent of the leaders felt that "how the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minority groups is a matter of internal Soviet politics and none of our business." And 59 percent of the public thought it frequently or sometimes justifiable for governments facing political terrorism to limit civil liberties in order to combat terrorism. Only 25 percent thought it rarely or never justifiable.[47]

Moreover, anticommunism evoked the image of a direct threat to the United States and served as justification for the much broader and concrete policies of containment and intervention. Human rights, on the other hand, called for an altruistic response. No direct threat was implied by a failure to deal with the problem. Just as importantly, the salience of the theme of human rights did not expand horizontally to provide justification for other core liberal internationalist policies.

Survey data confirm that the public never thought that human rights deserved to play a central role in U.S. foreign policy. The 1978 CCFR poll asked respondents to indicate whether each of thirteen specified foreign policy goals should be considered very important, somewhat important, or not important. Promoting and defending human rights ranked near the bottom of the list with only 39 percent of the public and

[46] See Michael Mandlebaum and William Schneider, "The New Internationalisms: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy" in Kenneth Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World* (New York: Longman, 1979), 47.

[47] Rielly, *American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, 1979*, 13–14.

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36 percent of the leaders calling it very important. Securing adequate supplies of energy, by contrast, was considered a very important goal by 78 percent of the public and 88 percent of the leaders. When given the freedom to list the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States, only 1 percent of the public and 7 percent of the leaders named human rights as a major problem.[48]

Despite the considerable attention Carter devoted to the issue, public support for the promotion of human rights changed little from levels recorded prior to his presidency. In the 1974 CCFR survey, 68 percent of the public favored active support for human rights. Virtually the same percentage (67 percent) was recorded four years later at the midpoint of Carter's term.[49] Carter's efforts had no observable success in broadening the appeal of an issue that already gathered fairly widespread, though tepid, support.

Carter's emphasis on human rights was a failed attempt to invest a fundamentally pragmatic set of foreign policies with some moral core. Human rights was intended to appeal to the moralism of the American public in much the same way anticommunism once had. Human rights, however, proved too far removed from concrete interests to play an effective legitimizing role. The public, while supportive in principle, never perceived the issue as critical and often found reasons to disagree with its application in practice. Moreover, because human rights did not relate in any integral way with Carter's broader strategy of adjustment, it could not easily serve as the bedrock value upon which the remainder of Carter's policies could be justified. The problem with the Carter administration was not, as some have asserted, that it was too moralistic but that its moralism was too peripheral to the main thrust of Carter's policies to invest the latter with some core ideological meaning.

Crisis/Normalcy

The public's growing apathy toward foreign affairs during the first years of Carter's term provided an indication that Carter's message was not getting through. The 1974 CCFR survey indicated that 35 percent of the public was very interested in reading newspaper articles about other countries and 50 percent were very interested in reading

[48] Ibid., 12–13.
[49] Ibid., 13–14.

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about U.S. relations with other countries. By 1978, a second survey showed that the percentages of people very interested in these topics had declined to 26 percent and 44 percent respectively.[50]

Such apathy is of little consequence during periods of elite consensus and policy stability. For a president trying to institute significant policy changes during a period of elite conflict, public apathy is a serious source of weakness. Public apathy can doom presidential efforts to isolate elite opponents by mobilizing mass opinion. Moreover, apathy means inertia. Public attitudes can undergo significant changes only during periods of heightened attentiveness. Even when events provoke such attention, changes in attitudes can easily melt away with a return to normality unless perceptions are filtered through a novel and coherent ideological framework that can transform transitory attitude shifts into relatively permanent belief system changes.

While the Vietnam war produced strong shifts in opinion, many of these changes remained fragile because altered perceptions were not translated into a structured ideological alternative. By the time Carter entered office, few people were paying attention and the international stimuli that could spur renewed attentiveness were missing. As a result, inertia was leading to the restabilization of old patterns of belief. Carter's attempts to stymie this trend were in vain. Apathy played against Carter's efforts to imprint a new set of images on the public psyche.

One traditional means through which public attention is engaged, attitudes altered, and support mobilized is the manipulation of crises, whether real or manufactured. Presidents generally benefit politically, at least in the short run, from the rally-around-the-flag effect that influences the public during periods of external threat. As Theodore Lowi has noted, this creates a political incentive for presidents to exaggerate threats and respond with bold rhetoric and actions.[51] Such an approach, however, was antithetical to Carter's philosophy of adjustment, which rested upon the premise that crises could be preempted or managed through cooperation and diplomacy. As a result, the early Carter administration shied away from dramatic confrontation and bellicosity. Carter's conservative critics, on the other hand, felt few qualms about using this tactic against the administration.

It is significant that Carter's greatest successes came with respect to issues that could be dealt with through quiet, behind-the-scenes

[50] Ibid., 8.

[51] Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 145–148.

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diplomacy such as the Camp David Treaty or the recognition of China. When crises erupted, whether genuine or as consequence of exaggerated perceptions of threat fostered by Carter's opponents, the administration found it extremely difficult to shape a liberal internationalist response without appearing weak or vacillating. Politically, all the incentives favored abandoning quiet diplomacy in favor of confrontation. Each passing crisis found Carter yielding in growing measure to the rising pressures to stake out a tougher stance. Indeed, Brzezinski, the most hawkish of Carter's advisers, took advantage of such episodes to slowly wrest power from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and shift policy away from détente.

In a book written along with I. M. Destler, former Carter officials Leslie Gelb and Anthony Lake, recall:

> As conservative assaults on his policies began to score more heavily, Carter sought to beat them back by adopting more of their tone, if not their program . . . (R)ather than concentrate on what it was accomplishing, the White House (and especially National Security Assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski) went beyond describing the Soviet threat to looking for ways to dramatize it. The result was that the accomplishments, the measures to deal with the threat, constantly paled in comparison, and Carter looked weaker rather than stronger.
>
> (T)he shift in tone was being produced at least in part by political considerations. It was no secret that Carter's White House political advisers wanted him to appear "tough" on East-West issues.[52]

In time, the administration increasingly relied upon oversell in order to shore up Carter's sinking political fortunes. In the process, Carter moved steadily further from his initial liberal policies, abandoning adjustment for a strategy of resistance. Two events, the Cuban brigade episode and the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, reveal how domestic pressures prompted the administration to exaggerate external threats and crises.

The political pressures to resort to oversell in order to toughen up the administration's image were probably never better illustrated than in 1979, when Carter strenuously objected to the presence of a Soviet military brigade in Cuba. Carter seized upon the issue during the debate over the SALT II treaty as a response to critics who charged the administration with leniency toward Soviet misbehavior. The administration's reaction contrasted sharply with its handling of a similar episode

[52] I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake, *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 73.

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a year earlier when the Soviets shipped a squadron of MIG-23 fighter-bombers to Cuba. In that instance, Carter played down the significance of the shipment, thereby avoiding an international crisis or prolonged domestic debate over the issue. When the Soviet brigade was discovered, however, the administration decided to dramatize its importance. One aide explained that "This time, with SALT at stake, we felt we had to come out swinging."[53] As it happened, the effort backfired when Carter was forced to concede that the Soviet troops were advisers who had long been stationed in Cuba without American objection and found that the United States had no reasonable means for bringing about their withdrawal.[54]

Nevertheless, the brigade incident revealed how insecure the administration had become about the political legitimacy of policies it had earlier embraced. Writing as the episode unfolded, Leslie Gelb, by then a private citizen, argued that what should have been seen as a "little annoyance" was treated with "panic" due to "the climate of near-hysteria about the Soviet Union's military capability and international designs that has been created by right-wingers and abetted and magnified by the news media." The White House, Gelb believed, "latched on to the situation as an opportunity to prove the President's toughness." Gelb advised Carter to resist such pressures by "stak(ing) out a solid middle ground" on relations with the Soviet Union and holding it by "tak(ing) on the right wing frontally." He acknowledged, however, the difficulty of taking such a stand by noting that right-wing threats of electoral retribution against a president who appears soft on the Soviet Union "seem real" because conservatives "have the money and the workers."[55]

Carter did not choose to "take on the right wing" as Gelb advised. Instead, his administration moved to mend fences with conservatives by soft-selling the SALT II treaty, stepping up criticism of the Soviet Union, and promising large increases in defense spending. Indeed, as the White House became increasingly sensitive to outside criticism, power shifted toward the more conservative members of Carter's foreign policy team, and a steady stream of liberal foreign policy makers exited from the administration.

[53] Quoted in Richard Burt, "In a Diplomatic Corner," *New York Times*, 14 September 1979.

[54] See Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1984), 828–48; and Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, 213–216.

[55] Leslie Gelb, "The Rightists' Brigade," *New York Times*, 16 September 1979.

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As the SALT II negotiations neared fruition in October 1978, Paul Warnke was replaced as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by George Siegnious, a retired military general. Brzezinski had convinced Carter that the more conservative Siegnious could provide a better defense of SALT II before the Senate than the liberal Warnke.[56] In mid-1979, Andrew Young, one of the more outspokenly liberal members of the administration, was fired from his post as ambassador to the United Nations after he met with a UN observer of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in violation of U.S. policy.[57]

Perhaps the most telling change in personnel came about when Leslie Gelb, a driving intellectual force behind Carter's early strategy of adjustment, resigned his post as the State Department's director of political-military affairs after repeated clashes with Brzezinski. According to the *New York Times*: "One aide said the two men exchanged messages that were often 'dripping with venom' in what was viewed as a personal 'struggle of will'." Gelb's disillusionment may have sprung from the relatively hawkish Brzezinski's increasing dominance in policy making over the more moderate Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. It was perhaps one indication of Brzezinski's ascendance that Gelb was replaced in his former position by Reginald Bartholomew, a Brzezinski staff member with expertise on the Soviet Union.[58]

In this atmosphere, little remained, aside from the seemingly doomed SALT II treaty, of the administration's earlier inclination to seek better relations with the Soviet Union or to pursue innovative policies toward Third World problems. Indeed, Huntington observes that, during the fall of 1979, the domestic climate with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations was such that "The cooperative track of the Carter policy was rapidly disintegrating, and it only remained for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to eliminate it entirely."[59]

It is only within this context that the administration's fevered response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be comprehended. Unlike the Soviet brigade episode, the invasion presented a potentially real, rather than a manufactured, threat to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, as Raymond Garthoff argues, "the vigor of the American reaction cannot be attributed to the Soviet intervention alone."[60] Although the

[56] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 818.
[57] Smith, *Morality, Reason and Power*, 168.
[58] See C. Haberman and A. Krebs, "Arms Expert Resigns," *New York Times*, 4 May 1979.
[59] Huntington, "Renewed Hostility," 282.
[60] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 946.

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evidence is not conclusive, there are indications that Carter's decision to so thoroughly dramatize the threatening nature of Soviet actions was partially grounded in his desire to rally public support and use the crisis to restore his fractured domestic credibility.

After the Soviet Union sent troops and tanks rumbling across the Afghan border during the last week of December 1979, Carter told Congress in his State of the Union address that "The Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War." Carter adopted a broad and frightening interpretation of Soviet actions: "The Soviet Union is attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil."[61] Consistent with these views, Carter announced what became known as the Carter Doctrine: "Any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States" and "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."[62]

Before Carter's speech, his aides told members of the press to expect an address reminiscent of the Truman Doctrine speech of 1947, which shocked the nation into a cold war stance. As Leslie Gelb noted after Carter's talk, however, "There was nothing in the Truman speech . . . to compare to the amazing list of Carter responses to the Russians. . . ."[63] Carter initially asked various department heads to prepare lists of possible sanctions against the Soviet Union. The plethora of items emanating from the bureaucracy were to constitute a menu from which selections would be made. Instead, Carter simply added the lists to one another and took each of the suggested steps. Carter's response signaled the shelving of détente for the time being and the severing of almost all official contact between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, Carter tied U.S. sanctions to the maximal

[61] Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union" (address given before a joint session of Congress, 23 January 1980), reprinted in George Landevich, ed., *James E. Carter* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1981), 135. Garthoff calls Carter's characterization "obviously a gross overstatement no matter how heinous or even potentially threatening the action." See Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 957.

[62] Carter, "The State of the Union," 135.

[63] Leslie Gelb, "Beyond the Carter Doctrine," *The New York Times Magazine*, 10 February 1980, 19.

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goal of forcing a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Even Brzezinski feared that Carter might have gone too far.[64]

It is difficult to attribute Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion wholly to international considerations. In his study of U.S. and Soviet decision making surrounding the crisis, Raymond Garthoff highlights the disproportionate nature of the administration's response. Garthoff shows that the strategic significance the administration attached to Afghanistan itself was inconsistent with previous U.S. assessments, the interpretation placed upon Soviet motives and aims was in conflict with information available to policy makers at the time, and U.S. policies in the aftermath of the invasion were inconsistent with one another and poorly coordinated with stated U.S. goals. Garthoff's analysis reveals a poor fit between the external stimuli provided by the invasion and the U.S. response.

The administration's behavior appears rather puzzling, for instance, in light of the fact that Afghanistan had never before been considered critical to western security and had long been subject to Soviet influence. In order to avoid conflict with its powerful neighbor, Afghanistan had pursued close relations with the Soviets since 1955. An organized Communist party had been active in Afghanistan since 1965. After a 1973 coup against the Afghan monarchy, the new leader, Mohammad Daoud Khan, included members of the Parcham faction of the Communist party in the government. The 1978 coup, which brought the communists to power, was instigated by pro-communist army officers after Daoud first removed Communists from his government and later began to arrest a number of key Communist leaders.[65]

Throughout this period, the United States remained aloof from Afghan affairs. Even the 1978 coup aroused no great concern. As Garthoff observes: "The United States . . . reacted to the April 1978 coup and the installation of a Marxist pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan with equanimity, if disappointment."[66] Indeed, the administration even continued to provide a small amount of aid to Afghanistan after the coup. This behavior contrasted sharply with the administration's expressions of alarm eighteen months later, when Carter treated the Soviet occupation as part of a broader pattern of Third World expan-

[64] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 951, 955–956, 958.

[65] Ibid., 891–98; and Douglas Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Journal of Peace Research* 24 (December 1987): 367–71.

[66] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 939.

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sionism and a possible prelude to Soviet military moves elsewhere in the region.

Yet, according to Garthoff, this interpretation of Soviet motives was seriously flawed.[67] Contrary to Carter's claims, Soviet intervention flowed from the rapidly decaying political stability of the Communist regime, which took power in 1978. The Afghani Communist movement was badly split and the Soviet favored faction was, after a time, purged from the government. The leaders of the dominant Khalq faction, Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hefizullah Amin, pursued, against Soviet advice, rapid and radical social reforms, which inspired revolt among the country's traditional Moslem population.

The worsening divisions within the Communist ranks and the growing popular rebellion worried Soviet leaders greatly during the months prior to the invasion. The Soviets blamed Amin, who had gained effective control over the government from Taraki, for poor leadership. They therefore sponsored a failed attempt by Taraki to have Amin assassinated. Aware of Soviet intrigues against him, Amin began to seek international support from other countries, including Pakistan and the United States in an effort to bolster his position.

This series of events convinced the Soviets that they had no alternative but to intervene with military force. Garthoff argues that:

> The real Soviet fear was that Amin was neither reliable as a partner nor subject to Soviet guidance, and at the same time was ineffective in controlling the growing resistance. In desperation Amin might turn to the United States as Egyptian President Sadat and Somali General Siad had done. Alternatively, he would likely be swept away by a popular Islamic national movement. In either case the Soviet Union would lose all its cumulative investment in Afghanistan . . . .[68]

Garthoff further adds that Soviet leaders intervened militarily because "they saw no other way to ensure that [Afghanistan] would remain a buffer."[69] Garthoff finds little evidence of opportunism, risk taking, or broader ambitions in Soviet behavior. The Soviets viewed Afghanistan as a vital interest rather than simply another opportunity for expanding their influence. They saw little risk that the invasion might lead to military confrontation with the United States—not, as some observers charged, because the Carter administration was consid-

[67] Ibid., 895-965.
[68] Ibid., 921.
[69] Ibid., 928.

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ered weak but because Afghanistan was well within the Soviet sphere of influence while of little apparent strategic concern to the West.[70]

U.S. officials knew of Soviet concerns about the course of events in Afghanistan and had received veiled warnings from the Soviets about possible military action. Nevertheless, U.S. officials failed to seriously consider the possibility that the Soviet move was seen by the Soviets not as a stepping stone to further aggression, but as a limited response to local circumstances in Afghanistan itself. The implications of Soviet warnings were never closely analyzed, and State Department experts who might have made better sense of what was happening were not consulted by top decision makers.[71]

Because of the U.S. failure to examine Soviet motives carefully, officials neither recognized nor resolved contradictions between the objectives of punishing Soviet aggression and securing Soviet withdrawal. U.S. decision makers neglected to consider, for instance, the possibility that if the Soviet move had arisen from insecurity about instability along their border, a strong U.S. response intended to punish the Soviets might only confirm and heighten Soviet fears and make withdrawal less likely.[72]

There is, in short, a great deal remaining unexplained about the administration's behavior if we view its responses solely in the context of the actual circumstances presented by the crisis. Carter's response makes more sense, however, if we consider Garthoff's suggestion that "Part of the reason for the Carter administration's adamant stand was the president's own concern over the widespread domestic criticism that he had been irresolute on a variety of other issues. . . ."[73] Carter's behavior, in other words, appears less puzzling if we assume that he was acting in part to save his presidency.

This explanation appears all the more plausible when we consider that the Soviet occupation came at the beginning of a presidential election year and at a low point in Carter's popularity as he faced skepticism and debate over his handling of the economy as well as a variety of foreign policy issues including defense spending, arms control, and Soviet/Cuban activities in the Third World. Moreover, as the multiple foreign policy crises of the fall and winter of 1979 raised the domestic salience of foreign policy issues, the stakes attached to

[70] Ibid., 927–37. Also see Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'," 372–374.
[71] Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 938–65.
[72] Ibid., 961–65.
[73] Ibid., 957.

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Carter's handling of these problems rose accordingly. In June 1979 only 3 percent of the public named a foreign policy issue when asked to specify the most important problem facing the country; but by January 1980 this share had risen to 42 percent.[74]

Indeed, as he no doubt hoped, Carter's tough actions brought him significant gains in public support. After his State of the Union address, Carter's foreign policy approval rating rose to 53 percent as against 40 percent who disapproved.[75] According to one polling organization, the percentage of the public approving Carter's handling of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union rose from 37 percent in January 1979 to 56 percent one year later.[76]

Despite impressive relative gains, Carter's absolute levels of support remained rather modest. Indeed, further survey results revealed considerable public hesitance about embracing a newly assertive Carter and his policies. An image of weakness was so closely identified with Carter in the minds of many people that even Carter's stern response to the Soviet invasion won him only limited credit. Sixty percent of all respondents to one survey, for instance, wanted the president to get tougher in his dealing with the Soviet Union, while only 3 percent thought that Carter was "too tough." Seventy percent of those who disapproved of Carter's handling of foreign policy thought that he was "not tough enough" with the Soviets. Even among those who approved of Carter's handling of foreign policy, 50 percent thought that Carter was "not tough enough," while 45 percent thought Carter's response to the Soviet Union was "about right."[77]

[74] From CBS/NY Times surveys, reported in "Opinion Roundup," *Public Opinion* 3 (February/March 1980): 21. It is important to emphasize that while Afghanistan raised the public salience of foreign policy issues, it did not represent as sharp a turning point in public opinion as is sometimes suggested. As Schneider's analysis of the CCFR data clearly shows, the public had been moving in a more conservative direction and was more given to distrust toward the Soviet Union for several years prior to Afghanistan. This preexisting climate of fear and distrust, which Carter accurately read in gauging his reaction, probably accounts in part for the public's apparent willingness to so quickly and overwhelmingly accept the most alarmist interpretation of Soviet motives and aims regarding Afghanistan.

[75] George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1980* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1981).

[76] "Opinion Roundup," 27.

[77] Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1980*. The same pattern characterized public reactions to Carter's policies toward the Iranian hostage crisis. In a CBS/NY Times poll taken in January 1980, only 1 percent thought that Carter's reaction to the taking of American hostages by Iran had been "too tough." 36 percent believed that Carter was doing enough to end the hostage crisis. By far the largest share of respondents, 63 percent, believed that Carter should have taken stronger actions against Iran. See "Opinion Roundup," 27.

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These results left little doubt about in which direction the public wanted Carter to move; although many gave Carter only grudging credit when he did so. The president found himself in an unenviable position: having failed to win popular legitimacy for his strategy of adjustment, Carter's conversion to the politics of resistance came too late to fully rescue his deflated domestic credibility. As Americans went to the polls in November of 1980, ten months after Carter approved some of the toughest anti-Soviet measures taken by any postwar president, one survey showed that 70 percent of the public still insisted that "we should take a tougher stand toward the Russians."[78]

Conclusion

Carter's foreign policy difficulties stemmed less from his own inadequacies than from his inability to reconcile structural tensions between the imperatives of external adjustment and the politics of internal legitimation. Carter initially gave priority to external adjustment over domestic legitimacy. Although many of his early initiatives succeeded abroad, Carter's overall strategy proved too complex, too flexible, too pragmatic, and too incompatible with the techniques of oversell to easily sell to the American people. The unpopularity of Carter's foreign policies at home, both among vested interests and the general public, led to unacceptable political costs that eventually prompted Carter to return to traditional policies and legitimation techniques in an effort to bolster his political prospects.

The broader consequence of Carter's failure was the postponement by at least a decade of adjustment to declining power in U.S. foreign policy. Mushrooming budget and trade deficits provided the most telling indicators of continued U.S. overextension abroad during the Reagan years. The growing costs and failures of traditional policies during the late Reagan and Bush years eroded the domestic constraints on policy change and led policy makers to adopt a number of tentative and ad hoc measures of adjustment.[79] Yet only with the election of Bill Clinton has the United States once again begun to face up to the task of closing the gap between resources and commitments. Clinton proposes to reduce the defense burden, increase domestic investment,

[78] Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, "America's 'New Thinking'," *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Fall, 1988): 4.

[79] On the failures of resistance during the Reagan years and the ad hoc movement toward adjustment, see Oye, "Constrained Confidence."

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draw down overseas commitments, and rely more heavily upon allied burdensharing and multilateral mechanisms for addressing global problems.

To gauge the prospects for Clinton's success, we must recall that the equation between resources and commitments is two-sided. Carter's early strategy for closing the Lippmann Gap focused principally on curtailing commitments or finding less costly ways of meeting them. Clinton should find this task far easier than did Carter. The end of the cold war along with the continuing decline of U.S. economic competitiveness have each served to rework the domestic climate and to increase support at home for shedding burdens abroad.

Yet Clinton faces a more severe challenge than did Carter on the resource side of the equation. The social, economic, and educational problems plaguing America in the 1990s are far deeper and more intractable than during the Carter years. Without significant domestic reforms, America's position will be eroded far more by internal weaknesses than by external overcommitment. The principal focus of adjustment in the 1990s must thus lie in the domestic arena. In tackling this thicket of challenges, Clinton can learn one important lesson from Carter's earlier experience: no program of reform, no matter how clever or sensible, can succeed unless accompanied by a well planned strategy of legitimation that anticipates and counters the opposition provided by vested interests and entrenched attitudes.*

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Book Reviews

Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America *by Walter LaFeber. New York, Norton, 1993. 452 pp. Paper, $12.95.*

This revised and expanded version of a 1983 edition remains probably the best known work in English on Central America published in the 1980s, a decade of unrelenting and devastating conflict in the isthmus and a volatile political debate in the United States over what to do there. Though LaFeber's account focuses on these critical years (the final two chapters deal with the Central American imbroglio from about 1979 until the end of the Bush administration) the reader comes away with more than a recapitulation of U.S. foreign policy—particularly its strategic calculations and grievous errors in a region considered the nation's "backyard." LaFeber's indictment of the U.S. failure in Central America commences in the strategic plotting of U.S. leaders and the fanciful dreams of Central America's first leaders in the early nineteenth century. Though the twentieth century and especially the last twenty-five years receive by far the greatest amount of space in the author's assessment, this work represents a persuasive case that Central America constitutes the most flagrant embarrassment for U.S. policy in the western hemisphere in this century.

How did five countries about which modern Americans remained poorly informed become so critical for U.S. policy makers in the 1980s? A facile view, espoused by many, held that Central America provided a challenge to U.S. resolve in a strategically vital region or, conversely, an opportunity to commit U.S. purpose to the rectification of social and economic injustices in an area both Republicans and Democrats agreed was of tremendous importance. A somewhat more complicated variation on these themes invoked the persuasive agenda of the new world order—that is, Central America was a test for U.S. resolve but required cooperation with other Latin American nations (notably Panama, Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia) and with Western European governments to achieve a satisfactory resolution of this conflict. In the political dynamics of the unfolding isthmian crisis in the 1980s, the unappreciated force at work—

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negotiation among Central Americans themselves—may have had more to do with the tentative peace achieved at the end of the decade.

LaFeber goes into considerable detail about these and other efforts in his analysis, but his dominating theme is the damage done by U.S. intrusion into Central America's economy and politics for much of this century. His explanation reaches deep into Central American and U.S. history. Employing dependency theory, he demonstrates how a metropole-periphery relationship between the United States and Central America distorted the isthmian future from early in the nineteenth century. Central America's fitful efforts to attain unity shattered before internal divisions and international pressures. In the late nineteenth century, Central America's republics embarked on agro-industrial development, principally in mining, coffee, and bananas. In each of these areas, especially in bananas, foreigners were prominent or the foreign market was critical. With the turn of the twentieth century and the heightened U.S. strategic interest identified with the canal and the regions abutting the canal route, Central America lay virtually helpless before U.S. power.

Most Americans are vaguely familiar with the history of the banana wars, the military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America from the late 1890s until the Great Depression, culminating in the "Vietnam War" of the 1920s in Nicaragua. That ended with a U.S. military withdrawal, but the economic and political system undergirding U.S. hegemony remained. Woodrow Wilson condemned the gunboat diplomacy and imperialism of his Republican predecessors (Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft) yet actually strengthened the imperial grip. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt mouthed platitudes about the Good Neighbor and tightened the U.S. economic noose around the isthmian neck. After the World War II, Washington exploited anticommunist sentiments to derail meaningful social reform in Central America. The metaphor for tragedy was the left-of-center but noncommunist revolution in Guatemala, brought down by a CIA plot in 1954.

LaFeber is relentlessly linear and understandably judgmental in his scholarly vivisection of U.S. policy in the aftermath of Guatemala. Essentially, he argues, U.S. policy makers refused to heed the warnings about upheaval and revolution from within Central America. Always they were distracted by reformist promises—the creation of a Central American Common Market in the early 1960s and, of course, the parallel birth of the Alliance for Progress and John F. Kennedy's warnings that "those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable." The grim reality, as JFK perhaps recognized, was that the guiding directive behind the Alliance was strategic (counterrevolution in the countryside) and that (as a CIA report acknowledged) the undeniable advancements made by Latin America, including Central America, in the 1960s paled in comparison to the frustrations of people who saw revolution as the only way to change things.

Thus the Central American tragedy of our time: in Nicaragua, a people's war

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against a familial dictatorship; in Honduras, a crisis over landholding in the countryside; in El Salvador, ruthless domination by a modernizing elite; in Guatemala, a grim rural war in the shadows; and in Costa Rica, the degrading of middle-class democracy through debt and a little known struggle for land by marginal rural migrants. Under such conditions, revolution was inevitable. The United States, determined to maintain its "system" and unable or unwilling to "reconcile the contradiction between its professed ideals and its century-old foreign policy" (p. 368), employed force to resolve matters. That may have worked for Theodore Roosevelt's America but it will not do for modern Americans.

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The Coming Health Crisis: Who Will Pay for Care for the Aged in the 21st Century? *by John R. Wolfe. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1993. 162 pp. $22.50.*

In this important, well-researched book, John Wolfe outlines the dimensions of the crisis in health care costs and delivery that could occur in this country in the next century. He reviews the projected demographic changes that will take place as the population ages, discusses the implications of these changes on the need for medical and long-term care, and suggests policy options to avert the impending crisis.

Because of fluctuating birth rates and increases in survival rates, the proportion of the population that is aged will increase dramatically between 1990 and 2050. As the population ages, the need for medical care and long-term care will rise and the proportion of the population productively employed in economic activity will fall.

The present financing structure for the health-care-related needs of the elderly relies heavily—through Medicare and Medicaid—upon government transfers of money from younger generations to the elderly. Market failures such as adverse selection and "moral hazard," as well as a tax policy that favors pay-as-you-go financing of employer-provided health insurance have stifled the private market for medical and long-term care insurance for the elderly and created the reliance upon governmental insurance. Given the projected shrinking of the younger, employed population, failure to change this financing structure will mean that it will be increasingly burdensome for the younger population to finance the present levels of quality and quantity of medical and long-term-care services provided to the elderly.

Wolfe reviews a number of possible solutions to this dilemma and suggests there is still sufficient time to avert a crisis. He discusses separate strategies for financing medical care for the elderly (now financed largely through Medicare) and for long-term care (now funded mainly by Medicaid or private money).

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The financing of the Medicare program could be changed by raising more revenues, prefunding the program, increasing beneficiary cost sharing, or by explicitly rationing care. Increasing current tax rates would raise Medicare revenues, but such a strategy would increase intergenerational transfers. Alternatively, revenue could be raised by increasing the costs borne by the elderly by increasing the Medicare premium, through new taxes on the aged, or through taxes on private "Medigap" insurance. Prefunding of the Medicare program, rather than the current pay-as-you-go financing structure, could retain the integrity of the program without increasing intergenerational transfers. Increased cost sharing by beneficiaries could raise additional revenue and decrease the demand for medical care. Rationing Medicare benefits to those who need the insurance the most or to those services that are most effective could also help to reduce Medicare spending.

Wolfe suggests a number of alternative financing strategies for long-term care. The current Medicaid program has encouraged the use of institutional long-term care over alternative sources of care, provides no incentive for beneficiaries to contain costs, and has hindered the growth of a private long-term care insurance market. Wolfe suggests several changes in the structure of Medicaid, including financing Medicaid through block grants rather than the current matching formula to create a greater incentive for states to contain Medicaid costs. In addition, he suggests that policy makers consider making long-term care insurance mandatory in order to eliminate the current problems of adverse selection and reliance upon Medicaid as an alternative to private insurance. Wolfe discusses ways to use public financing to encourage families to care for their elderly members and ways to promote long-term care in settings other than nursing homes. Finally, he suggests ways to promote the purchase of private long-term care insurance.

ANNE LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap *by Stephanie Coontz. New York, Basic Books, 1992. 391 pp. $27.00.*

Family values were much bruited about during the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign. On the Republican side, Dan Quayle attacked Hollywood cultural elites for glamorizing unwed single motherhood, and Marilyn Quayle praised wives and mothers who set aside their own career ambitions to care for their husbands and children. On the democratic side—where, arguably, tougher cultural contradictions had to be managed!—Al and Tipper Gore and their brood displayed traditional family values, while presidential candidate Bill Clinton celebrated hardworking single mothers (like his own) and threatened to make "deadbeat" fathers "pay up" on their child support. To parry Republican attacks on domi-

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neering career women, Hillary Clinton avoided the use of Rodham for the duration of the campaign, got her hair redone in a puffy style, and starting baking cookies and gazing adoringly at her husband. Amid all of this posturing, not much light was shed on fundamental issues of work, parenthood, and the changing roles of men and women. But it did become clear that these issues are both emotion laden and here to stay in American politics.

The Way We Never Were offers facts and perspectives that may be relevant to current and future political debates. In the preface, Stephanie Coontz tells us that she originally set out to write a conventional chronological account of changing family forms in U.S. history. But her experiences speaking to real, live audiences soon convinced her that it would be more interesting and relevant to organize the book around the dispelling of current misconceptions and myths about families and the supposed family crisis.

Nostalgia for an idealized "traditional" family with a breadwinner father, a stay-at-home mother, and well disciplined children is unrealistic, Coontz insists. No such family type was prevalent in much of U.S. history. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, children often lost one or both parents to early death, and so a stable two-parent family was not typical. Only during the 1950s did it become truly widespread among whites—and then because of a combination of economic, demographic, and political circumstances that has not existed before or since. Male wages could support young families; the federal government helped with GI educational loans and low-interest mortgages; and rates of childbearing were very high in the wake of the Depression and World War II.

Besides, Coontz argues, the 1950s family situation was not so ideal as we tend to imagine in retrospect. Women were oppressed, she argues, by the confinement of their adult roles to motherhood and consumerism. And children, she suggests, were never so well behaved as we imagine. One startling fact she throws out is that the highest rate of teenage pregnancy in the modern United States occurred—not recently, as we tend to imagine—but in 1957! The difference back then, of course, was that such a pregnancy usually led to a shotgun marriage. In recent years, it has become much more common for unwed pregnancy to progress to permanent single parenthood.

Coontz seeks to absolve feminism of any blame for current stresses on contemporary families. Women have gone to work out of economic necessity; and tendencies toward higher rates of divorce and lower rates of childbearing took effect before the feminist movement hit its stride in the 1970s. In Coontz's view, more equality for women in homes and workplaces, not a return to traditional female roles, is the only realistic way forward. She does not say as much as she might about the issue of who is to care for children in a world where both mothers and fathers are working, and where many fathers do not meet their economic or parental responsibilities. Coontz is so anxious to avoid the presumption that changing roles for women have caused problems that she opens herself to the accusation of not acknowledging the real sufferings of many American children.

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Coontz's most sustained analyses of public policy come in her discussions of family dependence on government, welfare, and the problems faced by African American families. She does not acknowledge as readily as she should that contemporary African Americans really do have different patterns of marital and parental behavior than nonblacks. Yet Coontz is right to stress that many of the difficulties faced by black families are due to poverty and male unemployment, not peculiar values. And she is eloquent on the subject of governmental involvement with all American families. Why, she asks, should we treat families who receive paltry welfare payments as dependent, while not acknowledging the even greater dependence of postwar middle-class families on federally guaranteed mortgages and other forms of government aid?

Overall, this book has a bit of a frenetic quality as it moves scattershot from dispelling one myth to another. Nevertheless, the bottom line for Coontz is sensible: successful families in America have never done it on their own, in isolation from communal and governmental supports. If we want to help families today, she concludes, we should not try to return to mythical past ideals. Instead, we should look for ways to encourage stronger community networks and public policies to address widely shared dilemmas of how to combine work and parenthood.

THEDA SKOCPOL
Harvard University

From Outrage to Action: The Politics of Grass-Roots Dissent *by Laura R. Woliver. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1993. 195 pp. Cloth, $36.95; paper, $16.95.*

Students of American democracy have long argued about the extent to which new groups, especially those that challenge the status quo, face barriers to entry and success in the arena of political conflict. Laura Woliver's study of four newly-emergent citizen groups addresses this question and gives us some purchase on the difficulties they face and the circumstances under which they are more likely to realize their goals. The heart of this slender book is a series of theoretically grounded case studies of local ad hoc grassroots efforts occasioned by grievances with the criminal justice system. The case studies, which are based on interviews with those involved supplemented by archival research in newspapers, make for fascinating and often moving reading. Although Woliver does not propose a new theoretical understanding of citizen action—or even push the limits of current theory—she has read extremely widely and applies the appropriate theoretical perspectives with intelligence and critical judgment.

Taken together, the cases—which diverged widely in the extent to which stated goals were attained—point to several factors that are associated with the success

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or failure of ad hoc citizen groups. One is the nature of the objective. When the ends are concrete and narrowly defined, the chances of success are enhanced. Providing contrast is the fate of the group formed in the aftermath of the murder, a block from her school, of a ten-year-old girl. The deep sense of vulnerability and anger engendered by the grisly crime ultimately focused on the failures of the criminal justice system. Although the working-class political amateurs behind this effort had a larger vision of exactly what they wanted—public safety and an end to a system that allowed repeat offenders back onto the streets—their accomplishments were circumscribed by the absence of more concrete objectives.

A second and even more fundamental factor associated with the success of a challenging group is the level of resources at its command. Two of the four cases involved efforts to recall judges who had made controversial remarks from the bench in sexual assault cases. The judge who referred disparagingly to the way women dress (although the victim in the particular case had been clad in corduroy pants and a turtleneck sweater) and then queried "should we punish a 15 or 16-year-old who reacts to it normally?" (p. 29) did not survive the recall; the judge who called the 5-year-old victim of sexual assault a "sexually promiscuous young lady" (p. 124) did. What differentiated the groups in the two cases was that the first was led by experienced political activists with connections to the women's movement. These ties provided access to leadership and an organizational infrastructure as well as the basis for the formation of a more formidable coalition. Also contributing to the failure in the second case is that the judge in question benefited from considerable support from established groups, including the local bar.

As strongly as this theme emerged, Woliver may give it somewhat short shrift. Indeed, if one were to quibble with her somewhat unsystematic application of social science theories, it would be that she does not give sufficient emphasis to social movement resource mobilization theory. Woliver argues that, in the case of the successful judicial recall and another in which an ad hoc citizens group was rooted in the civil rights movement, the links to a social movement provided additional critical ingredients, "communities of memory" and "a language to describe injustice" (pp. 159–160). However, it could easily be argued that what permitted these two collective efforts to achieve greater success was not so much the sense of identity and ideological coherence as the enhanced resources of experienced leadership and the rich network of allies that accompany ties to an established movement. In fact, in comparison to the other two cases, Woliver's narratives about the two relatively successful groups are not only longer but are based on many more interviews. One could speculate either that Woliver was more careful in doing her homework in these two cases (which is doubtful) or that the more successful efforts involved more activists, a factor contributing to their ability to realize their objectives.

A final theme that emerges with special poignancy from Woliver's close-up

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look at citizens in action is that those who fight city hall may pay a price beyond the expenditure of time and energy. Many of the activists involved were subjected to personal attack, their motives impugned when, in their view, the justice of their causes was so self-evident. The result is that in both cases where citizen efforts met failure, the experience of becoming involved politically was not empowering but, on the contrary, left previously inexperienced citizens not merely disappointed but afraid. It is little wonder that these experiences did not provide the basis for sustained political challenge.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN
Boston College

Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States *by Theda Skocpol. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992. 714 pp. $35.95.*

"In an era when many industrializing western nations were launching fledgling paternalist welfare states for workers—that is, sets of regulations and benefits devised by male bureaucrats and politicians for the good of male wage earners and their dependents—the United States sought to help not workers but soldiers and mothers" (p. 525). Theda Skocpol seeks to explain this core problem and explore its implications in this dense and rich historical analysis of the formative period of the uniquely stripped down United States version of the welfare state.

Skocpol develops her familiar historical and comparative perspective on state building and policy through a study of United States social policy making from the Civil War to the doorstep of 1935 and its crucial Social Security Act. The much more developed welfare states serve as the constant backdrop for this case.

Also familiar is the institutionalist—now called polity-centered—analysis that places at center stage the acts of governing and the specific institutional arenas in which struggles over governance occur. Skocpol prefaces her analysis with a concise summary of the institutionalist argument against understanding policy as a by-product of industrialization or a mere reflection of national values, the class structure, or other social identities.

These approaches no longer, if they ever did, have the standing of alternative hypotheses subjected to comparative testing. Rather, Skocpol dismisses these approaches before getting to the main business: applying the polity-centered analysis to pursuing the dead-ends in the history of the U.S. state, including the protection of soldiers (Civil War pensions), protection of workers (workingman's insurance, hours and wages regulation), and protection of mothers and children (protective legislation, mothers' pensions, the Sheppard-Towner Act).

Even were this book to consist entirely of this familiar framework for Skocpol's research, it would be well worthwhile. Following these might-have-beens and

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almost-weres gives us a much better handle on cross-national comparison than theoretical counterfactuals could ever offer. But she adds a dimension that marks a crucial turning point in her career and, one hopes, in this field: gender analysis. The point is not just that she considers policy proposals with substantial impact on and support from women. She joins a large and growing interdisciplinary group of scholars who see gender as a key aspect of the structure and culture, not just of the wider society but of the community of policy activists, politicians, and bureaucrats who struggle over policy formulation. Many of us have long argued that it is impossible to understand the development of the American state without taking account of its gender basis. Perhaps our colleagues who have ignored scholars more persistently identified with feminist scholarship will listen to Skocpol now.

Integrating a gender analysis does not just fill in gaps about women in history; it helps Skocpol take an impressive analytical step forward. In the first part of the book I still sense that the determined focus on institutions, especially parties and courts, leads her to an excess of single variable causation that parallels the approaches she faults. The final section of the book on the historical push for a maternalist state is noticeably more subtle and interwoven, showing more clearly how institutionalism need not be a combatant with other approaches but now can structure models of politics that seriously incorporate what has been learned through other means. In books of this scope readers will find something to quibble with and so did I. But this is a tour de force.

VIRGINIA SAPIRO
University of Wisconsin-Madison

A Foreign Policy in Transition: Moscow's Retreat from Central America and the Caribbean, 1985–1992 *by Jan S. Adams. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1992. 248 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.*

Noting the dramatic institutional and ideological changes initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–1991), Jan S. Adams outlines changes and continuities in Soviet foreign policy towards Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico. Adams credits Gorbachev with overseeing a foreign policy shift form expansionist-driven support for Marxist-Leninist, militant Third World states and struggles to non-ideological diplomacy dedicated to strengthening ties with and respect for non-Marxist states. "Moscow's Retreat" refers, therefore, to an ideological, military, and economic delinking of Soviet foreign policy from Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as a distancing from Latin American and Caribbean Communist parties and revolutionary movements.

The questions posed by this book are important—all the more so given the end of the cold war, the political spaces created for reassessing old assumptions, and the limited understanding of the Soviets' role in Latin America and the

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Caribbean (LAC). The analysis in the book, however, is disappointing. Although Adams sketches competing ideological positions and institutional changes within the Soviet foreign policy establishment in the 1980s, it is never entirely apparent why Gorbachev was successful in delinking the Communist party from the regime, why the doctrinal change associated with the New Thinking was slow to translate into action in LAC between 1985-1988, and, most importantly, the extent to which the Soviet Union had actually influenced "Left" positions and policies in LAC prior to the New Thinking. Had Adams more systematically pursued these questions, she could have made a stronger argument about the nature and scope of changes versus continuities of Soviet influence in the twenty-three LAC countries discussed.

Adams largely tends to analyze LAC politics as a playground for changing U.S.-Soviet politics. Consequently, she effectively deprives LAC states, parties, and social movements of any autonomy, assuming that the formation of legal and revolutionary Left parties and movements can be explained by expansionist Soviet foreign policy. Given the heated theoretical and ideological debate on the role of domestic versus international factors in explaining Latin American politics, she needed to demonstrate rather than assume both that LAC nationalist struggles were part of a Soviet (and Cuban) foreign policy plan and that the nationalist struggles discussed actually followed Soviet directives. While she does illustrate Soviet support for already existent nationalist struggles in LAC, she does not marshal evidence that these nationalist struggles grew out of, followed, and depended on Soviet directives.

Adams's use of Soviet documentation and interviews provides an interesting perspective on changing Soviet discourse and institutions. Nonetheless, this book needed to elaborate both on the mechanism and content of political changes in Latin America and the Caribbean and how these developments related, if at all, to changes in Soviet policy. Instead of highlighting these processes and linkages, Adams tends to infer Soviet influence and intentions from diplomatic visits to and from the Soviet Union as well as by whether a given country's policies were consonant with those articulated by the Soviet Union. While causation by association and causation by speculation might lead to correct inferences, they do not substitute for a more detailed analysis of the intent, content, and consequences of such visits, as well as the reasons for which different countries arrived at similar policy positions.

Adams concludes this book with a plea to move beyond a cold war paradigm in order to appreciate the ways in which ideological and institutional changes in the former Soviet Union can contribute to peace and economic development in the LAC countries. Ironically, Adams needs to heed her own advice in her analysis of Moscow's relationship to Latin America and the Caribbean before and during perestroika.

DEBORAH J. YASHAR
Harvard University

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The United States and the State of Israel *by David Schoenbaum. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 404 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

Books on the tangled relationship between the United States and Israel are not in short supply. This one, however, is different in two respects: it tries to be comprehensive, even eclectic, in its coverage; and it often questions conventional wisdom. David Schoenbaum, professor of history at the University of Iowa, has long dabbled in Middle Eastern affairs, often adopting a somewhat contrarian point of view. His beyond-the-beltway credentials, which he proudly flaunts, and his professional grounding as an historian help to make this an unusually rewarding book.

Schoenbaum may not have ever occupied a pivotal position in the U.S.–Israeli relationship, but he seems to have read nearly everything that anyone has written about it. And he is a critical reader, convinced that facts, even in this postmodernist age, cannot be taken lightly. So his book is filled with information, anecdotes, and analysis. Unlike some authors, Schoenbaum does not seem to have a particular axe to grind. He neither lavishes praise on Israel nor seeks to criticize it. Instead, he treats the relationship between the two countries as a dynamic, complex, often changing one. In short, he sees the relationship as historical, "a product of frequently ambiguous, untidy, and fortuitous places, times, and circumstances rather than a timeless and self-evident feature of the landscape" (p. x).

While the author's approach has much to recommend it, the result is a narrative that is sometimes disjointed, moving from one topic to another without much sense of direction. On occasions, the chronology of events is hard to keep straight, as the author jumps from one topic to another. The writing, while lively, is often dense and convoluted, somewhat like a sustained argument rather than clear analysis.

The book was completed while the Likud was still in power, and the Madrid negotiations had just gotten underway. Schoenbaum is torn between the many reasons he can think of to be skeptical that Arab-Israeli peace might result from the talks, and the slight chance of success that he glimpses. He hesitates to speculate on what peace, or the end of the cold war, or both would mean for the U.S.–Israeli relationship, leaving the reader with the rather vague notion that the "special" qualities of the relationship that he has described in such detail will endure. He is probably right. But it would be hard to say precisely why, even after reading this rich and complicated book. Perhaps with more of an analytical framework the book might have been more helpful for anticipating future trends as well as explaining the past. But to raise this point is to get at the heart of where historians and political scientists tend to part ways. Schoenbaum is decidedly a historian who sees his task as studying the past. He revels in the uniqueness of the relationship between Israel and the United States. Whether one shares these perspectives or not, this is a book worth reading carefully.

WILLIAM B. QUANDT
The Brookings Institution

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The Passionate Attachment: America's Involvement with Israel, 1947 to the Present *by George W. Ball and Douglas B. Ball. New York, W. W. Norton, 1992. 382 pp. $24.95.*

Although the end of the cold war has prompted many Americans to rethink their country's role in the world, few will be ready for the drastic reorientation of America's special relationship with Israel that George and Douglas Ball propose in this tendentious volume. One part polemic and one part memoir, their book traces America's ties with the Jewish state from its inception in 1948 through the 1991 Gulf War. George Ball served as undersecretary of state during the mid-1960s and emerged from some testy dealings with Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir as an early critic of the Israel-as-strategic-asset thesis that he and his son now contend has distorted American policy in the Middle East for nearly half a century.

The first half of the book comprises a thinly researched survey of bilateral Israeli–American relations highly critical of the Truman, Johnson, Nixon and, Reagan administrations for practicing "unilateral diplomatic disarmament" toward Israel (p. 110) rather than heeding George Washington's advise to avoid "passionate attachments" to all foreign nations. Jack Kennedy and Jimmy Carter receive some credit for good intentions, but only Dwight Eisenhower wins high praise for his firm stand against Israel in the aftermath of the Suez crisis. The Balls assert that these policies flowed from pro-Israel attitudes fostered by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and from anti-Arab sentiments among key segments of the U.S. national security bureaucracy. Had the authors relied less on *Facts on File* and more on the works of Steven Spiegel, Edward Tivnan, and Cheryl Rubenberg, or had they probed the voluminous records at the presidential libraries, they could have produced a far more persuasive case with far less loaded language. Even the most ardent friend of Israel would be hard pressed to disagree with the Balls when they say that David Ben Gurion drove the hardest bargains in Washington or that Menachem Begin manipulated American Jewish leaders ruthlessly to his own advantage. But when the authors resort to terms like "extortion" (p. 83) and "bribery" (p. 273) to describe Israel's dealings with America, or when they liken Israel's admittedly brutal repression of the Intifada to Nazi war crimes (p. 187), they slip into rhetorical overkill that undermines their broader argument.

The second half of the book raises some provocative questions regarding Israeli-American relations in the aftermath of the cold war. The Balls argue that an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism among Palestinians in the occupied territories, the rapid influx of Soviet Jews into Israel, and the growing strength of the Gush Emunim and other ultraorthodox groups in the Knesset will badly fragment the political system in the decade ahead, leaving the Israelis more vulnerable than ever to pressure from the United States to make peace with their Arab neighbors. Meanwhile, America's seemingly intractable economic woes have already created a public groundswell to reduce drastically U.S. foreign aid to

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friends and allies around the world, including Israel, perennially the largest single recipient of Washington's largesse abroad. In short, the Balls believe that diplomatic realignment and economic expediency may well lead the United States to administer the "cold douche" (p. 312) necessary to alert Israel to the new realities of the 1990s. In perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book, the authors estimate the price for maintaining America's special relationship with Israel during the next decade at roughly $150 billion—one third resulting from direct military and economic assistance, two-thirds resulting from the loss of potential arms sales to the Arab states and other indirect costs. Yet even if these projections are right, many readers will put down this book with the feeling that had the Balls displayed a little less passion and a little more detachment, their critique of the "passionate attachment" would have been far more compelling.

DOUGLAS LITTLE
Clark University

Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress *by Carol M. Swain. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1993. 273 pp. $37.50.*

Black Faces, Black Interests focuses on African American representation in Congress. Swain is interested in knowing if the voting patterns of Congresspersons from largely African American districts are related to the proportion of African American voters in a representatives' home district. Swain divides home districts into four types: "historically" black districts that have black voting age populations (VAP) of more than 50 percent and have had black representatives for ten years or more; "new" black districts that generally range from 50 to 60 percent black VAP; "heterogenous" districts in which no single race/ethnic group is more than 50 percent of the VAP; and "majority-white" districts in which whites are a majority of the VAP. For contrast, Swain also looks at white Congresspersons who represent districts where African Americans are between 35 and 49 percent of the VAP, and districts where African Americans are a majority of the VAP. Swain then analyses congressional voting patterns across these categories. She uses three indicators to distinguish votes, a scale developed by the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the AFL-CIO scale, and another scale of her own that focuses on issues directly relevant to African American interests.

Swain finds that the percentage of African Americans in a district is not a strong predictor of voting behavior. Representatives in districts that are majority white, such as Alan Wheat, are as strongly supportive of black interests as are representatives of majority black districts. Swain also discovers that white representatives of partially or majority black districts work hard for the black vote and are supportive of black interests as well. Swain additionally suggests that black representatives from majority black districts work less hard on behalf of

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their constituents than representatives from racially mixed districts because of an absence of political competition in majority black districts.

Swain concludes that continued emphasis on creating majority black districts under the Voting Rights Act is misplaced; she prefers creating minority black districts where blacks and whites will have a mutual interest in coalition-building. In any event, she points out that most of the majority black districts that can be drawn have already been drawn, so future black representation must come from minority-black districts.

Despite valid criticisms of black congressional leadership, Swain's conclusions are narrow and sometimes contradictory. Swain sharply criticizes blacks who say that only blacks can represent blacks in Congress as a double standard, since they do not say that blacks cannot represent whites. However, in highlighting the lack of political competition in majority black districts and some irregular configurations of districts drawn to increase black voting strength, Swain ignores the broader context. If political competition is good for blacks, then why not for whites? Why attack the Voting Rights Act but not the partisan legislative gerrymandering that causes most of the irregular shapes and incumbency protection schemes that characterize congressional districts in general, not just black ones. Likewise, Swain's evidence of diminishing white resistance to black representation is limited to a few congressional and mayoral races, hardly enough to declare a new political era. Swain's belief is that blacks have "pluralized" to the point where they no longer need collective action as blacks. If one believes this, and there is no evidence offered to suggest that many blacks do, then there is no need to challenge electoral systems to make them more open to blacks. Black candidates simply need to make themselves more presentable to white voters as candidates.

While Swain's conclusions are suspect, her book offers a critical counterpoint to the traditional arguments of voting rights advocates.

J. PHILLIP THOMPSON, III
Barnard College

Declining Fortunes: The Withering of the American Dream *by Katherine S. Newman. New York, Basic Books, 1993. 270 pp. $23.00.*

When members of one academic turf invade the territory ordinarily claimed by another, the results may be disastrous or highly stimulating. The book by Catherine Newman, an anthropologist at Columbia University, is emphatically of the second type. The author offers a view of the decline of the income and status of the baby-boom generation, which came of age in the 1980s and early 1990s. Disregarding the usual theoretical and empirical tools of the economists, the author goes directly to the source by interviewing over 150 persons living in a fairly typical suburban community composed of white-collar professionals and

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skilled blue-collar crafts people. Eliciting her respondents' views of the downward mobility that most of them have experienced in the last two decades, she traces the effects of the decline in fortunes to the withering of the great American dream of upward mobility.

Newman argues that the trials and tribulations of the tail end of that generation hit the baby boomers particularly hard, since they followed immediately the exceptionally strong upward mobility of the postwar generation of their parents. She is especially convincing when she shows in what way a study based on family income hides the fact that an income level that was achieved in the past by only one member of a family can now be maintained only if both husband and wife are employed. In other words, relatively high income levels in a family are nowadays being achieved only through a structural change in the status of the adult members of a suburban family. Moreover, the children of the last baby boomers generation cannot expect as much support from their parents as the latter received from their grandparents.

Generally speaking, inequality in America is at present at its highest since the New Deal and World War II. Wage stagnation instead of rising income levels are the rule rather than the exception. A young man today can expect only some 15 percent less income than his father earned at a comparable age. But since his mother was not typically in the work force whereas his wife is, he has been forced to trade his authority in the family for attaining the same living standard as his family of origin.

Newman is especially convincing when she shows that the extent to which the suburban status was rising was not solely due to the forces of the market but was largely the result of government intervention through massive transfers of wealth provided by the GI bill and various inexpensive governmental mortgage programs. Veterans of the Vietnam war enjoyed much lower levels of government support than the members of their fathers' generation.

The author is sensitive to the shades of meaning expressed by her respondents. When one of them says "we were a Sears Roebuck family living in a Bloomingdale community," one realizes that this respondent lives in a world of relative deprivation, even though she has probably never heard of such a high-sounding term. The author is also sensitive to strains and tensions that may arise when parents cannot seem to understand why their children do not "make it" as they did in their own days. They don't seem to realize that their successful upward movement was in large part not due to individual effort but to structural socioeconomic conditions that are no longer at play. This book goes a long way in explaining the wave of discontent and bewilderment that fueled the recent appeal of Ross Perot.

LEWIS A. COSER
Boston College

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Mass Media and American Politics, *4th ed. by Doris A. Graber. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1993. 460 pp. Paper, $23.95.*

There is little wonder why Doris Graber's text is in its fourth edition: it is comprehensive and provides a good balance of theoretical approaches, cogent explanations, and timely examples. It is a valuable resource for people new to the field of political communication, as well as for those who are more familiar with the material. *Mass Media and American Politics* is an especially useful book for students, as Graber reviews the literature and provides extensive references to a wide range of research on communication and politics.

Graber argues that the mass media are important and increasingly powerful players in the American political process. She devotes the book to examining the relationships between the press and politics, broadly defined. Data from analyses of newspapers, network and local television, newsmagazines, and to a lesser extent radio, new media technologies, and "infotainment" programming are presented to illustrate the range of media available to the public. The process of newsmaking is also examined. In this case, Graber analyzes how news routines differ for coverage of domestic versus foreign affairs and during times of crisis versus politics as usual.

Politics in the United States are dealt with in a comparably wide-ranging fashion. Chapters are included on the media's interactions with other institutions at the federal, state, and local government levels. In addition, political processes involving the media are considered: elections, policy making, regulation, and access. With Graber's particular expertise in the area of information processing, there is an especially strong chapter on the media's role in shaping citizens' political attitudes and behavior.

One of the book's strengths is that it does not simply focus on the impact of the media on other political actors or processes. Rather, Graber gives a more complex picture of the symbiotic relationships that take place at many levels. For example, in examining who controls information in the United States, the author considers the system-level constraints placed on the mass media by citizens, government regulators at the Federal Communications Commission and in Congress, industry lobbies, advertisers, and competing media outlets. The discussion of these constraining influences is complemented by a chapter emphasizing the power of journalists and media organizations to shape the information presented in the news. Drawing on personality theory, organization theory, and role theory, Graber analyzes why the news looks the way it does. Another example of the interactive role of press and politics can be found in chapters nine and ten. Here, Graber details the conflicting goals and missions of the media and government and the resultant struggle to control coverage of the presidency, Congress, the courts, and subnational levels of government.

Although the thrust of the book's arguments demonstrates how the mass media play a central role in the conduct of American politics, Graber shows that the mass media operate within a broad political, economic, and social context. They

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are powerful and pervasive, but they are not lone determinants of political outcomes. This theme resonates throughout the book and unifies the chapters, whether they examine the media's influence on citizens' political thinking or policy making and new media technologies.

In short, Graber provides an excellent introduction to the mass media and American politics, integrating recent scholarship and theoretical approaches with provocative cases from the real world. *Mass Media and American Politics* is a first rate account of the increasingly important role of communication in the American political process.

ANN N. CRIGLER
University of Southern California

Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell *by Herbert Brownell with John P. Burke. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1993. 406 pp. $29.95.*

Herbert Brownell personifies the concept of modern Republicanism that President Dwight Eisenhower always had difficulty defining. In this informative memoir, Brownell comes through as a decent, concerned, and cautious politician who was ready to embrace moderate change to prevent more serious social disruption. A native Nebraskan, he entered New York state politics by way of the Yale Law School and a partnership in a prestigious Wall Street law firm. After several terms in the state assembly, he became Thomas Dewey's campaign manager in the presidential elections of 1944 and 1948. An early Eisenhower supporter, he was one of the many from the Dewey camp to enter the administration. Like the others—John Foster and Allen Dulles in foreign policy, press secretary Jim Hagerty, economic adviser Gabriel Hauge, appointments secretary Thomas Stephens—Brownell advocated a strong commitment to internationalism abroad and moderate change at home.

As Eisenhower's first attorney general, serving from 1953 through late 1957, Brownell made his most significant contributions in the area of civil rights. From the outset he found himself at odds with the president, who refused to use the White House as a bully pulpit to challenge segregation and who wanted to limit his efforts to end discrimination to areas under federal jurisdiction. To his credit, Brownell refused to accept such narrow limits. In five years, he created a new Civil Rights Division within the Justice Department; submitted a legal brief, despite Eisenhower's reservations, to the Supreme Court on the *Brown* case; and insisted, over the strenuous opposition of Democratic senators, on the appointment of federal judges in the South who were at least not on record as opposing desegregation. His most important contribution was the Civil Rights Act of 1957. In 1955, Brownell outlined legislation aimed primarily at extending voting rights to blacks in the South but which would also empower the attorney general to

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take legal action against all types of civil rights violations. Eisenhower showed little enthusiasm for such a broad grant of federal power; in the final negotiations over the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the president reached a compromise with Senator Lyndon Johnson that dropped this crucial feature and greatly weakened the resulting legislation.

While Brownell is always respectful, this incident and several others he recounts reveal a much more remote and aloof president than the contemporary public image of Ike as a genial and friendly figure. Eisenhower never bothered to consult Brownell before gutting his major legislative effort. Nor, as the author admits, did the president ever develop a personal relationship with his attorney general or the other leading cabinet members. Ike preferred instead to relax by playing bridge and golf with wealthy businessmen, saving his camaraderie for those who had succeeded outside of government. He treated his Washington associates much the same way he did subordinates like George Patton and Omar Bradley in World War II—at arms length.

Brownell's memoir largely reinforces the portrait of Eisenhower put forward by revisionist scholars, notably Fred Greenstein. The president, Brownell notes, was a shrewd politician who preferred to govern by indirection so as not to jeopardize his own personal popularity with the American people. At first this behavior puzzled the attorney general, who was used to Dewey's habit of discussing all sides of an issue before reaching a decision. In contrast, he notes that Eisenhower only "broadly hinted at his position, and I was supposed to be smart enough to recognize where he stood" (p. 99). And he soon learned that Ike could be a stern taskmaster who delegated responsibility as well as authority. When he once began giving the president detailed explanations for a series of pardons, Ike cut him short, saying he would act on Brownell's recommendations. "But remember," the president added, "you and I have initiated a policy of making these pardon actions open to the public. If anything proves to be misrepresented or incomplete about these cases, it's your responsibility." Brownell quickly grasped the point, commenting years later, "I knew if I made mistakes, I was dispensable" (p. 297).

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

The Anatomy of Thatcherism *by Shirley Robin Letwin. New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1993. 377 pp. $32.95.*

Reflecting a distinguished scholarly career in political philosophy, Shirley Letwin writes about Thatcherism in ways untypical of most political scientists. She presents her understanding of the underlying purposes of Thatcherism and then clearly analyzes the policies of Prime Minister Thatcher's governments of 1979–

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1990 to illustrate how those purposes were pursued. Persistently and cogently presenting her theme, Letwin has little concern with academic inquiries about Thatcher's impact on voting behavior, internal party organization, cabinet government, and other aspects of the political process. Her audience is probably less specialized than that usually addressed by the political science profession. It might well include anyone seriously interested in the role of ideas in politics. Although Letwin regards her explanation as ammunition for either supporters or opponents of Thatcherism, I suspect that supporters will respond more favorably to the book's broadly sympathetic account.

An early chapter, entitled "The Vigorous Virtues," deserves close attention, for it is the liberation of these virtues that Letwin defines as Thatcherism. She does not regard her definition as a description of what Thatcherites said or did, but rather as an abstraction from their sayings and doings. For Letwin, the result is not a theory in a universally applicable sense but a coherent response to historically concrete British problems. Prominent among the problems are socialism and the cultural revolution of the 1960s, from whose influence individuals and their families are to be freed to cultivate the vigorous virtues—to be "upright, self-sufficient, energetic, adventurous, independent-minded, loyal to friends and robust against enemies" (p. 33). Economic policies for privatization, home ownership, or monetarism, for example, are merely among the means to accomplish the broader purposes. Thus, Letwin's definition of Thatcherism is not synonymous with laissez-faire economics.

Letwin does not believe that desired purposes were always accomplished or even that all Thatcher governmental policies were well designed to achieve those purposes. She appears more purely Thatcherite than the prime minister and her colleagues. She approves the largely successful efforts to curb trade-union power as well as many economic policies despite doubts about their fulfillment. But she criticizes health service reforms because of their insufficient use of consumer power, and she finds government policies toward universities to be incompatible with Thatcherite principles.

Especially interesting is Letwin's discussion of measures to restrain local governments. Here the Thatcherite purpose, as at the national level, is to limit the apparatus and practice of socialism. Attempts to do so by enforced privatization of local services and by central controls on local expenditures do not, therefore, represent centralization of authority for its own sake. The same objective—undermining municipal socialism—was also the purpose of all the ill-fated poll tax through its intended creation of a broad local taxpaying public that would itself, without central control, resist increased expenditures for which it would have to pay. More generally, Letwin attributes a consistency to Thatcherism that its practitioners failed to make explicit. For her, just as neither local autonomy nor centralization is the real issue, so the presence or absence of governmental intervention is not the heart of the matter. "In short, the Thatcherite preference

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for a market economy is not a repudiation of government intervention but a commitment to a certain manner of intervening" (p. 323). Thus a case is made for intervention to facilitate the economic activities of individuals and also for a strong state to enforce laws and maintain peace and security.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

The British General Election of 1992 *by David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993. 380 pp. $49.95.*

The 1992 British general election resulted in an unprecedented fourth consecutive election victory for the Conservatives. But the Conservatives' success was not presided over by Margaret Thatcher, the architect of the electoral successes in 1979, 1983, and 1987, but by her successor, John Major. Thatcher—the only British prime minister to have given her name to an ism—was forced out of office in November 1990 in the wake of resignations of her two most senior ministers, Geoffrey Howe and Nigel Lawson, and by arguments about the poll tax, one of the most unpopular taxes ever introduced in Britain.

Under Thatcher, the middle ground of British politics shifted. The Conservatives pursued increasingly radical policies involving massive privatization and the extension of popular capitalism. In response, the Labour party was forced to come to terms with the market, the selling off of council houses to their tenants, and even to question that centerpiece of postwar socialism—the public ownership of key industries. But this revolution was largely confined to the political elites. Opinion surveys consistently showed that most voters preferred a mixed economy to a free market one and that there was a widespread concern about the state of the public services, notably the National Health Service. The scene seemed set for the election of the first Labour government in thirteen years or, at the very least, for a hung parliament.

Butler and Kavanagh, in the fourteenth Nuffield study (and the twelfth to be written or cowritten by Butler) provide an authoritative account of the election. Most dramatic, they argue, was the failure of the opinion polls to predict the result, on a scale comparable to Gallup's prediction of Thomas Dewey winning the U.S. presidency in 1948. Although the polls had been inaccurate in 1951, 1970, and 1974, they had at least identified the leading party. In 1992, however, most polls indicated that Labour was leading, and in the final week of the campaign only one poll placed the Conservatives ahead. In fact, the final polls were in error by about 8 percent—an unprecedented margin in modern opinion polling. Among the possible explanations for this disaster, the authors identify the effects of a late swing from Labour to Conservative (which was partially confirmed by the exit polls) and differential refusals to interviewers among groups of party supporters.

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The authors conclude that the campaign was the decisive factor. As little as a 1 percent swing against the Conservatives would have robbed them of a parliamentary majority and resulted in a hung parliament. They argue that Labour ran a more disciplined and effective campaign than the Conservatives, making more use of their spokespersons, including a larger proportion of women than the Conservatives. However, the Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, consistently rated below John Major in the polls; "in so far as the campaign had a presidential element, the Conservatives clearly won" (p. 253). But the voters also appeared to distrust Labour's ability to manage the economy and were suspicious of the higher taxes that would be needed to fund Labour's public spending plans. Although voters appeared to lean towards Labour as an alternative to what they saw as a tired Conservative government, they did not trust the party sufficiently to take the risk of electing them.

The importance of the 1992 British election lies less in the Conservative victory than in the Labour defeat. The authors conclude that the result confirms the electorate's rejection of socialism and demonstrates that the social democratic left in Britain, as in so many other European countries, has no clear and electorally attractive political message. The election does not presage the realignment of the party system—that was more likely in the 1980s than in the 1990s—but it does suggest a fundamental imbalance in the party system. The Conservative vote over the last four general elections has been only 42 percent. "That could be a base or could be a ceiling but in three party politics it has proved enough to be decisive" (p. 283). As in the past five Nuffield books that David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh have written, they have combined insight and perspective with journalistic narrative to produce the definitive account of the election.

IAN MCALLISTER
University of New South Wales, Australia

The Man Who Stayed Behind *by Sidney Rittenberg and Amanda Bennett. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1993. 473 pp. $25.00.*

This is a truly astonishing autobiography by an American radical who spent virtually his entire adult life in China, during which time he came to know the highest levels of Chinese Communist leadership and the lowest levels of its cruel underlings. It is short on political surprises but long on the testimony of how far blind belief in an ideology can sustain loyalty under the most brutal and inhumane treatment.

Rittenberg began as an idealistic youth in the American Communist party, organizing local coalminers and steelworkers. After Army-sponsored Chinese language training at Stanford, he arrived in China on duty just after World War

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II. Shocked at the high-level corruption and mass-level poverty, he contrasted this with the abstemious austerity and dedication to helping the peasants at Mao Zedong's headquarters in Yanan. There he joined the Chinese Communist party (CCP) and came to know Mao, Zhou Enlai, and other notables on an intimate basis. Their personality profiles provide a uniquely insightful part of his story.

The author edited CCP broadcasts in English, a function that ultimately carried him to the highest level of any foreigner, with access to inside sources and classified documents in the Broadcast Administration. His account of how news and propaganda were managed for insiders as well as outsiders is brief but useful for analysts of the Chinese media. More voluminous and gripping is his description of the insidious reporting on and denunciation of colleagues as the political winds from above shifted from one extreme to another.

Rittenberg fell afoul of this pernicious system in 1949, being denounced as an American spy and placed in solitary confinement for six years. Despite months of mind-bending drugs, one year of total darkness, and the recurring cruelty of guards, he kept his faith in Mao, the CCP, and Marxism. Suddenly in 1954 he was released with an official apology for having been "wrongfully charged and imprisoned." Although he had been outspoken on various matters, sometimes imprudently, Rittenberg had never been guilty of anything more serious. His enthusiasm for the regime unabated, he rose ever higher, with greater personal power and privileges until the Cultural Revolution convulsions eventually toppled him once again. Ten more years of solitary confinement followed. The grim life of endless interrogations and maddening imprisonment failed to break his ideological commitment, although he began to question the CCP's leadership abilities.

After Rittenberg's release, again with apologies for the "mistake," he rejoined his family to discover the physical and psychological persecution of his wife and children during his imprisonment. Their bitterness contrasted with his continuing belief in the system. Finally, in 1980 Deng Xiaoping's denunciation of the Democracy Wall and trial of noted dissidents became Rittenberg's epiphany. He and his wife left for America, where he reexamined his entire life and concluded he had basically misjudged Marxism and the men who practiced it in China.

The story is a painfully familiar one for anyone who has read a first-hand account of the Cultural Revolution or of imprisonment in China. Rittenberg's impressive honesty and retrospection also parallel several books by former Red Guards. The complete corruption of human relations and the totalitarian tyranny of the regime become vividly real in this well written memoir. While the regime goes on despite—or worse, perhaps because of—the 4 June 1989 massacre, many millions of Chinese have long since arrived at Rittenberg's belated epiphany. However they cannot leave to tell their tale.

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Arizona

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Black Hands of Beijing: Lives of Defiance in China's Democracy Movement *by George Black and Robin Munro. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1993. 390 pp. $24.95.*

After the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and massacre in 1989, the Chinese Communist party blamed "black hands" for behind-the-scenes manipulation that led to the tragedy. The Communist party was partially correct that the democracy movement included some political activists. This book tells the exciting and fascinating story of three: Chan Ziming and Wang Juntao, both intellectuals currently in jail, and Han Dongfang, an independent labor leader whose prison-induced illnesses resulted in his release from jail.

What makes this book unique among the dozens of Tiananmen Square books is the way it transcends the constraints of documents, journalism, or personal memoirs. This book is grounded in in-depth interviews with dozens of people active in the 1989 movement and now living on many continents. This methodology yields a very richly textured book, with facts, hopes, motives, and emotions.

Rather than trying to summarize or critique this very detailed account, this review will list some of the striking insights this book offers.

The demonstrations of 1989 were directly linked to political demonstrations and actions in 1976, 1979, 1980, and 1986–1987. Many of the 1989 nonstudent activists had worked together in the previous political efforts.

The Communist leaders were very worried by the Polish example of Solidarity. They were more anxious about political participation by workers than by students and were determined that no Solidarity Movement would grow in China.

A vigorous independent political movement was emerging in the mid 1980s. Veterans of previous political movements, Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao, established the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute in 1985. With income coming from publications, lectures, correspondence courses, and contributions, it was able to rent office space, hire a staff of fifty, and fund conferences, survey research, and publications. It was establishing networks among independently thinking intellectuals, workers, and party members. As the Tiananmen Square crises evolved, it helped establish a Joint Liaison Group of All Circles in the Capital to Protect and Uphold the Constitution. This was the nucleus around which an opposition party might have eventually crystalized.

Chen and Wang did not see themselves as dissidents. They thought that they were helping the reform faction within the Chinese Communist party. They had fairly close contact with highest party and government officials and received financial contributions from a son of Deng Xiaoping. Throughout the crisis, they were cautious, striving to end student demonstrations before bloodshed.

Student leaders did not know well the older generation of political activists and did not work well with them; they were unwilling to establish close political relations with workers. Students were more emotionally committed to martyrdom and less interested in compromises that might consolidate modest political gains.

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Chen, Wang, and Han were assigned to jail (the concept of trial does not apply to the predetermined proceedings), tortured, even deliberately exposed to contagious diseases. They maintained their political integrity at great personal cost. They were treated so badly not because they were violent, irrational, radicals, but precisely because they were moderate, nonviolent, and able to put together a political coalition that might threaten the power of the Communist party. People with this type of jail experience often become national leaders. Their biographies are far from completed.

While this book goes a long way to explain the dynamics of the demonstrators, it says rather little about the black hands in the party and government. One wonders if the establishment side will ever offer interviews with the frankness of the ones in this book. George Black and Robin Munro deserve our deep thanks for researching and writing this fascinating and indispensable book about China's democracy movement.

BENEDICT STAVIS
Temple University

An American Paradox: Censorship in a Nation of Free Speech *by Patrick Garry. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1993. 157 pp. $22.95.*

It is hard to tell what audience the author has in mind for this book. It is not scholarly in the usual sense. The book and its index lack any reference at all to most recent (that is, published in recent decades) writers in the field—C. Edwin Baker, Lee Bollinger, Thomas Emerson, Owen Fiss, Kent Greenawalt, Harry Kalven, Catharine MacKinnon, Frederick Schauer, and Cass Sunstein, for example—and take only negligible note of the classics, such as Zechariah Chafee, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Alexander Meiklejohn, and John Stuart Mill. Such history as is used in the work is superficial and seems slanted to suit the author's purpose, as in his use of the Salem witchcraft trials as an effort by the Puritans "to reinvigorate and redefine their community," which was by this account becoming secularized by immigration and "the declining social control and homogeneity in the colony" (p. 108). What the book instead mainly demonstrates is skillful use of a clipping file, on a computer, no doubt. It is full of the phrase "for instance," leading to examples collected from journalistic sources of incidents intended to illustrate whatever aspect of purpose of censorship Garry is attempting to establish at that point. For the most part, these instances or examples strike me as interchangeable, almost equally useful in demonstrating some other point.

It is doubtful that attempts at censorship in America, or in any free society, are in fact a paradox. They seem to me perfectly logical, as Holmes remarked in his *Abrams* dissent. But Patrick Garry does perform a service in this book by trying to categorize and catalogue the various impulses behind such attempts.

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One (Chapter 4) is a loss of faith in the marketplace of ideas, that is to say an increase in the level of disbelief that a search for truth is in fact underway. Garry illustrates this by reference, among other things, to the supposed political correctness movement, which he views with alarm, as is the fad among many campus intellectuals (see p. 55). Another is a search for an American identity in a nation of immigrants and minorities (Chapter 5). An effort at quality control is a third, over sloppy speech (rap songs), bad art (witness the debate over subsidization by the National Endowment of the Arts), and the like (Chapter 7). A fourth, related to the search for an American identity, is the local desire for a return to, or preservation of, the community, as in the case of Salem I have already referred to (Chapter 8). A fifth is the need to overcome an increasing sense of insecurity (Chapter 9). Something that Garry calls "The Last Option" (that is, something that will work a cure for a problem when nothing else will) is treated by him as a separate cause of censorship (Chapter 6), although it might as well have been viewed as a common denominator among them all.

An underlying assumption of all this is that censorship has generic causes that can be classified like species of moths or confusing spring and fall warblers. I do not know if this is true, but the assumption itself lends interest to a book that is otherwise simply a compendium of instances of the largely local censor at work.

BURKE MARSHALL
Yale Law School

The Craft of Justice: Politics and Work in Criminal Court Communities *by Roy B. Flemming, Peter F. Nardulli, and James Eisenstein. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992. 218 pp. $24.95.*

This book is the most recent and perhaps the final publication from a massive research project spanning three decades. This investigation of nine criminal courts in three states was grounded in quantitative information on 7,400 cases, extensive coded questionnaires of criminal court participants, and more than 300 less structured interviews.

Based primarily on the extensive interview data collected in the project, the book both complements and extends the previously published books and articles generated in this project. The interviews are artfully utilized to support and extend points made in the text, giving the reader a strong subjective sense of how the individuals who work in the courts see themselves, their colleagues, and their jobs. The authors, together with their interviewees, are highly successful in explaining how these courts work. Indeed, I believe this book presents as clear and comprehensive a picture of the complex interrelationships of political environment, internal organization and administration, and formal and informal procedures of felony trial courts as we are likely to see for many years. As such, it represents a fitting conclusion to a highly productive collegial research effort.

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The book's key strengths are its placement of court systems and actors in a broader political and organizational context than that found in previous accounts, and the richness of its portrayal of variation in individual and organizational behavior. The authors organized the book around each of the three key figures in the courthouse: the district attorney, the judge, and the defense attorney. They devote two chapters to each of these occupational groups and successfully identify both common and disparate aspects across the various courthouses. The reader is thus given not only a subjective feel for process and individual behavior, but also a broader sense of how courts differ along important dimensions.

The discussion of district attorneys, for example, begins with a simple typology of the political styles of district attorneys' offices. The DAs in the nine courts studied were divided among the categories of "insurgents," "reformers," and "conservators," based on their professional and political objectives, their orientation toward change and reform in the court system, and their place in existing power relationships in the courthouse and in the wider political system in the county. While this kind of rudimentary political analysis may not appear startling to students of state and local government, it begins to fill major gaps in our current understanding of the relationship of trial courts to the broader political system.

I was also impressed by the authors' focus on administrative issues that—while frequently evoking a yawn from social scientists—are critical to understanding both the individual motivations of judges and lawyers, and the basic case handling processes in trial courts. The chapters on district attorneys included a politically and organizationally informed discussion of the impact of vertical vs. horizontal prosecution. The chapters on judges included a useful discussion of docketing and case management procedures. Such arcane issues as whether a court adopts a master or an individual calendar for assigning cases to judges can have a powerful impact on the incentive systems of judges and other participants; on the informal relationships that develop between judges, assistant district attorneys, and defense attorneys; and on the conduct and results of plea bargaining. Indeed, how a court manages and schedules its cases can be more critical to an attorney than its sentencing or plea bargaining practices.

My only reservation regarding this fine book is more a semantic quibble than a major concern. The book's primary metaphor, as its title suggests, is "craft," a term that is used in a variety of contexts: "bench craft," the "political craft of chief prosecutors," "courtroom craft." I suppose one could also speak of the craft of plea bargaining, for example, or of the craft of judge shopping or perhaps even the craft of sentencing. At the end of the day, however, I am not entirely sure of the value added by this vaguely jargony importation to criminal justice research of a term typically applied to less esoteric occupational skills and talents. Why not simply discuss judging, or sentencing, or the political and organizational skills of chief prosecutors?

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Perhaps this problem is unavoidable. After all, the third book in a series that began with *The Contours of Justice* and *The Tenor of Justice* presumably had to maintain consistency in its title, and *The Craft of Justice* is certainly preferable to many plausible alternatives (*The Zen of Justice*?). But I did find the frequent and sometimes strained use of the term "craft" to be jarring, without adding appreciably to our understanding of the subject under discussion.

This minor picked nit should not obscure my overall judgment of this book. I found it to be an impressive, readable, and highly informative integration of a great deal of material into a book that should be valuable both in the classroom and as essential background for future research on criminal courts.

THOMAS CHURCH
State University of New York, Albany

Catholic Bishops in American Politics *by Timothy A. Byrnes. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1991. 189 pp. $29.95.*

This book is a well researched and engaging study of both the behind the scenes drama that plays out within the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the evolving role of the bishops as actors on the national political stage. Much of the discussion centers on the abortion issue, but Byrnes's purpose is much broader: "to fill a substantial gap in the literature on the American Catholic hierarchy, [to] suggest a more politics-centered approach to the study of religion and politics in general, and [to] contribute to the discussion of realignment theory and its applicability to contemporary American politics" (p. 8).

The opening chapters outline the history of the American Catholic hierarchy and set the stage for an analysis of recent debates among the bishops concerning an individual vs. a collective approach to setting their agenda and between a single-issue focus on abortion and a more complex, consistent ethic of life agenda. From Bishop John Carroll through at least the first decades of this century, the bishops focused primarily on local matters and were principally committed to demonstrating the patriotism of their immigrant parishioners. Catholic success in blending into the American melting pot meant new challenges for the bishops and a redefining of their role. At about the same time that John Kennedy proved a Catholic could be president, Vatican II encouraged bishops to act collegially and to address broader national issues. By the 1970s the National Conference of Catholic Bishops was well prepared to meet this challenge.

Byrnes argues that the bishops were always affected by politics and in turn responded to the political demands of their time, as for example in mustering support for America's various war efforts. A turning point came, however, in the presidential election of 1976, which Byrnes characterizes as "the key episode in the development of a relationship between the bishops' own publicly articulated policy agenda and the platforms and electoral strategies of the two major political

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parties. . . . All of the bishops' activities since 1976 can be characterized, to some extent, as responses to, or consequences of, the controversial events of that year" (p. 68). Although not all bishops have approved the change in strategy, since 1976, the bishops have chosen not to focus on abortion alone, but to set a broader, consistent ethic of life agenda. Presidential candidates have in turn chosen to identify themselves with only specific elements of the bishops' broad agenda.

The discussion becomes most fascinating when Byrnes turns to the intersection that occurred between the bishops and the conservative movement. The conservatives learned from the bishops' success in focusing national attention on abortion and "adopted the bishops' antiabortion agenda and tactics from 1976 and used them as tools in a major mobilization and coalition-building effort. By 1980, the bishops' right-to-life commitment and activities had been used to cloak a conservative political agenda in religious imagery and rhetoric" (p. 86).

Byrnes argues that the bishops' role in future elections will be shaped above all by the debates within the political parties themselves. He suggests that large numbers of immigrant Catholics from Latin America will pose a challenge to both bishops and political leaders and may lead the bishops to a renewed focus on the local level. This is an intriguing line of thought and one wishes that Byrnes had been a bit more daring in exploring it further. But Byrnes's book constitutes required reading for those who wish to understand how, in spite of the separation of church and state, politics and religion continue to intersect in setting the national agenda.

MARILYN J. HARRAN
Chapman University

Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy *by George F. Kennan. New York, Norton, 1993. 259 pp. $22.95.*

Since leaving the inner circles of power some forty years ago, Kennan has been one of the few outstanding public intellectuals in this country. Though he has remained a part of the Establishment, his relations with it have been marked by a certain awkwardness. Respected, even venerated, he has nevertheless been far too unpredictable and critical a figure to fit comfortably the mould of a so-called wise man. His political sensibilities in short have not been altogether sound by the ruling standards. Having to invent a place for himself in this often alienating American system has been his pivotal problem; unresolved, it has also been productive of a constant stream of interventions. This marginality or eccentricity is one reason for the fascination he continues to generate among younger scholars of public affairs. No less than four major studies of Kennan have appeared in the last few years (one by the reviewer). His present book is in part a response to those works.

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It is, however, a response of a peculiarly Kennanesque sort, for there are no polemics with anyone in particular. Puzzled, touched, and perhaps even inspired by these critiques, he seems to have sat down with pen and paper to restate what he thinks of life in general and the crucial issues of our time. He has always tended to proceed as though he were alone, sorting things out in dialogue with himself and conveying the result to some rather indistinct audience. What we get here is largely a reiteration of some of the salient themes and worries he has articulated with such elegance of style ever since the late 1940s.

He begins with a traditional, dualist account of the human being itself. Part animal, part soul, we are not perfectible. Having made that humbling realization, we are still obliged to do our best by tackling major problems with such personal resources as we may possess. Following this injunction, Kennan puts forth a sharply delineated panorama of his concerns: the dangers of egalitarianism and sameness; the ills of commercial culture, especially television and advertising; the corrosive effects on the social system of automotive transportation; the facile belief in growth; the absence of any cohesive and enlightened governmental system; the virtue of breaking up the unworkably big federal structure into a series of regions; the imperative to take care of problems at home and not fall into any expansive attempt to settle everything in the world; the subsequent need to maintain a vigorous but more moderately sized defense establishment; the need as well to continue existing alliance commitments with Japan and Europe in modified form but on the premise that the new situation calls for more basic change, especially in Europe. By way of novelty, he is more favorable to the UN and to the international pursuit of human rights than he used to be: less of a classical realist. Finally, Kennan also proposes an advisory Council of State, composed of individuals outside and above the myopic game of everyday politics, luminaries who would be in a position to formulate the national interest and suggest realistic, long-term policies.

The Council is an amplified version of the crucial Policy Planning Staff he headed in his State Department days after the war; but the proposal is, as Kennan very well knows, very much an ideal one. It serves in fact to fill an empty space, the absence of any visible force for change along the lines envisioned. His are essentially the ideas and inclinations of a communitarian conservative. It is not a position for which there is much of a social basis in the United States. Hence the diagnoses are unrelated to any sustained analysis of the existing configuration of political forces. There is little here about power structures and how they have changed in recent decades. To the widening gaps between rich and poor, globally as well as within the advanced industrial countries, he seems largely oblivious. The West, he assumes, is now some mass, middle class society.

He is indeed reluctant to face economic questions; they appear either as aspects of more urgent issues, such as advertising, or in the context of what government ought and ought not to be doing. There must, he says, be some limits to exploitation, some husbanding of our resources. Yet, beyond the abstract "government," he never asks who in fact might curb this exploitation, and how. He never really

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confronts the possibility that the market system itself might be the most relentless, effective standardizer of value imaginable, the most effective destroyer of community. He never asks whether the postmodern nightmare he fears is not in fact the cultural logic of late capitalism.

ANDERS STEPHANSON
Columbia University

China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition *by June Teufel Dreyer, New York, Paragon House, 1993. 448 pp. Paper, $22.95.*

This book is a text for a course on Chinese politics and possibly upper division courses in comparative politics. The book contains a chapter on Chinese tradition; four chapters on Chinese political history, covering roughly the period from 1840 to 1992; eight topical chapters; and a conclusion. The topical chapters discuss the economy, the legal system, the role of the military, education, quality of life issues, conformity and dissent, ethnic minorities, and foreign policy.

Texts presumably reflect the author's interests about the subject and the way the author teaches about the subject. Dreyer and I have quite different approaches to the study of Chinese politics, and I would not use her text in my course because of this. She ignores or underplays some topics I think deserve more attention. She puts more effort in some areas than I would. For example, her book contains almost nothing about China's open door policy, and the chapter on economics contains no statistics, fails to mention the critical third front policy, and is among the shortest of the topical chapters. State-society relations are not developed as fully as I would like, with the question of the existence of civil society not raised until the last five pages of the book. The chapter on conformity and dissent is subtitled the politics of the arts and journalism. But China's most famous dissidents in the last fifteen years have been neither artists nor journalists, but an electrician (Wei Jingsheng) and an astrophysicist (Fang Lizhi). The chapter on quality of life discusses health, demography, and pollution but does not discuss the status of women. Central-local relations also receive little attention, as does actual politics.

Reflecting some of her specialties, Dreyer provides strong chapters on the military and minorities, and many of the other chapters are good distillations of recent events. But the interpretations are standard; specialists will find little here to challenge them to rethink the way they approach their subject.

Some of the material is also quite dated and in cases simply wrong. Roderick MacFarquhar showed ten years ago that there was no conflict between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi on the Great Leap Forward; yet the author fails to cite MacFarquhar and fits the Great Leap into the old Mao-Liu two-line struggle model. In the chapter on Chinese foreign policy, units are identified by names they haven't held in ten years; and the People's Bank of China is incorrectly

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identified as having a foreign policy role. It is the Bank of China that is the "foreign" bank of the PRC. In the same chapter, the author largely ignores and does not cite A. Doak Barnett's work on the making of foreign policy in China, saying simply that foreign analysts know little about the foreign policy-making process.

I think the author misses some of the most fascinating aspects of Chinese politics. There is a tendency to emphasize China's shortcomings and downplay the successes of the regime. One example is the dismissing of China's longevity statistics by attributing this to the low fat diets and exercise that most Chinese engage in, not government policy. Of course, prior to 1949, Chinese (and most Third World peoples) had the same diet and plenty of physical labor. They did not live to be 70 years old, and most in the Third World still do not. To me some of the most interesting elements of Chinese politics revolve around the contradications between what seem to be a weakening central government but massive poverty eradication, further reductions in the birthrate, and the ability to actually keep economic reform going. A keener sense of the unique, conflicting, and contradictory aspects of the Chinese political system would have enlivened this book and challenged students more than they are now.

DAVID BACHMAN
University of Washington

Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity and Prime-Time TV *by Craig Allen. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 259 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $14.95.*

The popular consensus holds that telegenic John F. Kennedy was the first president to master and use television to communicate his persona and policies to the American people. Case in point: look what he did to Richard Nixon in the 1960 debates.

That case in point, Craig Allen suggests, came long after Dwight Eisenhower had quietly but thoroughly mastered the use of television as a medium for presenting the presidency to the electorate. Allen argues that Eisenhower was our first television-era president and that he owed his election and reelection to a shrewd recognition of TV's enormous power as a political tool.

In the public mind, of course, Eisenhower won the presidency because of his enduring popularity as commander of the Allied forces that liberated Europe in World War II. Obviously, that was the foundation of his success, but his invitation to become president of Columbia University surely ratified the presumption that he had learned more than military strategy and tactics at West Point. In or out of uniform, he was a political sophisticate, wise to the ways of bureaucracies and power structures and keenly tuned to the need for public support. He gravitated to people of power and influence; and when induced to

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run on the Republican ticket for president in 1952, he turned naturally to the power structure that could propel him into the White House—the American advertising community.

Historically, presidential candidates had cultivated the press, or at least acknowledged its importance, in running for office, but Eisenhower had abiding reservations about print reporters dating from his military days. The press could be unpredictable and certainly uncontrollable. However, Madison Avenue knew who was paying the bills, what was wanted, and how to tailor a message to a target audience. And in 1952 television was emerging from its diapers and growing rapidly into a loud and bumptious child attracting a large audience. In the 1952 campaign Eisenhower had what the ad world needed—a winning smile, a simple slogan, "I like Ike," and an opponent in Adlai Stevenson who never knew when to stop talking—even before the sound bite was invented—and who harbored an intellectual's disdain for hucksterism.

But TV had its downside, as Eisenhower discovered after his landslide reelection in 1956. It could spotlight failures or the triumphs of foes, as it did with the Soviet launch of Sputnik and the move to center stage of Nikita Khrushchev. Not even master handlers like James Hagerty and Eisenhower's personal TV coach, Robert Montgomery, could provide a gloss for these negatives.

In a meticulous recreation of the trail Eisenhower blazed through the new world of TV, Allen notes that there were a number of losers. Two stand out: The national political parties began to lose their control of the party's presidential choice to a process dominated by television. And the candidate who did not learn how to use the medium and project his personality on TV was an almost sure loser. Richard Nixon discovered that reality in 1960 against John Kennedy. He did not make the same mistake when he ran again in 1968, this time with expert TV handling.

As citizens, we all take television's role in the electoral process as a given, even as we vent our frustrations at its obvious shortcomings and biases. Allen's solid work on Eisenhower's role in the genesis of the giant that now casts such a long shadow over our politics is instructive—and sobering.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification *by A. James McAdams. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1993. 244 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $12.95.*

This book by a well known specialist on the former GDR brings a large number of interviews with East and West German officials to bear on the debate over the interpretation of forty years of inner German relations. The results are not always illuminating and at times are disappointing, which may well reflect the

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biases of the sources. Throughout the account there appears to be the underlying assumption that, at the fulcrum of East-West tensions, Konrad Adenauer and Walter Ulbricht—or their successors—had much choice in generating closer German-German cooperation or even a "German contribution to . . . reconciliation between the blocs," if only they had wanted to (p. 54). While Karl Kaiser in *Foreign Affairs* and others are congratulating Adenauer's "policy of strength" for anticipating the eventual collapse of the GDR, the author evidently considers the "confrontational policies" of German leaders (p. 56) a prime mover behind the conflict of the superpowers, and the "inter-German tensions" of that period a precedent of sorts for the unhappy contemporary relations between East and West Germans (pp. 208, 225). Ancillary to this view, moreover, is a rather benign view of Stalin's German policy and the assumption that the western allies were very serious about the pursuit of German reunification. No less controversial, in view of West German policies since 1951, is the suggestion that the Christian Democrats became promoters of European integration only after they had all but abandoned the goal of reunification.

Some of the author's interpretations of pro-GDR policies may also raise eyebrows. He hates the Hallstein Doctrine with a passion and is greatly taken with Ulbricht's expressed intent that the little GDR should take over the old FRG, a state nearly four times as large. Soviet conformity to détente policies in the 1960s and 1970s is rather overrated. On the other hand, he considers the German-German Basic Treaty the most important of all the *Ostpolitik* measures, evidently more so than even the Renunciation-of-Force Treaties between Bonn and Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague. Ulbricht's overthrow, he implies, was an internal affair and not a Soviet intervention. He relates without comment the ludicrous lengths to which the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was willing to go to please the—we now know—moribund Honecker regime in the 1980s and gives similar treatment to the suspicious horsetrading via Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski between Honecker and western figures like the late Franz Josef Strauss.

After such preliminaries, some readers may wonder how the author will reconcile all this with the actual occurrence of reunification, following the unexpected collapse of the Wall and the GDR system. But from this point on, the author hews more closely to consensus opinion and in fact raises some new perspectives for discussion. One of these is his strong focus on the pervasive elitism that not only caused East German leaders to ignore all portents of trouble but made West German party leaders similarly blind to the oppositional group life stirring in the last years of the GDR. The fall of the GDR, nevertheless, was not just due to this elitist myopia, but to the withdrawal of Soviet armed support in the midst of massive demonstrations for real democratic reforms and the dismantling of the Stasi secret police apparatus. It was this turn of events that made the 1989–1990 situation totally different from that before 1961. The author also does not tell us about the enormous sense of betrayal among the East Germans in 1989–1990 over how they had been lied to by the sybarites of Wandlitz, for example,

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about their bankrupt economy and polluted land. They were made to "waste forty years of their lives," as the slogan went.

There are some factual errors in this book, too. For instance, the data of the Rosa Luxemburg memorial demonstration is 1989, not 1988. The age of the German national question is two centuries, not just "decades" (p. 207). And Hans Modrow's "mild support" of December 1989; the polls gave him more than 90 percent in popularity. Neither is it true that the two unification treaties "were almost wholly formulated in Bonn" (p. 215) or that the 144 East German *Bundestag* members of October-November 1990 had no voting rights.

PETER H. MERKL
University of California, Santa Barbara

Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences *by Dijana Plestina. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1992. 223 pp. $42.00.*

Dijana Plestina sets herself an ambitious and important task: understanding the political dynamics behind regional economic policy in Communist Yugoslavia. Employing a combination of extensive interviews with policy makers and analysis of published data, Plestina builds up an argument that economic conflicts among Yugoslav regions provided the basis for ethnonationalist conflicts. Plestina's study consists of six chapters: an introduction, a conclusion, and chapters on each of the decades of Communist rule. (The 1940s are lumped in with the 1950s.) Plestina compares Yugoslavia's achievements in regional matters to its professed commitment to regional equality. She shows that, despite the early and loud emphasis of economic equality among regions by the Yugoslav Communists, the goal was not achieved.

Plestina blames the weakness of efforts to bring up the LDRs (less developed regions) in the 1950s on the persistence of the antifascist coalition. Those republics that contributed most to the Partisan effort—Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro—received disproportionate investment resources from the federally-run General Investment Fund, while those whose war record was more suspect, especially Croatia and Kosovo (then Kosovo-Metohija) in the 1960s were left out.

Plestina argues that in the 1960s the developed regions (Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina), using the threat of Serbian hegemony to gain LDR support, offered support for a development fund to finance investment in the LDRs in exchange for LDR support for market-oriented reforms and decentralization of the Federation. Yet, Plestina argues, these reforms ultimately did not guarantee the LDRs equality. While the resources of the Federal Fund were helpful to the LDRs, the growing marketization of the economy tended to fuel regional inequalities. Finally, in the 1980s the outbreak of the debt crisis in Yugoslavia led to the deemphasis of regional equality as external resources became scarcer.

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Plestina's evidence is illuminating, and much of her argument is convincing. However, several comments seem in order. First, Plestina argues that aid to the LDRs was in the interests of the country as a whole, and she rebuts the thesis that geopolitical danger in the 1950s precluded real efforts to deal with the regional issue. However, she fails to adequately stress the time dimension: much of the needed investment in the LDRs at that time was in infrastructure; the return would be seen only over a rather long time horizon. Thus, the position taken by Yugoslav planners of the time, who nervously awaited Stalin's invasion and felt compelled to speed up economic growth in the short term, does not seem so unreasonable.

Second, Plestina's argument that ethnonationalism grew out of economic conflict, rather than the reverse, is overly simple. Economic conflict may have been the only acceptable form for ethnonationalism to take; when ethnonationalism overspilled economic issues, as in the Croatian Spring, it was dealt with by repression.

Third, Plestina unintentially minimizes the efforts made by Yugoslavia to help the LDRs. The importance of federal transfers can be seen in the fact that nearly half the total investment in Kosovo in the 1980s came directly from the Federal Fund. My calculations show that informal subsidies were even larger than direct federal transfers! The problem here is less the amount of effort than the amount of effect per unit of effort. Yugoslav regional policy was simply not efficient.

Fourth, Plestina's argument that the DRs should have helped the LDRs for the benefit of the country as a whole, which I sympathize with, and her criticism of what she calls economic regionalism reflects a Yugoslav, rather than a Croatian, Serbian, or Macedonian perspective. Few Yugoslavs, especially after the 1960s, however, really thought in Yugoslav terms.

Despite these comments, this is a very useful and insightful study that should be of interest to specialists on Communist Yugoslavia and provide background to our understanding of the tragic wars in ex-Yugoslavia.

EVAN KRAFT
Salisbury State University

Media Portrayals of Terrorism: Functions and Meaning of News Coverage *by Robert G. Picard. Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1993. 147 pp. Paper, $25.95.*

Terrorist violence captures considerable attention in the headlines, among policy makers, and in classrooms. Far too often, however, analysts and observers treat it superficially: assertions posited as facts often are no more than broad generalizations and conjecture. The relationship between terrorism and the media is one of the key issues in understanding terrorism. In this short book, Picard provides an important exploration and a rigorous examination of common as-

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sumptions and facile judgments about terrorism and the media. No less important, he suggests areas for further research by applying communications theories to terrorist violence.

A basic component of the accepted wisdom on terrorism is that it could not exist without publicity. A corollary to that, of course, is the idea that limiting (or eliminating) media coverage of terrorist attacks is a legitimate means of combatting the phenomenon. To control violence in Northern Ireland, Great Britain in 1974 passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which requires journalists to notify authorities before meeting with a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), to report any unplanned contacts, and to make all materials available to authorities for inspection. Picard devotes considerable attention throughout the book to exposing the flaws in this seemingly logical argument. If terrorism cannot exist without publicity, Picard asks, how can one explain the existence of terrorist violence for millennia? Picard takes into account an often overlooked level of communication—that among the terrorists themselves. Even in the absence of general publicity, communication of the event plays an important role in terms of a group's cohesion and morale. The communication can also be directed to other terrorist groups or to potential state sponsors. Further, Picard demonstrates that most terrorist violence is never even reported in the media—only 2–3 percent of all acts of nonstate terrorism and even less where state terrorism is concerned. Media coverage is almost exclusively limited to sensational incidents with large numbers of casualties. The persistence of terrorist violence given the absence of significant media coverage cannot be explained by the conventional approach.

Discussions of terrorism often get bogged down with the problem of arriving at a satisfactory definition. Picard dispenses with the usual polemics by defining terrorism as "violence or threat of violence, designed to induce fear, as a strategy for achieving some goal" (p. 4). Picard contends that the use (or nonuse) of the word is in itself a means of political communication. He devotes one chapter to the means by which media coverage imparts meaning to terrorist attacks, from selective coverage to the influence of the presentation format. His analysis shows that media coverage is overwhelmingly oriented to the events themselves and government responses, not the political context in which they take place. He argues persuasively that the relationship between the media and the government, far from being adversarial, is in the majority of cases characterized by media support for whatever stance the government has taken.

One important contribution of this book is to suggest further research. Picard asserts that communications theories—analyses of how information is acquired and conveyed, and how meaning is attached—can be fruitfully applied to the study of terrorism. Organizational communication and cognitive approaches stressing the role of communications at the interpersonal and mass levels in developing attitudes have been largely ignored in the scholarly literature. This book's main shortcoming is its brevity; it poses far more unanswered questions than it examines in depth. At the same time, it has great heuristic value for

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students of journalism and political science, and makes an important contribution to the scholarship of both fields.

SANYA POPOVIĆ
Barnard College

Letting the People Decide: The Dynamics of a Canadian Election *by Richard Johnston, André Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crête. Montreal and Stanford, McGill-Queen's and Stanford University Press, 1992. 316 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $12.95.*

Canadian political science differs a good deal from that of the United States. For instance, the United States has the invaluable continuing series of the American National Election Studies, while Canada has separate surveys of particular elections, prepared independently by different teams of political scientists focusing on their specific research interests. The Canadian situation is about to change somewhat, however; surveys of the 1992 referendum and the 1993 election are being prepared by a group of scholars including most of those responsible for the 1988 Canadian National Election Study and for the volume under review.

The central thesis of *Letting the People Decide* is that issues, chosen mainly by political parties, play a major role in election outcomes. This argument is not as obvious as it might seem; in the substantial crossnational accumulation of studies of election outcomes, by no means all agree that issues are crucial. Central to the case is a careful analysis of the 1988 federal election campaign in Canada, which did indeed focus on one issue, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In addition, a substantial historical section outlines three successive "party systems" of mobilization of the changing Canadian electorate around selected issues.

The authors of this study used and will apparently use again "a design that has, to our knowledge, never been tried before in [studying a] general election: a rolling cross-section" (p. 8). Each day of the campaign, about eighty telephone interviews were collected from a carefully prepared random sample of Canadians, generating a large number of "events" (responses) that could be logged to trace the evolution of opinion. This survey material was supplemented by information on published polls, news, and advertising, and followed up by a final postelection telephone survey. (A mail-in survey was also completed but not used for the book.)

Sometimes this mode of analysis works; sometimes it does not. There seem to have been some technical problems when the procedures concealed happenings that could be glimpsed in the raw data or when the results were ambiguous. We can only applaud candor about such occurrences, although this unusual openness is also a somewhat troublesome reminder of how large a role plausibility plays in interpretation of quantitative data. That said, the arguments about the television

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debates and the media are fully persuasive and the conclusions drawn about the impact of campaign themes warrant attention.

This book is written clearly and on the whole nontechnically. But for an analysis that centers on issues and, secondarily, on leaders, it is disappointingly unspecific. The technique that is used seems to direct attention away from the lived experience of the campaign. For example, the third party advertisers that played a major role in the campaign remain anonymous, even invisible. Among these was Canada's largest national women's organization, making its first serious intervention into campaign politics. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), coordinator of over 400 women's groups, developed a plausible, if ultimately uninfluential statement of the prospective costs to women of the FTA. If issues matter, surely we need to learn about the nature and source of perspectives on them.

Four years later NAC appeared conspicuously and more effectively among the opponents of the constitutional agreement signed at Charlottetown. It will be splendid if the follow-ups of this book—the analyses of the referendum of 1992 and the election of 1993—can find a way to report some of the details of the campaigns—including the presence of women and women's groups among the electorate.

NAOMI BLACK
York University

The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State *by Mark Juergensmayer. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993. 292 pp. $25.00.*

Leaving aside the misleadingly sensationalist title and the apocalyptic vision of a global confrontation between the secular West and the religious rest, a vision which the author's own differentiating analysis tends to undermine, this is a compelling study of the recent emergence of various forms of religious movements and of the challenges they are posing to modern secular conceptions of the political order.

The main thesis of the book—the rise of religious nationalism as a hostile alternative to western secular nationalism—is substantiated by empirical studies of religious mobilization and revolts in the Middle East, in South Asia, and in the formerly Marxist states of Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Given the global sweep and the comprehensive breadth of the comparative analysis, the empirical studies have almost per force the character of summary reviews of contemporary trends.

The chapter on South Asia, the author's area of expertise, offers a nuanced and penetrating analysis of the interrelated conflictive dynamics between secular, Hindu, and Sikh nationalisms in India and between secular, Sinhalese Buddhist, and Tamil Hindu nationalism in Sri Lanka. The chapter on the Middle East

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retells concisely the better known story of the conflicts between secular and religious nationalism in Iran, Egypt, Israel, and Palestine. Less convincing is the analysis of religious nationalism in the formerly Marxist states of the Soviet system. The story of the revival of Buddhism in Mongolia occupies a prominent place but is questionably presented as "paradigmatic of what is occurring throughout the former Soviet Union and its client states" (p. 115). The discussion of Islamic nationalism in the Central Asian republics is too brief and undifferentiating. The discussions of Polish Catholicism and of the denominational conflicts in Western Ukraine are even more perfunctory and less supportive of the overall thesis of the book. In Ukraine, the combination of advanced societal secularization and a denominational religious structure much more pluralistic and byzantine than the one presented in the book makes any striving for a religious state unlikely and certainly doomed to failure. In Poland, it was not the collision but rather the collusion between Polish Catholicism and secular nationalism against Soviet imperialism and the secularist Marxist state that facilitated the emergence of a secular and democratic Polish state.

Much of the analysis throughout the book is based on the construction of a seemingly irreconcilable conflict between religious and secular world views, the conflation of the secular state with secular nationalism and public religions with religious nationalism and the religious state. But such an analysis is put into question by the recent role of religion, particularly the Catholic Church, in the demise of authoritarian regimes and in the consolidation of modern secular states from Spain to the Philippines and from Poland to Brazil.

The book offers a complex and convincing explanation of the emergence of religious nationalism in the nonwestern world as a response to the conjunction of crises of legitimation of the secular state and of secular nationalism at home, together with a global legitimation crisis of western models of modernization within the hegemonic context of a world system of nation-states. But unwittingly, such an analysis tends to treat political regimes as diverse as neutral liberal democratic states, militantly secularist confessional Marxist states, caesaropapist absolutist modernizing monarchies, and oligarchic military dictatorships as so many versions of the secular state and of secular nationalism. Conversely, the most diverse religious reactions to such different types of political order appear as so many forms of religious nationalism. Secular nationalism and religious nationalism are then constructed as mutually hostile alternative "ideologies of order" not unlike the traditional juxtaposition of communitarian *Gemeinschaft* (community) and individualist *Gesellschaft* (society) now transposed to the level of intercivilizational conflict between the West and the other.

All in all, however, the book offers a provocative thesis that in its ambitiously global empirical scope and its sweeping generalizations challenges some of the most cherished assumptions about universal trends of secularization and modernization that the social sciences have inherited from the Enlightenment.

José Casanova
New School for Social Research

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

American Political Scientists *edited by Glenn H. Utter and Charles Lockhart. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 374 pp. $85.00.*

Congress A to Z: A Ready Reference Encyclopedia, vol. 1, 2nd ed. *edited by David R. Tarr. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 547 pp. $110.00.*

CQ's State Fact Finder: Rankings Across America *by Victoria Van Son. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 454 pp. Cloth, $69.95; paper, $39.95.*

Hunger 1994: Transforming the Politics of Hunger *edited by Marc J. Cohen. Silver Spring, MD, Bread for the World Institute, 1993. 189 pp. Paper, $14.95.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1991–1992 *edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1993. 728 pp. $199.50.*

Politics in America: The 103rd Congress, 1994 *edited by Phil Duncan. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 1747 pp. Paper, $49.95.*

SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament *by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 834 pp. $75.00.*

State Government: CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities 1993–94 *edited by Thad L. Beyle. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 234 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, vol. 2 *edited by Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993. 433 pp. $49.95.*

The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies, 1789–1993 *edited by Clare Cushman. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993. 575 pp. Paper, $23.95.*

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



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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
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EDITED BY DEMETRIOS CARALEY
SPECIAL INTRODUCTION BY BILL GREEN

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